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Abstract
International commercial arbitration is recognised as the most widely 
accepted form of dispute resolution in international trade in both the Middle 
East and the West. But in the Middle East divergent, competing rationalities 
are constantly close to the surface and repeatedly collide in arbitration cases 
of international commercial disputes. The Islamic Middle East focus is on 
maintaining tradition and safeguarding relationships, features that both stand 
at the heart of the dispute resolution culture of the region. By contrast, in the 
West, international commercial arbitration is adversarial and individualistic, 
following the neo-classical model of law. In recent times when the western 
model has been superimposed on this deeply entrenched dispute resolution 
culture, hostility and dissatisfaction have resulted. In addition, instances of 
perceived or actual Western ignorance and bias against Shari ’ah have led to 
even more resentment on the part of the Arab players. Both Islamic law and 
tribal customs impose a duty of reconciliation on any intervener in a dispute. 
This third party must attempt to help the disputing parties reach a settlement 
that is just and fair. This clash of cultures is explored in detail in this thesis 
which uses Jordan as the case study. Jordan has a rich and embedded tribal 
history and traditions, which remain very much a part of contemporary 
society. The tribes of Jordan are critical stakeholders of the state and their 
customs are presented as key pillars of the identity of a Jordanian. 
Reconciliation is a positive feature of Middle Eastern dispute resolution 
dimensions of which this thesis suggests could be incorporated in the 
international commercial arbitration model, making it more representative of, 
and responsive to, a wider variety of cultural traditions.
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Chapter One
Introduction
‘Dispute processes are in large part a reflection of the culture in which 
they are embedded; they are not an autonomous system that is 
predominately the product of insulated specialists and experts.’
Oscar Chase, Law, Culture and Ritual (2005)
Divergent rationalities underpin dispute processes in the West and the traditional 
Middle East. The culture of international commercial arbitration is individualistic 
and adversarial whereas the Islamic/Arab culture remains based on traditional 
solidarity and aims to maintain relations as a form of negotiated order. In looking at 
arbitration in the Arab world and the West, I explore the distinctive rationalities that 
these different contexts involve.
The western model of arbitration is situated firmly in a neo-classic framework, 
whereas the Middle Eastern is more kin-based with a strong Islamic dimension. An 
Arabic party, for example, needs to locate the person that they are dealing with 
within an appropriate social space, thus identifying their family and tribe before any 
business discussions can take place. The purpose of this “is to ensure the empathetic 
anchoring which is essential for good business relations”1. In the West, individuals 
are less concerned with social rank and more interested in personal value and 
professional success. The ‘anchoring’ stage that is so important to an Arabic party is 
not part of western cultural baggage.
Disputes are found everywhere in the social world “both within groups and between 
them” . Disputes are unavoidable and dispute resolution is an instinctive function of 
society itself. In his study of the interaction between law, the courts and society,
1 N. Antaki, “Cultural Diversity and ADR Practices in the World” in Goldsmith, Ingen-Housz and 
Pointon (eds.), ADR in Business: Practice and Issues Across Countries and Cultures (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006), 265
2 S. Roberts, Order and Dispute: An Introduction to Legal Anthropology, (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 
1979), 45
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Shapiro3 suggests that “all cultures and societies possess multiple avenues for 
conflict resolution for individuals who cannot settle their disputes themselves”4. At 
the root of these mechanisms is the triad, i.e. two disputants and a third party who is 
to help resolve the dispute. The intersection of two factors, the consent of the 
disputants as to the third party, as well as to the norms used by their triad, and the 
mediated solution to the dispute, place those avenues on a continuum. As we move 
along this continuum, from mediation to arbitration and, finally, to adjudication, the 
solutions evolve from being a consensual arrangement accepted by both parties to 
being an oppositional decision imposed by a third party independent of the explicit 
consent of either party.5
Therefore, in every society, past and present, institutions and mechanisms for dealing 
with disputes exist and, these are culturally linked to their context.6 They reflect the 
parties’ backgrounds and cultures. In a world that has become a ‘village’, the most 
basic commercial contracts may cross borders and be affected by plural cultural 
sensitivities. Even the perception of conflict, as well as the way it is handled, is very 
different from culture to culture.
For the purposes of this thesis, I will focus on commercial arbitration in Jordan. 
Jordan was chosen because it is a burgeoning economy and because of this, many 
commercial disputes have an international dimension. This inevitably leads to a clash 
between cultures when different rationalities (representing both local processes and 
international commerce) come into contact with each other. Two arbitration cases 
that took place in Amman illustrate the deeply contrasting pictures of dispute 
resolution in the West and the Middle East.
1.1 Two Arbitration Cases
3 M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1984)
4 ibid 1
5 ibid 1-5
6 O.G. Chase, Law, Culture and Ritual: Disputing Systems in Cross-Cultural Context, (New York: 
University Press, 2005)
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The following two arbitration cases are practical examples of both international and 
local arbitration in Jordan. They give the reader a flavour of what arbitration looks 
like in reality, the importance of the respective players, the culture and the 
framework that disputes must be resolved within. The methodology of this research 
is ethnographic and thus, a snapshot of the ‘village’ where I conducted my fieldwork 
sets the scene for the rest of the thesis. The first arbitration is truly international; a 
Spanish claimant with English lawyers who employed Jordanian representatives, a 
Jordanian defendant with Jordanian lawyers and three Jordanian arbitrators. The 
second is local with the panel, the lawyers and the parties all Jordanian. These 
variables result in striking differences in approach.
1.1.1 An international Dispute
The case was an international construction arbitration between a Jordanian 
University (the defendant) and a Spanish Contractor (the claimant). The contract was 
to build and equip a teaching hospital in Jordan including the supply of all the 
medical equipment, worth $500 million. The employer’s lawyers were a Jordanian 
firm. The contractor’s lawyers were an English firm with Jordanian agents. The place 
of arbitration was Amman, Jordan. The language of arbitration was Arabic and 
English. The arbitrators were three Jordanian engineers with different specializations. 
The claimant was the contractor with a $200 million claim. This firm alleged that the 
employer’s engineer’s instructions were inadequate and the workshop plans 
insufficient and most of the designs supplied were either incomplete or out of date. 
The employer had a counterclaim of $300 million for breach of obligations on the 
part of the contractor and the supply of sub-standard medical equipment, as well as a 
delay in completion of 1 year.
All pleadings were in writing and in Arabic. The witnesses had a choice of giving 
their evidence either in Arabic or English. There was a clerk who handwrote a record 
of all the testimonies, then these records were typed up. Most of the work done with 
regards to the contractor’s claim was done by a quantity surveyor.
The two sides agreed that they would not interrupt the examination, cross­
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examination and re-examination of witnesses with objections. The questions asked 
by the Jordanian employer’s lawyer were long winded and at times sounded like 
pleadings. The arbitrators did not step in and the other side could not object. For two 
days there were no questions relating to the dispute. At some stages, witnesses were 
asked to read from documents or try to remember dates that were clearly stated in 
documents and were undisputed. Most of the Spanish contractor’s witnesses had 
been flown in from abroad. The relationship between the Jordanian lawyer and the 
tribunal was friendly and they did not stop him from doing what he wanted. There 
was a clear transformation in attitudes between tthe tribunal and the Jordanian lawyer 
when the tribunal interrupted or attempted to take some control of the proceedings. 
However, the friendly manner, like ‘an old boys club’, returned after these breaks.
The Jordanian agents were represented by a wo»man lawyer. She was trained by and 
worked for a number of years with the leading lawyer for the defendant. On certain 
days her boss attended and then the whole dynamic of the hearings changed. He 
would interrupt and object to the style of the Jordanian lawyer. This ended up in a 
‘screaming match’ and the arbitrators suggested talking to the two men in a separate 
room to calm matters down and to get them to shake hands. The ensuing calm was 
however only temporarily.
There were pleadings exchanged by both sides regarding the way things were being 
conducted at the previous hearings. After intense discussion, matters regarding the 
way the arbitration would be conducted were agreed and the arbitrators seemed to be 
playing a more active role by interrupting and trying to keep the questions asked by 
the hospital’s lawyer relevant.
The contractor’s lawyers told me that they were consciously trying not cause too 
much of a fuss as this may have risked antagonizing the tribunal or making the 
lawyer for the employer “more bitter”. However, the fact that the cross-examination 
was not completed within the agreed time limits was causing the contractor many 
problems in producing the witnesses for examination in Amman.
At some point, the lawyer for the employer asked the witness to read the contents of 
site instructions. One of the arbitrators intervened and told the lawyer that
12
“documents speak for themselves”, but this was not accepted immediately. The 
employer’s lawyer argued that he could ask the witness anything he liked, as the 
contractor’s lawyers had done when examining their witnesses. He pointed out that 
the tribunal could not make up a rule in the middle of witness evidence.
While cross examining the witness in English, on a number of occasions the lawyer 
for the employer called the witness a liar in Arabic. At certain points, the lawyer 
would outline in Arabic what each set of questions was aiming to achieve. He sat 
closest to the tribunal and a mere whisper from him was heard by them.
At one point the lawyer for the employer started shouting at a witness and was very 
aggressive towards him. The witnesses complained to the tribunal asking them to 
instruct the lawyer to address him as politely as he was addressing everyone else. 
One of the arbitrators replied that he should carry on being a polite witness as this 
was the correct manner. Then, the tribunal ordered a break and while nothing formal 
was said to the lawyer, the tribunal may have said something informally to the 
employer’s lawyer because when we returned from the break he was questioning the 
witness calmly, almost whispering. He looked like he was making a special effort to 
be calm.
The lawyer kept whispering under his breath, just loud enough for the tribunal to 
hear; that the witness was not answering the questions. Even though the tribunal 
requested the lawyer not ask the witness to read from the documents, as this was 
unnecessary, the lawyer ignored them. It seemed to be a request, not a direction.
When the contractor’s English lawyers examined the witness their approach was very 
calm and formal both towards the witness and the tribunal.
1.1.2 Commentary
I spoke to one of the arbitrators in private and he told me that the problem with 
lawyers is that they do not change their attitudes from court to arbitration. They try to 
highlight the strong points in their case through the witnesses, even though they are
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clear from the documents. In the court, the judge has a huge workload and cannot 
spend the time reading and grasping all the papers, unlike an arbitrator who reads the 
documents more than once. Thus, there is no need at all to go through the documents. 
No matter what a witness says, the documents are taken to be the true evidence. 
Therefore, all the questions that the employer’s lawyer asked about documentary 
content and information arising from this were a complete waste of time and money, 
but the arbitrator said, the lawyer needed to show his client that he had worked hard 
and read all the papers.
The lawyer from the English firm representing the Spanish contractor advocated 
mediation to me and told me a story about the American mediator Michael Shane. He 
mediated a dispute regarding one of the bridges in Hong Kong. The claim was for 
$800 million. The Hong Kong government settled and paid the clamant $270 million 
and both parties felt that they had each won. From the start Michael Shane, told both 
parties “to get real” on certain matters. He used confidential negotiations with each 
party to a maximum and never disclosed what he said to the other party in reality. 
The contractor was concerned about losing the claim, due to the fact that they did not 
comply with some strict notice requirements included in the contract. Also, the 
employer was concerned that the case of the contractor relating to unfair terms would 
be successful. Michael Shane picked on both parties’ weaknesses and this led to 
effective negotiations and the settlement of the dispute.
The quantity surveyor in this case told me that Dispute Adjudication Boards (DAB) 
appointed at the start of the contract had been useful in practice, especially as the 
characters on the board were strong and professional. They had conducted regular 
visits and dealt with isolated matters as they arose. The board’s members had to get 
familiar with the characters and the project, which would then equip them to deal 
with matters as they arose. A complex project which had a lot of tunneling work and 
ground issues had found the expertise of the DAB helpful in keeping matters running 
smoothly. The board made decisions on many matters, such as whether a change 
could be considered a variation or not.
The arbitration ended about six months after I left. The employer’s lawyer 
discovered that the Spanish company had merged into a new entity before the
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arbitration started. The new entity had no right to sue the University as it was not 
recognized as its legal successor. The authority of the Jordanian lawyers was taken 
from the regional office, not the branch office that had undertaken the project. The 
English solicitors thus did not have proper authority to act on behalf of the 
contractor. At the start of the arbitration, the claimant did not exist as a legal entity. 
Therefore, the case was dismissed by the arbitrators for lack of jurisdiction.
I interviewed the two lawyers who represented the University. One of them, a young 
lawyer who had completed a PhD from Kings College London, explained “the reason 
for the hostility was due to the fact that the opponents were not on good terms”. He 
said; “Usually arbitration sessions are much nicer. This arbitration was a “bone 
breaking” matter. After all, it was the largest arbitration in the history of Jordan. He 
felt the lack of lawyers on the tribunal panel led to a lack of control of the hearings. 
“There were legal arguments that were made by the two sides that I felt the tribunal 
did not fully understand”. Even though the three arbitrators had a lot of arbitration 
experience, they could not control the sensitivities between the two parties and just 
stayed out of it so they were not accused of any bias.”
I was told by the more experienced Jordanian lawyer for the University that “the 
Spanish government was pressuring the Jordanian government, claiming that the 
award was wrong and it should never have been allowed. An application was 
submitted to court to set aside the award but it was refused. Recently, I received a 
letter from the Spanish embassy requesting that we negotiate some sort of 
settlement.”
I informally saw the local lawyer for the Spanish company and asked him about the 
case, he was very angry and said that they planned to start a new arbitration. As far 
as I know this has not happened yet.
1.1.3 A Local Arbitration
This involved arbitration between a publicly owned company and a Jordanian 
contractor over a major construction project. There were three arbitrators; two
lawyers and one engineer. The chairman was noticeably younger than the other two 
arbitrators and the lawyers for both sides, but he had a PhD. This arbitration related 
to a dam that had been constructed by the claimant, a Jordanian construction 
company. The defendant was a local government agency. The dam had collapsed 
almost immediately after construction. The claimant alleged that the defendant did 
not pay the final payment of 450,000 JD and also stated that the reason for the 
collapse of the dam was the ground conditions that the defendant were aware of, but 
did not inform the contractor about. The defendant claimed that the dam was badly 
constructed and that it was the claimant’s duty to examine the ground conditions. 
Thus, the defendant claimed damages for the collapsed dam.
One of the two lawyer arbitrators was very active in asking questions of the 
witnesses and wanted to make sure that the record of testimonies was clear. The 
other engineer arbitrator wanted to ensure that the other arbitrators grasped the 
technical details of the dispute. This was done while the witnesses were being 
examined, which caused some problems of procedure and sometimes a lack of 
clarity. The arbitration panel believed that it was important to have clear statements 
on record and thus on some occasions asked the witnesses to repeat their answers a 
number of times.
One of the parties’ lawyers wanted to exhibit a document, the other side’s lawyer 
said in a friendly fashion that he had no right, but that there was no objection. The 
other side then said that they did have a right, which resulted in an argument. As a 
result, the side who originally had not objected then decided to object on record out 
of spite. One of the arbitrators then intervened to calm everyone down and the 
document was exhibited and no objection was recorded.
Usually, a discussion would evolve between the arbitrators and the witnesses. I was 
told by one of the arbitrators that this was the way arbitration should be conducted 
taking advantage of its informal nature. Another arbitrator believed that this was a 
sign of the lack of experience of some of the arbitrators during witness examination. 
The arbitrators asked the parties to arrange a site survey. They just wanted to look 
around and see what they were deciding on.
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Because this panel had two lawyers and one engineer, the hearing seemed to be much 
calmer with more cooperation between the panel members compared to many 
arbitrations were the panel consists of three lawyers. There seemed to be more team 
work. The personality of the arbitrators reflected considerably on the mood of the 
hearings. It was a clear advantage having an arbitrator who is an engineer and an 
expert in the field who could specify exactly what he wanted from the technical 
witnesses using his knowledge to the fullest. Therefore, the engineer arbitrator was 
very active when the contractor was being examined.
The public company (defendant) was awarded considerable damages but the 
contractor applied to set the award aside and that is still ongoing.
i|c ♦  *  g|c $  $  $  $  $  $  $
The differences between the two arbitrations are not restricted to procedures and 
nationalities alone, they felt different when I observed them. The input of the 
arbitrators in the local arbitration was absent in the international arbitration. In the 
international arbitration, the arbitrators were reserved in their actions and comments. 
Whereas in the local arbitration, the arbitrators were involved ‘in the thick of the 
action’; they asked questions, directed the hearings and resolved any conflict arising 
between the parties’ counsels. The social prestige and respect of the arbitrators and 
the lawyers themselves played a vital role in keeping order in the hearings of the 
local dispute. The social stature of the Jordanian players in the international 
arbitration was not used as part of the techniques of the running of the hearings. It 
was reserved to unofficial comments and discussions in the breaks.
Many interviewees insisted that it is essential to have a lawyer on the panel. These 
contrasting arbitration cases seem to support this view. The presence of an 
experienced lawyer as an arbitrator of a similar age to the parties’ representatives 
meant that matters never ‘got out of hands’. Whereas, in the international arbitration, 
the panel suffered in some way from a lack of legal expertise. It sometimes led to the 
arbitrators falling hostage to the defendant’s lawyer. Also, the claimant having a
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female lawyer excluded her from the ‘boys’ discussions’ in the breaks. The rest of 
the claimant’s team were excluded because they were British and therefore, did not 
speak Arabic. Everyone was polite, but not engaging.
In summary, the main difference between the international arbitration and the local 
arbitration was that the international hearings were very adversarial with no co­
operation between the players, whereas the local arbitration seemed to be much more 
collaborative. It is noteworthy, that each arbitration is different and these differences 
are in part a reflection of the personalities and perceptions of the players.
The social stature of players in Jordan is important and this will be explained in 
detail in part two of the thesis. Local arbitrations in Jordan are akin to the traditional 
arbitrations that have been conducted along tribal and Islamic lines for many 
centuries and these will be explored in the thesis in great detail. International 
arbitration in Amman is imported from the perceived norms of arbitration as 
formulated by the West and, thus, its workings are not as smooth and effective as 
seen in the local arbitration.
1.2 Thesis Outline
The first part of this thesis explains how arbitration culture has developed in the 
western world as a result of disenchantment with court-based adjudication. In part 
two, we see this culture superimposed on a deep, existing structure in the Middle 
East, which causes a clash between the Western and Eastern norms of dispute 
resolution is specifically played out particularly in chapter four. This chapter comes 
after chapter three on dispute resolution in Islamic law. The two great streams 
underlying contemporary arbitration are examined further within one jurisdiction in 
parts three and four. We begin our journey in part three describing the deeply 
embedded tribal structure and justice system that has become part of the Jordanian 
state, in order to draw a picture of the landscape of the traditions and culture. Then, 
the clash of the two Nationalities in Jordan is analysed within chapters six and seven 
which describe the westernisation of arbitration in a way that ignores and even in 
some instances offends the deeply rooted reconciliatory approach to dispute
resolution. The interviews with the Jordanian arbitrators provide the native voice 
throughout the thesis. In each chapter of the thesis, there is a specific battle of 
rationalities that takes place in order to produce the final picture of international 
commercial arbitration in the Middle East, and specifically in Jordan.
This thesis will not have a traditional literature review as it deals with many areas of 
writing. When it was necessary to outline the literature in order to help with the 
contextualisation or in the form of background, I did so within the required parts. For 
example, chapter two have a literature review of international commercial arbitration 
and chapter seven describes the range of views and writing with regards to wasta 
which provide the literature review for these two areas.
1.3 The Growth of International Commercial Arbitration
‘There is [now] clear evidence of something of a world movement... 
towards international arbitration.’
, n
Sir Michael Kerr, Lord Justice of Appeal
Over the last 100 years, international commercial disputes across the western world 
have almost abandoned the neoclassical model of court based dispute resolution in 
favour of arbitration. The courts’ role in resolving international trade disputes, 
usually arises “where the parties have failed to make an express choice of forum in 
their contract”8, thus they head to court by default. The reason for this shift is not just 
to improve speed or reduce costs, as it is often emphasised at arbitration conferences, 
but rather that corporations and government entities that are engaged in international 
trade are not willing to litigate in the other party’s home court. As a result, 
“arbitration is the only game in town”9. Hunter explains that the advantages of speed 
and cost only exist in “domestic arbitration before a sole arbitrator and even then
7 Lord Justice Kerr, preface to Craig, Park and Paulsson, International Chamber o f Commerce 
Arbitration (Paris: I.C.C. Publishing, 1990), xii
8 M. Hunter, “International Commercial Dispute Resolution: The Challenge of the Twenty-first 
Century” , Arbitration International, Vol. 16 No. 4 (2000), 379, 380
9 V.V. Veeder, “The Global Counsel Top 10 Arbitration Specialist” (Global Counsel, June 2002) at 
www.practicallaw.com/global
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only in specialised fields.”10 It is also important to remember that one of the most 
positive features of arbitration in the international context is that arbitral awards 
through the New York Convention11 enjoy much greater global recognition than the 
judgments of national courts.
Consequently, there is no doubt that arbitration is the chosen dispute resolution 
process in international trade and this trend has formed certain norms that are 
recognised among arbitration practitioners. This model of international arbitration is 
perceived by many non-westerners as a false western panacea, imposed from the 
outside and hence insensitive to indigenous culture and needs. In the Middle East, the 
model caused great hostility and tension in the 1950s and 1960s and in some way, 
this resentment has not completely disappeared. Instead it has been redirected against 
major arbitration players, rather than directly against the process itself. The main 
reason for this uneasiness appears to be the ignorance and lack of understanding of 
many western arbitrators as to the longstanding Islamic and tribal dispute resolutions 
which exist in the Middle East. To help address this issue, the international 
arbitration players must acknowledge these deep rooted local traditions, of which 
arbitration always formed a part.
1.4 Arbitration in Jordan
‘The momentum for Arbitration in Jordan is self perpetuating.’
Interview with Jordanian lawyer 
(May 2004)
The Islamic Middle East has not fully embraced what might euphemistically be
19referred to as a “modem” arbitral system. The lawyer-scholar must accept and 
internalize the fact that history and religion are the keys to understanding commercial 
arbitration in this part of the world. Islamic law pervades the commercial world, as 
well as a Muslim’s way of life. Also, Islam has always been a religion of trade and of
10 n 8 above
11 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
12 A.J. Gemmell, “Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East”, 5 Santa Clara Journal o f 
International law (2006), 169
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world traders.13 In the Pre-Islamic Arab community, negotiations tended to be the 
most relied upon method of dispute resolution.14 If the parties failed to resolve their 
differences, a hakam (an arbitrator) was appointed. A hakam could be any male 
possessing high personal qualities who enjoyed a favourable reputation in the 
community and whose family was noted for their competence in dispute settlement.15 
If the hakam agreed to arbitrate, the parties then put up a meaningful form of security 
(property or hostages) to ensure their compliance with the hakam’s decision.
The decision of the hakam was final, but not legally enforceable. It was an 
authoritative statement as to what the customary law was or should be. In fact, 
Schacht refers to a hakam in such situations as “a lawmaker, an authoritative 
expounder of the normative legal custom or sunna.”16 Schacht continues, “[t]he 
arbitrators applied and at the same time developed the sunna; it was the sunna with 
the force of public opinion behind it, which had in the first place insisted on the
17procedure of negotiation and arbitration.” Arbitration continued as a dispute 
resolution practice in the Mohammad Sall-Allahu Alayhi Wa Sallam (s.a.a.w) and 
post-Mohammad (s.a.a.w) eras. In fact, for a Muslim, “arbitration carries with it no
1 ftbetter imprimatur than that given to it by the Prophet himself.”
The formal commercial legal order in Jordan is an import from civil law 
jurisdictions, as well as English law. However, indigenous dispute resolution has 
vigorously survived underneath and alongside these formal rules and procedures. 
Mallat19 confirms that the commercial law of the Middle East is an exact copy of 
European law, albeit with the long-standing traditions of trade in the region. He 
contends “a brief presentation of commercial law decisions across the Arab world is 
sufficient to show the dominance of western principles in the field and the direct 
translation of western terminology and rules for local transactions.” However, he
13 L. Lim, “Terrorism and Globalization: An International Perspective”, 35 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 
(2002)703, 704
14 J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 7
15 ibid
16 ibid 8
17 ibid
18 nl2 above, 173
19 C. Mallat, “Commercial Law in the Middle East: Between Classical Transactions and Modem 
Business”, American Journal o f Comparative Law, Vol. 48, No.l (Winter 2000), 81
20 ibid
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also admits that arbitration is a different matter in that; it is influenced by Islamic 
traditions and cultural phenomena. Mallat attributes this, to what he calls the revenge 
of classical law upon the state and the slowness of its judicial system. Merchants in 
both the Middle East and the rest of the world resort to arbitration to avoid the 
judicial system for a variety of reasons, some of which include the process in court 
may be too slow, too unpredictable, too open, too unreliable or too expensive.
The advent of commercial arbitration in the second half of the twentieth century was
superimposed on the existing local culture of arbitration for dealing with commercial
disputes. This de Sousa Santos calls localised globalism, when “transnational
practices and imperatives [impact] on local conditions that are thereby destructured
01and restructured in order to respond to transitional imperatives” . This seems to be 
what happened with regards to commercial arbitration in both Jordan and the wider 
Middle East.
Many Middle Eastern scholars and practitioners trained in the West have often 
returned to their countries of origin ready to impart what they have learned about 
western conflict resolution techniques, as if there were no existing methods of 
dispute resolution in these countries. Actually, there are deep cultural, social and 
religious roots that underlie the way Arabs behave when it comes to conflict 
resolution and reconciliation. These involve issues such as patrilineal families, the 
question of ethnicity, the relevance of identity, the nature of tribal and clan solidarity, 
the key role of patron-client relationship and the norms concerning honour and 
shame. Religious beliefs and traditions are also relevant to conflict resolution and 
control. Some of the indigenous techniques found in the Middle East today alongside 
arbitration are wasta (intercession) and rituals of sulh (settlement) and musalaha 
(reconciliation).
Geography has an impact on the way people interact and behave for the protection of 
honour and their scarce resources. For example, the Arabian Peninsula and Jordan 
are characterised by desert and other arid land. In the desert, the fittest and strongest 
survive and there is ‘strength in numbers’, therefore tribal people have had to stick
21 B. de Sousa Santos, Towards a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic 
Transition, (Routledge: London, 1995), 263
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together and support each other due to such difficult conditions. In recent times, 
people of the Middle East have increasingly moved away from pastoral nomadism, 
but this life has left a very deep imprint on Middle Eastern culture, society and 
politics. One anthropologist hypothesises that the characteristics of pastoral 
nomadism account for the strikingly similar cultural orientations found throughout 
the vast area of the Middle East; “we find remarkable similarities among the 
traditions of many people throughout a large region...Islamization, the spread of a 
religious faith, is offered as an explanation for this informality...Extreme arid 
conditions resulted in independent little herding groups dispersed acrosS the desert 
and steppe...This situation is reflected in the atomistic form which political alliances 
tended to take.”22
As well as the tribal heritage of the Arab world, Islamic traditions are also relevant to 
any examination of arbitration law within the Arab systems. Behind the statutes of 
most Arab countries, and more importantly in the mind of an Arab party, counsel or 
arbitrator, lies a rich layer of Shari'ah23 Saleh argues that “whilst most of the statutes 
codify accepted legal principles which are borrowed from the West, there is still a 
body of uncodified shari’a that may remain influential, mainly with regard to 
behaviour of the parties and arbitrators, even though they are not embodied in a 
modem piece of legislation.”24 It is essential to understand that some of the norms of 
pastoral nomadism, especially the ones relating to dispute resolution, were further 
reinforced by the arrival of Islam.
The people of the Middle East remain famous for their loyal attachment to their 
families, distinctive rituals of hospitality and conflict mediation, as well as effective 
and flexible kin-based collectivities. Lineage and tribe have, until quite recently, 
performed most of the social, economic and political functions of communities in the 
absence of centralized state governments. The family in the Middle East is 
dominated by the powerful role patriarchy plays in decision-making. A related 
element in understanding social and political behaviour in the Middle East is kinship.
22 M. Meeker, Literature and Violence in North Arabia, (Cambridge, MA; Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), 7
23 S. Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: Shari'a, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006)
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Despite the creation of modem states following the collapse of colonial mle, the 
basic unit of identification for the individual is not the state, the ethnic group or the 
professional association, but the family.
Alongside the family and kinship, there are religious considerations; “even where the 
Shari’a is not applied in current practice, there could be a reversion to it in any 
particular case.. .Without doubt, a knowledge of the Shari’a will become increasingly 
important for practitioners...”25 Religion in the Middle East plays a very important 
role in influencing an individual's life in both private and public interactions. The 
socio-cultural and historic environment that saw the birth and spread of the three 
main global monotheistic religions encouraged close relations between the private 
and public in the individual's life in the Arab world. Islam is “a complete way of life:
0f\a religion, an ethic, and a legal system all in one.” Din, the Arabic word for
religion, “. . .  encompasses theology, scripture, politics, morality, law, justice, and all 
other aspects of life relating to the thoughts or actions of man . . .  it is not that
onreligion dominates the life of a faithful Moslem, but that religion . . .  is his life.”
The penetration of this tribal heritage and religious underpinning into the commercial 
world within the Middle East has created a gap between the Arab way of doing 
business and that in the West. It is quite clear that the co-existence of these two 
rationalities is potentially problematic. The differences are not just in the general 
landscape, but in the detail and perceptions of specific matters. For example, Irani 
argues that conflict from a western perspective is considered to have a positive 
dimension, “acting as a catharsis to redefine relationships between individuals, 
groups and nations and makes it easier to find adequate settlement or possible 
solutions.” Whereas conflict in the East is considered to be negative, threatening 
and destructive to the normative order and needs to be settled quickly or avoided. 
These two views of conflict are sufficiently dissimilar to make the argument that
25 M. Ballantyne, “Book Review of Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: A Study in 
Shari’a and Statute Law” Arbitration International, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1989), 269,272
26 S.M.H Tabatabae, The Quran in Islam: Its Impact and Influence on the life o f Muslims, (London: 
Zahra Publications, 1987), 86
27 D.S. Roberts, Islam: A Westerner’s Guide-From Business and the Law to Social Customs and 
Family Life, (London: Hamlyn, 1981), 67-68
28 G. E. Irani, “Islamic Mediation: Techniques for Middle East Conflicts” MERIA Vol. 3, No. 2- June 
1999,1
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each side has a very different starting point when it comes to understanding conflict 
and, consequently, conflict resolution.
Western societies today strongly privilege individualism, thus, social pressures and 
relationships do not operate as influential factors in dispute resolution. Parties are 
committed to the process as a result of legally binding procedures or because the 
process serves their individual interests. Conflict is not necessarily seen as a negative 
interaction that should be avoided. The western model calls for a direct method of 
interaction and communication. Also, in the western model, any intrusion of 
emotions and values is perceived as an obstacle to reaching an agreement.
By contrast, conflict resolution in the Middle East aims to restore order. Even though 
a dispute might begin between two individuals or two families, it soon involves the 
entire community or clan. The initiation and implementation of any intervention is 
based on the social norms and customs of the society. These social codes operate as a 
pressuring tool to reach and implement an agreement between two parties. 
Bargaining moves are conducted on the basis of preserving social values, norms and 
customs. Future relationships are crucial elements in settling disputes in the Arab- 
Islamic context. Priority is given to people and relationships over task and structures. 
Face to face bargaining or negotiation could be perceived by the parties as 
antagonising the situation or as a humiliating act for the victim.
One of the clearest contrasts between western and Middle Eastern dispute resolution 
lies in the nature of the third party intervener. In the Middle East, the third party is a 
leader who lives in the community and has high status and who brings considerable 
knowledge of events, the character of the dispute and the disputants. In the western 
case, third parties are usually strangers to the dispute. They lack the closeness and 
connection to the disputants. Such distance is appreciated and encouraged in a 
western context. The Middle Eastern intervener advocates a settlement that relates to 
notions of justice as accepted in the society and enforces social norms. Western 
settlement aims at achieving lasting agreements.
The credibility of the third party in the Arab-Islamic context is based on kinship 
connections, religious merit and knowledge of customs and community. In the
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western case credibility is based on training, professional degrees and experience. In 
the Arab context, emotions are relevant in dispute resolution, in contrast to the 
western intervener, who is expected to remain detached from the disputants and be 
committed to the process itself.
There is no denying that in the East and West disputing landscapes are different. The 
very concept of conflict as well as resolution is unaligned. The striking collective 
nature of the East when contrasted with the largely individualistic phenomena of the 
West sets these two worlds apart. This could be explained by the cultural heritage of 
the Middle East, which is tribal and Islamic in nature. These features have seeped 
into the legal culture of Jordan, which is the main focus of this thesis and in turn 
influenced the attitudes and behaviour of the players in the Jordanian arbitration 
process.
In the remainder of this chapter, I explore the literature on disputing theory and the 
definition of legal culture in order to give some parameters to this research. In the 
last section, I explain my ethnographic methodology which highlighted the differing 
features of the international arbitration culture and the local Jordanian arbitration 
process.
1.5 Legal Culture
There is agreement in the literature that the basic conceptual understanding of 
“justice must satisfy the appearance of justice” must be found at the heart of 
disputing theory . Bruner makes the essential point that the “appearance of justice” 
is not the same everywhere. There are longstanding debates about culture and legal 
culture, which I will review in this section. After examining the differing definitions 
and arguments over these two concepts, it seems that it is quite difficult to have one 
narrow definition. However, for the purposes of this thesis, culture is taken as the 
interaction between norms, cosmology and practice.
29 The famous dicta of Felix Frankuter, J.S. Bruner, “Foreword” n 6 above, ix
30 ibid
Chase31 contends that the ways in which disputes are managed plays an important 
role in shaping the cultures in which they operate and dispute processes are a 
reflection of the culture they are found within. The question that Bruner puts is “how 
particular dispute resolution systems, once in play, both fit the culture and work their 
way back into it to accentuate or modify its way of life” . Bruner answers this 
question in part by using Chase’s example of the benge oracle , used by the African 
Azande for resolving their disputes. Bruner says “one cannot understand such 
seemingly bizarre ritualization unless one understands the pervasive ritualization of 
witchcraft as a whole in this fascinating society.”34 In the same way, one cannot 
understand the peculiarities of Jordanian arbitration without fully grasping how the 
family, kinship and religion fit within the disputing culture, and more extensively 
legal culture. Newman confirms that in order to understand the disputing processes in 
a society, one must recognise “the ‘idiom’ of law, the language in which its concepts 
and conflicts are expressed, is surely a matter of cultural determination... Many ritual 
taboos, religious practices and normative values are embodied in legal codes...”
Chase argues that the link between disputing and culture is most robust in “cultures 
that do not strongly differentiate between disputing practices and everyday life.” 
The legitimacy of these practices will depend on general satisfaction with them. 
Thus, it is not surprising that institutions imposed from outside may differ 
considerably from local processes as disputing institutions are “a product of, a 
contributor to and an aspect of culture.” In some societies, like Jordan, explicit 
legal norms merge with other normative understandings, embedded in custom and 
invoked implicitly in the way disputes are resolved and life is lived.38 Chase 
concludes that the relationship between disputing and culture is reflexive; “that the 
processes by which disputes are addressed will be influential ingredients in the 
ongoing social task of maintaining or “constructing” the culture in which they are
31 ibid
32 ibid x
33 A system where a small dose of poison is fed to a young chicken in which the chicken death’s or 
survival signals the innocent and guilty party.
34 n 6 above, ix-x
35 K. S. Newman, Law and Economic Organization: A Comparative Study o f Preindustrial Societies, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 210
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located.”39 Therefore, disputing culture is a set of social practices that predominate 
disputes and influence practices, beliefs and norms.
Since law is a product of dispute, and “law’s operation is but a special case of 
disputing practices importantly influencing culture”40 then also systems of dispute 
resolution are culture specific, as they are created by human beings and they reflect 
the characterisations necessary to identify that legal culture. Pierre Bourdieu41 
describes the law as the “quintessential form of active discourse, able by its own 
operation to produce its effects. It would not be excessive to say that it creates the 
social world, but only if we remember that it is this world which first creates the 
law”42.
Legal scholars talk about culture in two ways. First, there is a notion of a general 
legal culture which is usually taken to mean those aspects of national culture that 
find expression in the legal system.43 Legal culture “points to differences in the way 
features of law are themselves embedded in larger frameworks of social structures 
and culture which constitute and reveal the place of law in society.”44 As Freidman 
put it, legal culture consists of the “attitudes, values, opinions held in society with 
regard to law, the legal system and its various parts...those parts of the general 
culture -  customs, opinions, ways of doing and thinking that bend social forces 
toward or away from the law.”45 The second notion is that culture consists of shared 
norms and expectations produced by legal actors. Actors engaged in repeated 
interaction over time produce culture 46 Lawyers form an epistemic community that 
is a community of professionals with common training and expertise. It is culture as 
a product of law, rather than as a constraint on law, an effect rather than a cause.47
39 n 6 above, 138
40 ibid 127
41 P. Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field” (Richard Terdiman, 
trans.) (1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 805
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Nelken48 describes two forms of analysis within the realms of legal culture. The first 
he calls the “explanatory approach” where casual priority between competing 
hypothetical variables is developed. This approach “uses various aspects of legal 
culture to explain variation in levels and types of legally related behaviour.”49 The 
second approach Nelken names “interpretative”, where the aim is understanding how 
aspects of legal culture fit together. This approach “seeks to use evidence of legally 
relevant behaviour and attitudes as an index of legal culture.”50
Chase says we must use the tools of “cultural contextualization of incident”51 in 
order to understand the meaning of particular dispute processes. To achieve this “we 
must observe the relevant practice closely and must place them within the culture in 
which they operate.”52 According to Nelken, an interpretative stance is more helpful 
than the explanatory approach to treating culture as part of a flow of meanings and is 
less interested in drawing a definitional line between legal culture and the rest of 
social life. On the other hand, Chase claims that interpretative explanations are 
insufficient. Disputing is not about meaning making alone; it is essential that we 
explore the way functional and cultural representations are interpreted. “A disputing 
practice will be better understood when we see how it works symbolically and 
functionally.”53
In order to understand what is meant by legal culture, it is important to define the 
term “culture”. In reality, the definition of both these concepts is contested. Culture 
was defined by Tylor54 as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, 
art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of society.”55 Raymond Williams states “culture is one of the two or three 
most complicated words in the English Language...because it has now come to be 
used for important concepts in several distinct intellectual disciplines and in several
48 D. Nelken “Using the Concept of Legal Culture” Australian Journal o f Legal Philosophy (2004) 
29:1
49 ibid 9
50 ibid
51 C. Geertz, “Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective” in C. Geertz (ed.), Local Knowledge: 
Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology, (New York: Basic Books, 1983)
52 n 6 above, 3
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distinct system of thought.”56 Anthropologists have traditionally defined culture as 
“the way of life of people.”57 Many definitions have revolved round the idea that 
culture represents a set of practices, values, beliefs and customs acquired by 
individuals as members of a distinctive society, and those resulting from interaction 
between people, which have accumulated, assimilated and been passed on to 
subsequent generations.
Different scholars have tried different approaches to the same difficult measuring of 
legal culture, but it seems that none are entirely satisfactory. Others have suggested 
that the concept is misleading and should be abandoned altogether. However, Nelken 
sets out a spectrum to which culture corresponds:
“...one way of describing relatively stable patterns of legally oriented 
social behaviour and attitudes. The identifying elements of legal culture 
range from facts about institutions ...to various forms of behaviour 
...and, at the other extreme, more nebulous aspects of ideas, values, 
aspirations and mentalities. Like culture itself, legal culture is about who 
we are, not just what we do.”58
Blankenburg and Bruinsma59 define the concept of legal culture as including four 
components: law on the books, law in action as channelled by the institutional 
infrastructure, patterns of legally relevant behaviour, and legal consciousness, 
particularly, a distinctive attitude toward the law among legal professionals.60 In this 
thesis, it is the legal consciousness that relates to dispute resolution in Jordan that I 
am describing and explaining. However, it is important to note that this concept has 
suffered harsh criticism. Cotterrell61, for example, argues that the concept of legal 
culture lacks rigour and is ultimately theoretically incoherent. He illustrates this view 
with reference to a variety of meanings given to the concept by Friedman over the 
years. Cotterrell says legal culture is of little use because it is difficult to build such a 
variable term into testable explanations, especially as “the concept is sometimes
56 R. Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary o f Culture and Society (Glasgow: Fontana, 1976), 76
57 G. Mathews, Global Culture/  Individual Identity: Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket, 
(New York: Routledge, 2000)
58 n 48 above, 1
59 E. Blankenburg, & F. Bruinsma, Dutch Legal Culture, (Netherlands: Kluwer, 1994)
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61 R. Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror o f  Social Theory, (Aldershot, 
England: Ashgate Pub. Company, 2006)
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taken as what needs to be explained and at other times is asked to play the role of 
explanation.”62
Friedman63 refers to legal culture as “public knowledge, attitudes and behaviour 
patterns towards the legal system.”64 He also describes legal culture to consist of 
“attitudes, values and opinions held in society, with regard to law, the legal system 
and its various parts.”65 It is imperative for the purposes of this thesis to make the 
distinction that Freidman outlines between the legal culture of “those members of 
society who perform specialised legal tasks”66 and that of other citizens. He 
considers those members “especially important” and refers to them as “internal 
legal culture.”68 However, according to Nelken69, Friedman prefers to concentrate on 
the importance of external legal culture. Cotterrell criticises the distinction as unclear 
and argues that this division does not aid in the understanding of the social 
significance or the workings of the legal systems. He warns of “serious consequences 
for the explanatory usefulness of the concept of legal culture”70. Cotterrell suggests 
that in complex modem societies, legal culture should not be used as a description of 
existing empirical variability, but as “an ideal-type category to be used 
heuristically.”71 Friedman disagrees and argues that the attitudes of judges and 
lawyers as an elite and powerful group contribute significantly to legal culture.72
According to Freidman, the value of legal culture is that it helps us line up relevant 
phenomena concerning the relationship between law and culture into one very 
general category, under which we can then subsume other less vague and more 
measurable phenomena.73 Legal culture “is indeed an umbrella term to cover a range
62 ibid
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of measurable phenomena.”74 Freidman says legal culture “determines when, why, 
and where people use law, legal institutions or legal process; and when they use other 
institutions or do nothing...it sets everything in motion.”75 The casual significance of 
legal culture, he says, seems to be asserted. Cotterrell does not seem to be convinced 
by the arguments made by Friedman. Cotterrell argues “the concept of legal culture 
explains too much...yet at the same time, it explains very little...legal culture itself 
embraces such an indeterminate array of elements and operates on such an 
indeterminate set of levels of generality or specificity.” He suggests that the 
enquiries that aim at conceptualising legal culture should be concerned with specific 
and differentiated elements that can be identified and related within these 
aggregates.77 Cotterrell concludes that “strictly speaking there is no legal culture, but 
only culture seen from a certain standpoint of legal relevance to the observer.”
Tate79 examines legal culture and concludes that it is not reducible to public opinion 
or the attitudes of legal professionals. He also argues that institutions and legal 
culture are “mutually exclusive”. However, he agrees with Cotterrell that “legal 
culture has that slippery residual variable quality about it...It is everything and 
nothing simultaneously. It is the totality of laws, practices and opinions. And it 
somehow simultaneously stands apart from these things and effects how they work. 
It is both cause and effect.”80
Even though Friedman is a strong advocate of the concept of legal culture, he also
o  1
admits that the concept is “an abstraction and a slippery one” . Therefore, it seems 
the question; “why maintain a concept that is so hard to pin down?”82 is justified. 
Cotterrell answers this question stating that the concept serves an artistic rather than 
a scientific function; “it allows impressions of general tendencies to be sketched.”83
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He contends that the use of legal culture simply infers and suggests explanations in 
behavioural terms, where they cannot be easily supported by systematic empirical 
analysis. This does not mean that Cotterrell does not see the possible usefulness of 
the concept. He outlines that in certain contexts;
“...the idea of an undifferentiated aggregate of social elements, co­
present in a certain time and place, may be useful and even necessary in 
social research.. .the concept of legal culture may be useful to embrace 
provisionally an entire contextual matrix in which state law operates.”84
However, Cotterrell insists that the discussions of legal culture as a means of 
inferring and suggesting general impressions of behaviour that could not be 
supported by empirical analysis is defective. It is a convenient concept through 
which provisional reference can be made to the general environment of social
O C  Q £
practices, traditions and values within which law exists. Chase also contends that 
the difficulties with the concept of legal culture are its vagueness and the failure of
o n
individuals to acknowledge departures from a social orthodoxy.
Despite Cotterrell’s criticisms Friedman argues that as legal culture lies in states of 
mind i.e. attitudes and behaviours, the measuring of which empirically would not be 
easy, but that this does not mean that they do not exists. Legal culture does not have 
to be directly measured but it covers a wide range of phenomena that can be 
measured. The fact that inferences cannot be rigorous does not mean they are not 
worth making. He contends that there is a natural tendency among academics to 
overrate the importance of purely intellectual elements of culture, culture as a 
concept is no worse than other overarching social science concepts. He concludes 
legal culture “is a useful concept, despite its failings; and I would hate to have to give 
it up.”88 Amsterdam and Bruner agree with Friedman, “we seem to need a notion of 
culture that appreciates its integrity as a composite -  as a system in tension unique to
84 ibid 29
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a people not in perpetuity but at a time and place.”89 The problem with legal culture 
does not just relate to definitions and measurements, cultural analysis is difficult 
because “it is virtually impossible to sort out the casual relationship between culture 
and behaviour, even when the former is not defined tautologically as the latter.”90 
Notwithstanding these arguments, Cotterrell91 insists that the concept of legal culture 
is inadequate and theoretically incoherent.
Q9This concept has some natural boundaries as described by Van Erp; “m a 
community which shares a common culture, all members do not necessarily share the 
culture of that community's legal sub-community.” In my interviews with the 
arbitration profession in Amman, I focused on a small minority of lawyers and 
engineers who dealt with arbitration. They were all men and had an average age of 
55 years old. Their backgrounds were very similar and building a legal culture for 
them is one of the aims of this research. Nelken makes a distinction between the 
legal cultures of all the different branches of law. He says “lawyers specialising in 
some subjects may have less in common with other lawyers outside their field than 
they have with those abroad.”94 This is certainly true of my interviewees in Amman; 
they shared many opinions and attitudes with each other as well as their international 
counterparts.
It seems clear that the concept of legal culture has some usefulness. The beliefs, 
assumptions and practices understood as cultural no doubt affects the operation of 
the legal system and the players within it. However, a way must be found so these 
characteristics can be systematically included to the description of legal cultures, 
avoiding facile, deterministic and tautological explanations. Chase95 makes the 
critical point that the definition of legal culture must depend on the purposes that the 
definition aims to explain. Cotterrell96 reflects that this concept is most useful when
89 A.G. Amsterdam, and J.S. Bruner, Minding the Law, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2000), 231
90 World Bank, “Legal Culture and Judicial Reform” at 
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/LegalCultureBrief.doc
91 n 61 above
92 S. van Erp, “The Editorial”, Electronic Journal o f Comparative Law, Volume 5.1, March 2001
93 ibid
94 n 48 above
95 n 6 above, 7
96 n 61 above
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it emphasises the complex and diverse social matrix in which modem legal systems 
exist. However, the reliance on a general concept of culture makes the theoretical 
identification of a specifically legal culture problematic. The most appropriate use of 
culture, according to Cotterrell, is when the clusters of social phenomena whose 
exact interrelation is unknown and “whose collective significance is recognizable 
and requires emphasis.”97
Geertz observes that “man” creates governance “by enclosing himself in a set of
QQ
meaningful forms, ‘webs of signification he himself has spun’...” Chase states that 
the web is spun with a number of matters that inform each other. These are social 
arrangements, symbolic systems, epistemology, psychology and practices.99 The 
thesis that law ‘mirrors’ society, in other words law roughly reflects the culture in 
which it is found is not manifest in Jordan. As argued by Tamanaha100, globalisation 
of commerce and the transplantation of legal practices and concepts have 
undermined this premise. However, the western institution of arbitration has not been 
easily transferred to Jordan and the Middle East. One matter is clear, culture informs 
legal culture and they both inform the disputing processes and in turn the particular 
society’s view of justice.
1.6 Methodology
In order to experience and understand the legal culture of Jordan, I used an 
ethnographic approach. The use of this method provided me with a holistic picture 
which helped me understand the subject fully by peeling off layer upon layer of the 
legal dynamics of Jordan while I living as a participant-observer within the Jordanian 
arbitration scene. Ethnography allowed me to study and interpret cultural diversity 
through field work. It provided an account of Jordanian culture, the legal society and 
the arbitration community in Amman. The relationship between law and society and 
in turn culture is perfectly suited to this ethnographic approach. Merry explained, 
“The focus of our work is not on law and society, but on the ways in which law and
97 ibid 34
98 n 51 above, 167,182
99 n 6 above, 3
100 B.Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence o f Law and Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001)
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society are mutually defining and inseparable. One fundamental point is that law is 
intimately involved in the constitution of social relations and the law itself is 
constituted through social relations.”101 For the purposes of this research, I have used 
a wide meaning to ‘law’, to include rules, customs, rituals and regulations. My field 
research consisted of a period of nine months where I resided in Amman and then I 
visited regularly over the next three years.
The site of my fieldwork was Amman, the capital of Jordan. Within that 
geographical location, I circulated around a number of Jordanian law firms, the main 
courthouse in Amman, professional conferences and workshops relating to 
arbitration in the Middle East and Europe. The research consisted of observations of 
arbitration cases and interviews with arbitration specialists in Amman who were both 
lawyers and engineers.
My field research began in one of the law firms in Amman. In the firm, there were 
two partners; one of them a renowned Arab arbitrator, as well as three lawyers and 
two trainee lawyers. I worked there as a trainee lawyer, closely involved with the 
partner specialising in arbitration. I assisted in drafting arbitration claims and 
defences, researching the law, as well as sitting in on meetings with clients and 
taking instructions.
My next field research site was the office of a unique Jordanian firm which has three 
partners and a number of lawyers both senior and junior. The uniqueness of this firm 
stems from its strict division into three departments, each run by one of the partners 
with his own team. The departments are litigation and arbitration; merger and 
acquisition and banking and finance. I attended morning meetings of the litigation 
and arbitration department and went through the files on international arbitration 
cases that have been completed and also ones that were still active.
My third field research site was the firm of a well respected Jordanian lawyer who 
has over 40 years experience. His son is also a lawyer and worked in the firm 
alongside two other lawyers. He conducts a large number of local arbitration cases,
101 S.E. Merry, "Culture, Power, and the Discourse of Law" (1992) 37 N.Y.L. Sch.L.Rev. 209,209
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both as a lawyer and as an arbitrator. He gave me access to all his arbitration cases 
and I was able to attend all hearings of the arbitration cases he conducted or was 
involved in. I attended about 20 arbitration cases with him.
In each arbitration hearing, I would sit in the back of the room and take notes on 
what was being discussed. At the end of most hearings, I would discuss what 
occurred with this lawyer and took his views, feelings and opinions. I contacted 
leading commercial lawyers in Amman in order to attend as many arbitration 
hearings as possible and succeeded in attending ten other arbitrations.
I also interviewed a large number of Jordanian lawyers and engineers who I had 
observed and who were recommended by fellow arbitration specialists. I 
concentrated on engineers who are known for their arbitration experience and who 
regularly sit as arbitrators.
My field research included workshops that took place in Amman on arbitration, 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and construction law. I gained extensive insight 
into the thoughts and opinions of the arbitration community in Amman over coffee 
breaks and lunches. I also attended international conferences in the Middle East and 
Europe to keep up to date with the latest issues, thoughts and perceived problems. It 
was very important to be seen as part of the ‘mafia’ of arbitration as this allowed me 
to gain a lot of information about how matters are perceived by the arbitration 
community in the Middle East.
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Chapter Two 
The International Commercial Arbitration World
“Commercial arbitration must have existed since the dawn of commerce.
All trade potentially involves disputes, and successful trade must have a 
means of dispute resolution other than force. From the start, it must have 
involved a neutral determination, and an agreement, tacit or otherwise, to 
abide by the result, backed by some kind of sanction.”1
This comment upon commercial arbitration could arguably apply equally to both the 
western and Middle Eastern understanding of arbitration. It goes to the heart of the 
issue surrounding the legitimacy of arbitration. Originally, the international 
commercial arbitration model gained its legitimacy from the players within the field. 
They were a tight knit community with specific backgrounds, known and recognised 
among each other. Some of these key players will be described later in the chapter. 
However, as arbitration spread around the world with the growth of globalisation, it 
started to expand away from the core players that lent it legitimacy. As this 
happened, the legitimacy of arbitration increasingly came from the framework of the 
model itself. At the same time, arbitration has developed into a system that resembles 
the courts with rigid procedure, on the face of it making the identity of the players 
irrelevant.
The arbitration world remains a closed community. It is often perceived as a rather 
“closed and arcane European club” who are purportedly selected, according to 
Dezalay and Garth, “for their “virtue” -  judgment, neutrality, expertise” . A very 
successful arbitrator puts it strongly “It’s a mafia because people appoint one 
another. You always appoint your friends -  people you know.”4 However, this small 
tight knit circle has been slightly weakened by the invasion of American lawyers. In 
practice, arbitration has shifted from an informal justice dominated by Continental
1 M. J. Mustill “Arbitration: History and Background”, Journal o f International Arbitration, Vol. 6 
No. 2 (1989), 43,43
2 Y. Dezalay & B. G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Construction o f a Transitional Legal Order, (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1996), 8
3 ibid
4 ibid 10
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academics to offshore justice dominated by U.S. litigators. Therefore, Dezalay and 
Garth divide arbitrators into two groups: the “Grand old men” and the “Technocrats”. 
Both of these two groups can be seen as insensitive to the Islamic and Arab cultures, 
as will be discussed later in this thesis.
The ‘grand old men’ are the pioneers of arbitration exemplified mainly by very 
senior European professors imbued with “traditional values of the European legal 
elites.”5 They are of the opinion that arbitration should not be a profession: 
“arbitration is a duty not a career.”6 Whereas the ‘technocrats’ are a new generation 
of practitioners who came to arbitration because of the rapid growth of this market in 
the 1980s. A leading figure of this younger generation describes his generation as 
“technically better equipped in procedure and substance.”7 They present themselves 
as international arbitration professionals and also as entrepreneurs selling their 
services to business practitioners. The large Anglo-American firms, which dominate 
the international market of business law, support these technocrats. As it stands, both 
groups compete for appointments and present themselves as the better arbitrators. 
However, the language and the ‘advertising campaign’ conducted by them both is 
very similar, focusing as it does on the advantages of arbitration compared to other 
dispute resolution mechanisms. They organise conferences and workshops to market 
themselves in particular, and arbitration in general, under the auspices of one of the 
arbitration institutions.
International commercial arbitration is private justice. The parties decide to submit 
their dispute to private adjudication, by one or more arbitrators, appointed in 
accordance with rules the parties themselves have agreed to adopt. Arbitration is a 
binding, non-judicial and private means of settling disputes based on an explicit 
agreement by the parties involved in a transaction. Such an agreement is typically 
embodied in the terms of a contract between the parties. Parties typically choose their 
neutral private judge (arbitrator) and accept his decision as binding upon them. 
International commercial arbitration can be conducted in two ways, as an ad hoc or 
institutional arbitration. Ad hoc arbitration does not rely on the supervision or formal
5 ibid 34
6 ibid
7 ibid 36
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administration of an arbitration centre. In contrast, institutional arbitration is 
practised under the auspices of an arbitral center, usually according to the 
institution’s own rules of arbitration. There are few grounds for appeal of an arbitral 
award whether ad hoc or institutional and the terms of the award are widely
o
enforceable thanks to the success of the 1985 New York Convention .
Parties from different legal and cultural backgrounds are able to design a dispute 
resolution mechanism using the contract rather than the strict formalities of their 
legal systems. Arbitration is often described as a hybrid form of dispute resolution. 
“An international arbitration will usually have no connection with the state in which 
the arbitration takes place, other than the fact that it is taking place on the territory of 
that state.”9 International commercial arbitration begins as “a private agreement 
between the parties and continues by way of private proceedings, in which the 
wishes of the parties are of great importance. It ends with an award that has binding 
legal force and effect and which, in the appropriate conditions, the courts of most 
countries of the world will recognise and enforce”10. Arbitration could be organised 
with a considerable lack of formality which allows it to be conducted in different 
countries and against different legal and cultural backgrounds.11
The two main advantages of international commercial arbitration are firstly that it 
gives the parties an opportunity to choose a ‘neutral’ forum and a ‘neutral’ tribunal 
away from their respective national courts and secondly that arbitration awards can 
be enforced internationally under the provisions of the New York Convention 1958. 
Other advantages include the flexibility of proceedings and confidentiality.
With globalization, international trade has increasingly involved a large number of 
cross-border projects and contracts. This inevitably means more disputes between 
parties from different nationalities, jurisdictions and national courts. The number of 
arbitration forums has grown over the last fifty years and the case load of major
8 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 
New York Convention)
9 A. Redfem & M. Hunter, Law and Practice o f International Commercial Arbitration, (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), 1
10 ibid, 11
11 Ibid, 1
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arbitral institutions has more than doubled during the same period. The Economist 
predicted that arbitration is “the Big Idea set to dominate legal-reform agendas into 
the next century”12 and this seems to certainly have happened. Thus, it would be safe 
to say that arbitration is now the accepted method of dispute resolution for 
international business disputes and it is a key institution in the structuring of 
international markets.
Arbitration is indeed a concept which has meanings that are extensive across
differing fields of application. Casella proposes that “the availability of arbitration
influences the size of the markets, while at the same time the legal doctrine shaped
by the arbitrators, and the recourse to arbitration by traders, both depend on the
1
evolution of markets.” In the West, this has led to the status of arbitration 
undergoing great changes within the last few years, moving towards wider 
acceptance, reduced court interference during the proceedings and simpler yet stricter 
rules for the enforcement of the arbitration awards.
Arbitration’s success is reflected in the arbitrations of high-profile disputes, such as 
those arising out of the internationalizations of oil concessions in the 1970s and 
1980s and huge international construction disputes such as the Channel Tunnel. 
Success is also evident in the tremendous growth since the late 1970s in the number 
of arbitration centres, arbitrators and arbitrations. To allow for this popularity, states 
all over the world have modernised their laws on arbitration.
In theory, arbitration seems to be a perfect form of dispute resolution that parties 
construct and control all of which makes it attractive to international commerce. 
However, as we will see in chapter 4, this is not always the case and the picture is far 
from perfect. Ideally; “Arbitration must be legal-culturally neutral...the reality of 
today’s international commerce is far from such a stage. There are very many 
different arbitral practices associated with different legal and commercial cultures.”14
12 The Economist, 18-24 July 1992,17
13 A. Casella “On market integration and the development of institutions: The case of international 
commercial arbitration” European Economic Review 40(1996) 155,158
14 Y. Taniguchi, ““Is There a Growing International Arbitration Culture? An Observation from Asia”, 
in Van den Berg (ed.), International Dispute Resolution: Towards an International Arbitration
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In this chapter, I will paint a picture of the international arbitration field drawing on a 
study by Dezalay and Garth.15 The study showed that the commercial arbitration 
world operates as a “loose social space” which has its internal dynamics, inner 
competitions and conflicts, but which also generates commonly accepted practices 
and rules in the sociological sense.”16 The field of international arbitration has 
renowned players, common practices and debates as well as agreed discourse, which 
will all be explored in this chapter. These matters have created accepted norms 
within the field and in turn, some argue, a culture of international commercial 
arbitration. This will also be examined below. The battle of rationalities between the 
‘grand old men’ and the ‘technocrats’ is evident in each part of this chapter.
2.1 The Players
Historically, the identities of the players in international commercial arbitration have 
been vital to its survival and development, as in the past the legitimacy of this private 
justice was derived from the arbitrators themselves. Therefore, only a very select and 
elite group of individuals have been able to serve as arbitrators. The arbitrators of the 
past and the present have what Dezalay & Garth term “symbolic capital” which is 
“recognised power.. .recognition, institutionalized or not, that they receive from a 
group.”17 The values of the specific types of capital and their market-recognised 
equivalence are not necessarily stable. Different types of symbolic capital has gained 
and lost value over time in the international commercial arbitration field. The various 
forms of symbolic capital have included academic standing, scholarly publication, 
formal positions in the legal, economic or political system, as well as particular 
experience and training in alternative dispute resolution, connections to business, 
connections to political power, particular language skills and proficiency in technical
Culture, International Council for Commercial Arbitration Congress Series, No. 8 (The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International, 1998), 39
15 n 2 above
16 A. Sayed, “Towards a Reflexive Sociology of the Arbitration Field in the Arab World” Journal o f 
International Arbitration, Vol. 25 No. 2 (2008), 289,291
17 P. Bourdieu, “Epilogue: On the Possibility of a Field of World Sociology” in Bourdieu, Coleman 
(eds), Social Theory for a Changing Society ( New York: Russel Sage, 1991), 72
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aspects of arbitration practice.18 In other words, these points are seen as having a 
certain value as ‘capital’, depending upon the purpose and audience for which they 
are assessed. Thus, particular experiences, expertise and connections have a capital 
value to the extent that they are recognised as having such value by the rest of the 
group.19
The symbolic capital of the players involved in arbitration is changing. It seems now 
the arbitrators are drawn from large, international law firms with extensive 
experience in commercial legal work and representation of clients in arbitrations in 
particular. In order to enter arbitration circles anywhere in the world, one must have 
a platform, whether an academic position or a partnership in a significant law firm. 
“The platforms can be very different. The generation of the grand old men tended to 
develop their platforms outside of arbitration and then enter the field at a very high 
level.”20 However, the symbolic capital of the technocrats comes entirely from their 
activities in the field of international commercial arbitration. They are usually 
specialists in a field of law and internationalists. Their portfolios are well diversified 
within arbitration and their symbolic capital is their arbitration know-how. The 
‘symbolic capital’ of a group of leading arbitrators both grand old men and 
technocrats will be discussed below.
One of the leading men of international commercial arbitration is Pierre Lalive, a 
Swiss professor and lawyer. He occupies a key place in the history of arbitration and 
“everyone with rudimentary knowledge about international commercial arbitration 
knows his name.”22 His curriculum vitae gives some indication of his stature at the 
top of the field. He has had an impressive academic career in the field of 
international law. He has written numerous books and articles and he is a member of 
all the leading international law and arbitration institutions and clubs. His portfolio of 
symbolic capital, therefore, covers the national, the transnational, pure international 
law and the practice of business and law. Practice and academia, added to a good
18 n 2 above
19 ibid
20 ibid
21 The Biographical materials on prominent arbitrators is based on research conducted by Y. Dezalay 
& B. G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction o f a 
Transitional Legal Order, (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1996)
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family pedigree are his key symbolic capital. His first involvement with arbitration 
was as a legal clerk in one of the relatively few arbitration cases of the time, the 
Buraimi matter between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom. The cosmopolitan 
symbolic capital represented by Professor Lalive -  including his apprenticeships in 
major international arbitrations -  made him able to move easily into any national or 
international field that required the services of legal professionals. Professor Lalive 
could enter at the top because his presence would lend prestige to whichever 
organization or activity he elected to enter, thus making him one of the key players in 
international arbitration.
Another central player is Judge Gunner Lagergren from Sweden. He is an example of 
a very well known arbitrator whose other activities have also remained central to his 
career. The judge’s career is that of a distinguished lawyer to whom governments 
and businesses will entrust very complex and politically controversial disputes. His 
stature -  the symbolic capital of a leading international public arbitrator and 
cosmopolitan Swedish judge -  has enabled him to drop in and out of commercial 
arbitration as he chooses without affecting his stature.
A man with a slightly differing career, but the same stature, is William D. Rogers, a 
partner in the Washington D.C. law firm of Arnold and Porter. Like Judge 
Lagergren, he has not invested much of his time in building capital and relationships 
within the arbitration community. From his position of eminence as a cosmopolitan 
U.S. lawyer with ties to government and business, he is in demand as an arbitrator. 
His service as an arbitrator reinforces his prestige and authority and allows him to 
deploy his services in whatever is the most high-profile, significant international 
matter of the moment.
The career of Jan Paulsson, a partner at Freshfields, Paris, and one of the leaders of 
the emerging generation of technocrats, illustrates a different track than that of the 
characters above. His career is in essence transnational. He is an arbitration 
specialist, beginning his work as a new associate for the Coudert Brothers in 1975 on 
one of the Libyan oil nationalisation cases. As counsel, he has represented parties in 
seven ICSID cases -  many more than any other lawyer. He has co-authored the 
leading book on International Chamber of Commerce arbitration, published countless
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articles in English and French, is the general editor of Arbitration International, and a 
vice president of the London Court of International Arbitration. His symbolic capital 
comes entirely from his activities in the field of international commercial arbitration. 
Paulsson is an expert who has grown up with arbitration. Like other members of his 
generation, including most notably Albert Jan van den Berg, the editor of the 
Yearbook on Commercial Arbitration and a lawyer and professor in the Netherlands, 
his capital is based above all on his arbitration know-how, which is distinctly 
different from the players mentioned above.
There are relatively few well-known arbitrators from Third World countries. One of 
these is the World Court Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui from Algeria. He has had a 
cosmopolitan education with a French doctorate and experience practising law in 
France. His career includes Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Algiers, 
Minister of Justice and permanent representative of Algeria to UNESCO. However, 
even though he has had a great national career, an arbitrator from the Third World 
must gain access to and credibility from the centre of arbitration. He must have a 
connection to Paris, London or another legal centre. Judge Bedjaoui’s education and 
then practice in France gave him the recognition required.
Another leading character from the Third World is an Egyptian, Ibrahim Shihata, the 
vice president and general counsel of the World Bank since 1983 and the secretary- 
general of the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes. He is also the editor of the ICSID Review. Dr Shihata’s role in arbitration 
continues to be important, but his focus remains on the broader concern in which 
arbitration is a part: economic development and the role of law in economic 
development. His interest in arbitration is a by-product of his economic influence.
These profiles show how these prominent individuals have succeeded in the field of 
international arbitration. We have seen different generations, one formed mainly 
within their national settings outside of arbitration as the grand old men, and another 
formed in the international arena and within the arbitration field, the technocrats. 
There are judges, academics and practitioners, as well as lawyers from the Third 
World gaining recognition as arbitrators when they achieve recognition from the 
individuals and institutions at the centre. This generational gap that exists in the
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international commercial arbitration arena is also present in the Arab commercial 
arbitration world.
2.2 The Practice
“Commercial arbitration has changed beyond recognition within a 
working lifetime.”23
Like the evolution of the dominant group of arbitration from the ‘grand old men’ to 
the ‘technocrats’, the practice and form of arbitration has also changed. According to 
Mustill, arbitration has become a very profitable service industry, “the arbitral 
institutions, the arbitrators, lawyers, expert witnesses and the providers of ancillary 
services, all now charge fees on a scale which quite literally would have been 
inconceivable thirty years ago”24. This demonstrates how far arbitration has come 
from its early days.
This is not the only change in arbitration. Most commentators agree that the 
participants in a trade dispute, in former times, would submit to arbitration in good 
spirit. They would be looking for a resolution that was quick, cheap and informal, 
and for a decision which would be based on practical common sense and specialised 
knowledge of the trade. This produces a decision which the loser would accept 
whether he agreed or not. This might still be the case in domestic arbitration, but in 
multi-million dollars international claims, that is certainly no longer the case and it 
can be argued that it never have been the case anyway.
Consequently, this transformation is seen by many, especially the grand old men, as 
a disadvantage. Berger describes what he calls “second generation arbitration”, 
where arbitrations are fought as intensely and with as much zeal for taking every 
available advantage, whether procedural or otherwise, as any action in court. This, 
many say, is caused by the American litigators that are now playing a principal role 
in arbitrations. According to a senior observer; “The [US] lawyers are changing the
23 n 1 above, 54
24 ibid 54
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rules of the game.”26 Dezalay and Garth explain this as a social construction and a 
product of international developments. They say; “...events in the political and 
economic fields, especially decolonization, the oil crisis and the petrodollar mega­
projects, intersected with the legal developments”27 are the causes of such a change. 
“The vigour of the offensive brought by the American lobby to enlarge the club and 
to rationalize the practice of arbitration such that it could become offshore - U.S. - 
style -  litigation.”28
Therefore, two very different styles have come to bear. The litigators with their 
aggressive tactics and adversarial procedure and the ‘noble arbitrators’, where the 
terrain remains the law. Electing arbitration, says an American close to the new 
generation, “doesn’t mean that I necessarily want to give up all groupings of full- 
scale litigation and what might come with it.” The art seems to consist of “precisely 
knowing how to combine judicial attacks and negotiation behind the scenes in order 
to lead to an optimal solution from the point of view of the interest of the clients.” 
This is obviously the opposite of the traditional Continental model found within the 
club of international commercial arbitration, a model of ‘auxiliary justice’, where the 
duty of counsel is to clarify and aid the judges in rendering good justice. No matter 
what the causes of this transformation, it is clear that “the Anglo-American model of 
the business enterprise and merchant competition is tending to substitute itself for the 
continental model of artisans and corporatist control over the profession.” There is 
no doubt that Anglo-American litigators have changed the landscape of arbitration 
and in many ways may have changed some of its aims.
This battle between the grand old men and the technocrats in order to dominate the 
field of international commercial arbitration is similar to the battle between the 
lawyers and non-lawyers within the arbitration of construction disputes described by 
Flood and Caiger32. Both sides try to “monopolise fields through the process of
26 n 2 above, 51
27 ibid 31
28 ibid 53
29 ibid 55
30 ibid 56
31 ibid 39
32 J. Flood and A. Caiger, “Lawyers and Arbitration: The Jurdification of Construction Disputes”, 
MLR 56:3 (1993)412
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jurdification”33. Bourdieu states, “The juridical field is the site of competition for 
monopoly of the right to determine the law. Within this field there occurs a 
confrontation among actors possessing technical competence which is inevitably 
social and which consists essentially in the socially recognised capacity to interpret a 
corpus of texts sanctifying a correct or legitmised vision of the social world”34. Thus, 
what is happening with the international commercial arbitration in both the west and 
the east could be described as jurdification.
This transformation of the system and the almost non-existence of the form of 
arbitration that was previously seen as successful has not been damaging, as 
arbitration is far from withering away. On the contrary, arbitration is growing and the 
community, far from dissolving, seems to be forming a nucleus of a sort of offshore 
justice. This success could be explained quite easily. The main aim of arbitration is 
to avoid one of the parties’ national courts therefore the ability to achieve that 
through a forum that is close to the general model of the courts is even better. 
Dezalay and Garth say the current model “can be much better understood as simply a 
delocalized and decentralized market for the administration of international 
commercial disputes, connected by more or less powerful institutions and individuals 
who are both competitive and complementary.” These notional benefits of 
arbitration could be altered to become its flaws, as at the same time certain 
shortcomings can be perceived as advantages. This all depends on the aims of the 
players of that particular dispute and thus that particular arbitration. After all, 
arbitration can be anything the parties want it to be; there are limited rules and 
regulations that may restrict party autonomy.
2.3 The Discourse
The perceptions of the leading arbitration players are similar and in some ways 
repetitive. There is no doubt that many of the writers quote other writers in their 
work and vice versa making the discourse spherical in character. Examination of
33 ibid
34 P. Bourdieu, “The force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field”, (R. Terdiman trans.) 
Hastings L.J. 38 (1987), 805, 8017
35 ibid 58
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these writers has led to the conclusion that a promotional campaign is being carried 
out by these characters for the great virtues of arbitration. However, to the parties, 
the three main advantages are flexibility of procedure, enforceability of the award 
and confidentiality. A recent survey conducted by Queen Mary College, University 
of London into the attitudes and practices surrounding international arbitration found 
that the majority (73%) of corporations prefer arbitration to resolve their cross border 
disputes than litigation through national courts. The study consisted of interviews 
and online questionnaires to 150 in-house lawyers based at major corporations 
around the world.36 In addition, 95% of corporations expect to continue using 
international arbitration.
International commercial arbitration is an essential dispute resolution mechanism for 
international trade and commerce. Sir Robert Jennings defines commercial 
arbitration as “uncommonly well adapted to developing new rules and practices 
better suited to the conditions of the modem world, and to finding new and 
reasonable accommodations between the reasonable needs of both host state and 
foreign investor.”37 Berger goes even further and asserts, “the future development of 
world trade relations is depending on the existence and well functioning of a 
generally accepted, easily comprehensible and manageable extra-judicial dispute 
settlement process through arbitration.” Arbitration is seen as fundamental to world 
trade and a necessary incentive to foreign investment.
Bockstiegel explains the practical motives behind arbitration, which are that states 
will press for the jurisdiction of their courts for reasons of sovereignty and national
IQ
prestige, while foreign parties will press for avoiding the states’ courts. A foreign 
enterprise will fear the possible collision of interests of the judges in certain 
jurisdictions, where they rely on the state for salaries, advancement and social 
security. The state, thus, has many means of exerting pressure on them. The mere
“International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices 2008”,
http://www.pwc.co.uk/eng/publications/intemational arbitration 2008.html
37 R. Jennings, “Forward” in M. Hunter & A. Redfem, Law and Practice o f International Commercial 
Arbitration, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986)
38 K. P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration, (Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
1993), v
39 K. BOckstiegel, Arbitration and State Enterprise, (London: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
1984), 17
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possibility of this is enough of a reason for foreign private enterprises to try to avoid 
the jurisdiction of the national courts of the contracting state enterprise. Thus, the 
natural solution is an international arbitration tribunal. This fear is also relevant even 
when the home contracting side is a private entity. Professor Park agrees, “arbitration 
and mediation impose themselves on transactions with foreign dimensions as means 
to reduce the prospect of ‘home town justice’ in the other side’s courts. In an 
international sale or investment dispute, arbitration and mediation commend 
themselves not so much by virtue of their alleged efficiency, as by their utility in 
reducing both political and procedural bias.” 40
Hunter narrows the matters into the practical difficulties of playing, what he calls, the 
‘away game’. This includes issues such as all documents and witness testimony must 
be translated into the language used by the national court of one of the parties.41 It 
will also be necessary to engage lawyers with local rights of audience, which means 
that at least one of the disputing parties will not be able to have their own trusted 
lawyers in the driver’s seat. It must be admitted that these practical issues are real. 
Judge Brower recognises the importance of these complications and remarks in 
strong terms:
“By and large, parties to international transactions choose to arbitrate 
eventual disputes not because arbitration is simpler than litigation, not 
because it is cheaper, not because it is ‘final and binding’ and therefore 
substantially unreviewable, and not because arbitrators may have greater 
relevant expertise than national judges, although any one of those factors 
may be of interest; they arbitrate simply because neither will suffer its 
rights and obligations to be determined by the courts of the other party's 
state of nationality.”42
In Gaillard and Savage’s opinion, the most valuable advantage of international 
commercial arbitration is the substantial liberty that the parties possess to design 
their own dispute resolution mechanism, largely free of the constraints of national
40 C. Buhring-Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business, (Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1996), viii
41 M. Hunter “International Commercial Dispute Resolution: The Challenges of the Twenty- first 
Century”, Arbitration International, Vol. 16 No.4 (2000), 379, 381
42 R. B. Lillich, International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards “Judicialization” and 
uniformity? : The Twelfth Sokol Colloquium, (London: Brill Academic Publishers, 1994), ix
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law.43 There seems to be a consensus among writers that the birth of international 
commercial arbitration was mainly due to the need for parties to jointly construct a 
forum where they could resolve their disputes in a non-allied form.
Parties’ choice and autonomy cannot be underestimated; they are at the heart of 
arbitration. Ahdab proposes that this provides the universal environment of 
arbitration, allowing parties to keep their cultural identities enacted in a truly 
international trade. He says arbitration is the “bridge between cultures and a security 
rail for investment.”44 He quotes Mathieu de Boisseson, who he calls “one of the 
comer stones of French and European arbitration”, expressing what Ahdab says is a 
forgotten underlying choice behind arbitration, that is when parties resort to 
arbitration they are not waiving their linguistic and cultural identity, but “on the 
contrary, if they choose a truly international justice, an emanation of an international 
community of merchants, this is because they wished to refer to an authority and 
procedure able to decide on their dispute but also to respect their cultural 
originality.”45 Hence, not just avoiding one party’s national court, but also keeping 
their cultural values. In a lot of ways, arbitration is a compromise between different 
cultures and customs and this makes global trading easier. Therefore, according to 
Redfem and Hunter,46 international arbitration is the established method of 
determining international commercial disputes.
It is clear that one of the principle advantages of international commercial arbitration 
is adaptability. There is no uniform or standard method of procedure. What is 
supposed to happen is the arbitrators, the parties and their advisors will tailor a 
procedure to fit the dispute with which they are confronted. International 
commercial disputes take on a myriad of different forms. Redfem and Hunter state, 
“...any attempt to design a uniform arbitral procedure will be fraught with problems. 
It would also run the risk of defeating the purpose of international commercial 
arbitration, which is to offer both a binding and flexible means of resolving
43 E. Gaillard & J. Savage, International Commercial Arbitration, (London: Kluwer Law 
international, 1999), 1
44 A. Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab countries, (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 3
45 ibid 3-4
46 n 9 above
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disputes.”47 On the other hand, there are a set of characteristics that are important 
aspects of “the emerging global economy.”48 Nevertheless, the rule of thumb should 
be that only general guidance and a checklist may be offered as to ways of arbitrating 
international commercial disputes speedily and effectively, but the need for initiative 
and open-mindedness in adopting, adapting and developing the appropriate 
procedures to deal with particular disputes cannot be overstated.
International commercial arbitration occurs in different settings, these being either 
individual, with all arrangements made by the parties (ad hoc arbitration), or 
institutional, provided by administrative bodies e.g. ICC49, LCIA50 and CRCICA51 
(institutional arbitration). In either case, the result of arbitration proceedings is 
normally intended to be an award, which may if necessary be judicially recognised 
and enforced against a defaulting party. Arbitral awards are in fact backed by the 
judicial power of states and thus result in a legally binding decision equivalent to the 
judgment of a court. Thus, making it a real substitute for litigation.
Friedmann and Mestmacker offer what they consider a more profound reason for 
the favoured status of arbitration, which is obviously consistent with the previous 
writers mentioned. Firstly, there is opportunity of the parties to select a third party 
with special expertise and knowledge in a particular area and without special loyalty 
to a national legal system. Secondly, arbitration offers privacy and confidentiality 
and finally, there is the flexibility of the process. However, they propose another 
advantage; arbitration offers the possibility of highly specialised judgments. Thus, 
business people have access to judges who are familiar with the ‘usages of the trade’ 
and with the technicalities of the specific transaction being reviewed unlike national 
laws which have to respond to the needs of all citizens of the country. This allows 
arbitration to be tailored to the particular type of economic activity and to “be tied to 
the heterogeneity existing among economic agents.”53
47 ibid 88
48 n 2 above, 34
49 The International Commercial Court, Paris
50 London Court of International Arbitration, London
51 Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration, Cairo
52 D. Friedmann & E. Mestmacker, Conflict Resolution in International Trade, (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1993)
53 n 13 above, 158
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Mattli takes the value of the ability to tailor needs further and proposes that the 
institutions of arbitration such as ICC and LCIA can respond much more quickly to 
demands for new dispute-resolution rules and services than public courts. The reason 
is evident: private courts are demand driven. The very same market actors who 
request new rules also control these courts. Casella54 notes these forums are shaped 
from the “bottom” that is, by the firms that voluntarily finance and share the “club 
goods”. Thus, the demanders are also the suppliers; they possess full information on 
how new business practices or changing market conditions affect their dispute- 
resolution needs. Institutions, therefore, are capable of quickly responding to new 
needs by creating new services and by rewriting the charters of their courts. The 
frequent revisions of the rules of major arbitral institutions attest to the high degree 
of institutional flexibility of these forums. Casella goes on to say that international 
arbitration is understood to provide a “super-national” jurisdiction created by 
international businessmen, shaped by the evolution of international markets, and 
itself responsible for some of this evolution. It has been theorized as the road towards 
a transitional law, a “self-made economic law” created spontaneously by private 
traders and evolving independently of national parliaments and courts. Arbitration “is 
a kind of social jurisdiction, as opposed to state jurisdiction. International 
commercial arbitration is the jurisdiction of the business circles engaged in 
international trade.”55 This has led the ‘club’ to attempt to formalise a “transitional” 
procedural law and “lex mercatoria”. The former as procedural rules that govern the 
conduct of the arbitration and the latter a substantive law to govern the substance of 
the dispute. Both rest on the premise that local arbitration laws and municipal laws 
are by definition inapplicable to international arbitration, which is visualised as 
occupying a juristic universe of its own governed by the law of the international 
trading community, detached altogether from the mundane preoccupations of any 
single national system of arbitration law.
In my opinion, this description of arbitration as wholly controlled by business and 
finance is extreme to say the least. There is obviously no doubt that the corporate 
world plays a vital part in the success of arbitration, but this success would not be
54 ibid 156
55 ibid
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possible without the cooperation and recognition of national courts, not just for the 
enforcement of arbitral awards, but also in the enforcement of procedural orders in 
the assistance of tribunals. On of the other hand, one cannot deny the two major 
successes of this “club” on the international arena: the Model Law and New York 
Convention. Both of which have served international commercial arbitration and 
increased its use and familiarity across the globe.
The 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model 
Law) was drafted to provide harmonized standards for national legislation to regulate 
private arbitration processes. It also played an important role in setting minimum 
standards, at least on the statute books, for the arbitration processes. There are now 
37 countries in five different continents that have adopted or enacted legislation 
based on the Model Law. This includes Jordan.
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976 were followed by the UNCITRAL Model 
Law 1985 and were drawn up with the assistance of a wide range of experts hailing 
from different regions of the world. The drafting body for these two instruments was 
UNCITRAL, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, which 
was itself chosen on a regional basis from amongst members of the United Nations in 
order to ensure that it was broadly representative of the world's principal legal, 
social, cultural and economic systems. Nine members are from Africa, seven from 
Asia, five from Eastern Europe, six from Latin America, and nine from Western 
Europe ‘and others’. These others included Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United States.
The legislative history of the Model Law so painstakingly framed and discussed and 
then reviewed and finally adopted by the Commission, is a great success story. It is 
indicative of how an international body, by consensus, can draft an instrument for 
adoption by varying political, cultural and economic systems in the East and the 
West. On 11 December 1985, the General Assembly of the United Nations put its 
stamp of approval on the Model Law when it adopted a resolution recommending 
that all states give consideration to the Model Law view of the desirability of 
uniformity in the law of arbitral procedures and the specific needs of international 
commercial arbitration practice.
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In 1985, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Resolution approving the Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The resolution expressly recognised 
“the value of arbitration as a method of settling disputes arising in international 
commercial relations, because arbitration contributes to the development of 
harmonious international economic relations.”56 This Model aw will help eliminate 
any confusion that may be suffered by the parties and allow them to make a more 
informed choice as to the law and seat of arbitration.
The second instrument essential to modem arbitral procedure is the 1958 New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the
C*7
New York Convention) which has been ratified by 160 countries . It allowed arbitral 
awards to be enforced all over the world. Carbonneau puts it idealistically,
“The New York Convention has successfully developed a transitional 
judicial framework relating to arbitration -  a framework characterized by 
the reference to emerging international commercial realities and the 
dynamic interplay between the content of an international instrument and 
the interpretive and enforcement powers of national courts. The 
convention truly international stature and law making capacity are built 
upon two factors: its passive and largely symbolic function of codifying 
an existing and emerging international consensus on arbitration, and its 
endorsement by national legal processes that seek to affirm and integrate 
the convention’s content and underlying intent and thereby, entrench the 
Transnational recognition of and support of arbitration.” 58
Nariman explains the journey to the most successful multilateral convention so far 
adopted by the United Nations. He sees the hunt for a commercial dispute resolution 
process as caused by the disintegration of colonial empires, the establishment of 
independent nation states and the increased growth of trade between them. The New 
York Convention was bom out of the failure of the 1927 Geneva Convention as an 
effective treaty for the enforcement of foreign awards. In 1953, the International
56 United Nations Commission On International Trade Law UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration 1985 with amendments as adopted in 2006, vii, 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdFenglish/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998 Ebook.pdf
57 As at June 31,2004
58 T. E. Carbonneau, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Melting-the Lances and Dismounting the Steeds, 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 67
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Chamber of Commerce (the ICC) took the initiative for drafting a new instrument 
concerning foreign arbitration awards and submitted it to the United Nations. This 
was to become the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958. Under the Convention, almost in one bound, foreign 
arbitral awards became more acceptable and easier to enforce than foreign 
judgments. Thus, cementing the place of arbitration across the world.
International commercial arbitration has become big legal business and national legal 
systems compete for international arbitration cases. This is due to the increase in 
world trade and consequently the conflict potential of international transactions. 
Thus, international commercial arbitration has become a lucrative source of revenue 
for the countries hosting arbitration tribunals, especially now as it has developed into 
a “growth industry.”59 Legislatures all over the world, including in the Middle East, 
have begun to respond to the needs of international commerce and have enacted new 
arbitration laws as “marketing strategies”, signaling to the international commercial 
community that their legal environment is user friendly and is conditioned for 
commercial services. However, according to Caron, this is not necessarily favourable 
for the parties. He says; “This is not to imply that there is a perfect market. A 
limiting factor is that consumer knowledge often is incomplete. Even for the 
knowledgeable consumer, there are so many variables to weigh that it can be quite 
difficult to select the ‘best’ mechanism.”60 Consequently, there is more confusion 
than choice.
Goldman is also pessimistic about the trend towards harmonisation and argues that 
identical rules found in different legal systems or arbitration rules may in practice 
give rise to contrasting solutions due to the traditional differences between nations 
and the differing pace with which states accept new ideas.61 Bourdieu offers another 
explanation for the difficulties surrounding international harmonisation and for some 
of the complications of international institutions.62 As these rules rely in great part on
59 n 1 above, 55
60 B. E. Carter, D. D. Caron, F. Roessler, M.S. Millhauser, T. E. Dawson, Reporter, “Comparative 
Analysis of International Dispute Resolution Institutions,” 85 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. (1991) 64
61 E. Gaillard & J. Savage, International Commercial Arbitration, (London: Kluwer Law 
international, 1999)
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the lawyers of individual states and since these lawyers are trained nationally, and for 
the most part make their careers nationally, it is not surprising that they seek, as a 
matter of course, to deploy their ways of thinking and practising in the construction 
of international institutions. This “makes the international, the site of a regulatory 
competition between essentially national approaches.”63
Berger also criticises the legislature’s eagerness to meet the concerns and needs of 
the foreign consumer, which have led to the phenomenon of private lawmaking.64 
Draft arbitration laws are designed and discussed by private committees of experts, 
comprising lawyers from private practice, law professors, interested arbitral 
institutions and representatives from other lobbying groups. These private 
committees rarely consider the needs of the local community and the way the new 
arbitration legislation would fit within the state’s legal system.
Hunter argues that all this is not enough, an innovative system that satisfies the needs 
of commerce is required.65 There is no doubt that arbitration is a useful refinement of 
state-provided dispute resolution and will always be necessary, but he criticises this 
as “no more than refinements applied to a system that has been in use for tens of 
thousands of years. They are not truly innovative developments that are capable of 
providing a real response to the rapidly changing environment in which international 
commerce is conducted.”66 Now we see the clear lines between the theory of 
arbitration and its practice. It seems perfect on paper, however when taken and 
modified in different settings and environments, cracks start to show. At present, 
there are calls from many writers for an alternative to arbitration in the same way as 
arbitration is an alternative to litigation.
David adequately summarises the main motives behind resorting to arbitration; 
improving the administration of justice, the search for another justice, the search for
c n
conciliation, and for a dispute resolution process outside the province of the courts. 
He says in the first series of cases, parties want the dispute to have the same
63 ibid viii
64 n 38 above
65 n41 above
66 ibid 392
67 R. David, Arbitration in International Trade, (Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publication, 1985)
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conclusion, which would have been given by the court, but they expect this solution 
to be given in better conditions by an arbitration tribunal. This way the dispute will 
be settled more quickly, cheaper, after a less formal procedure, by persons who are 
trusted by the litigants or who have technical knowledge not to be expected in the 
case of ordinary judges. In the second group of cases, the parties want their disputes 
to be settled with regards to substance by a different set of rules i.e. not the law of the 
state, but by rules derived from commerce and commercial usages. The third 
category of cases, the parties want a solution that is acceptable and voluntarily 
enforceable by them both, so that smooth relations might continue between them in 
the future. In the fourth series of cases, the parties resort to arbitration because the 
nature of the dispute cannot be resolved by a court. This arises especially if the 
arbitrator is called to fill in gaps in a contract or to vary the terms of the contract. 
Parties do not resort to arbitration for one purpose alone, there are a variety of 
motives. However, nearly always, parties will appreciate the fact that, in arbitration 
hearings, there is less solemnity and less bureaucracy, procedure is less rigid and the 
discussion takes place in a more peaceful climate.
On a more empirical level, a study on the advantages of arbitration, where written 
and oral responses from 68 lawyers and arbitrators were obtained, found the “most 
significant advantages” of international arbitration were that it provided a neutral 
forum and that the New York Convention facilitated the enforcement of awards. 
Other “important advantages” included the confidentiality of the process, the 
expertise of the arbitrators, the lack of an appeals process, and limited discovery. 
Nothing seems to be surprising there but the study by Naimark and Keer69 who 
surveyed parties and lawyers involved in arbitrations administered by the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA) from January to November 2000 produced different 
results. One of the questions in the survey asked participants to rank a variety of 
factors “in order of their importance IN THIS DISPUTE ONLY.” The factors were 
“speed of outcome,” “privacy,” “receipt of a monetary award,” “a fair and just 
outcome,” “cost-efficiency,” “finality of a decision,” “arbitrator expertise,” and
68 C. R. Drahozal “Of Rabbits and Rhinoceri: A Survey of Empirical research on International 
Commercial Arbitration”, Journal o f International Arbitration, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2003), 23
69 R. W. Naimark & S. E. Keer, “International Private Commercial Arbitration: Expectations and 
Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People”, 30 Int’l Bus. Law (2002), 203
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“continuing relationship with opposing party.” Far and away the highest ranked 
factor was “fair and just outcome,” which “was nearly twice as important as the next 
closest rankings.” By contrast, privacy and the desire to continue a relationship with 
the opposing party ranked at the bottom.
The low ranking of “continuous relations” was explained by Myers, who is the head 
of a major international construction group; “...proceedings which occurred after the 
completion of an [international construction] contract...are resolved in a distinctly 
adversarial atmosphere in which large sums of money are sought, with little or no 
“commercial downside” -  meaning that the commercial relationship has normally 
expired and the parties have nothing to lose by refusing to accommodate each other
70for the sake of continuous harmonisations of commercial relations.”
In conclusion, international commercial arbitration is an instrument devised by 
international trade and commerce to maintain control over their contracts and 
disputes. This is ensured by retaining a closed community with admission by 
invitation only and formulating norms that guarantee that arbitration will remain the 
dominant form of international dispute resolution. However, this traditional 
hegemony has started to be affected by the admission of American lawyers and will 
be affected further when developing countries grasp the virtues of arbitration and 
uses them to their advantage.
2.4 The Culture
As can be seen international commercial arbitration is a community with its own 
players, institutions, regulations, rules and discourse. Thus, leading some to contend 
that now we have a culture of “international commercial arbitration”. For the 
purposes of this section I will use Bourdieu definition of culture and that is a field 
that “is organised around a body of internal protocols and assumptions, characteristic
70 J. Myers, “Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration”, International 
Organization 55(4), Autumn 2001, 919, 935
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behaviours and self-sustaining values”71. Many see arbitration as a meeting point for 
different legal cultures, a place of convergence and interchange wherein practitioners 
from different backgrounds create new practices to help resolve international 
disputes effectively and efficiently. There is increasing discussion of a transitional 
culture common to practitioners, arbitrators and the parties involved in the arbitral 
process.72 The culture of arbitration is typically referred to as the gradual 
convergence in norms, procedures and expectations of participants in the arbitral 
process.73 Ginsburg74 states that arbitration culture can be facilitative, encouraging, 
efficient as well as an effective form of communication. Also, it can be monopolistic; 
trying to keep out new entrants with different cultural claims. Gray feels that in the 
past 20 years “we have come to some consensus as to what the basic arbitration 
procedures should be, as well as what should be the fundamental relationship 
between arbitration and the court.”75 The culture of arbitration contains sub-cultures, 
which sometimes seems like the only form of culture that is recognised. This is 
because there is no general consensus on what the culture of arbitration should 
constitute. These sub-cultures would be specific to a certain type of dispute or a 
certain sector, for example, construction or maritime.76
77Taniguchi argues there is “a distinct commercial arbitration culture in the West” , 
which non-westerners perceive as exclusionary. However, “arbitration has become a 
legitimate method of dispute resolution virtually everywhere in the world with a
78varying degrees and scope of application.” Therefore, “if arbitration culture means 
the popularity of arbitration and enthusiasm about it, there is today a growing
70international commercial arbitration culture.”
71 P. Bourdieu, “The force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field”, (R. Terdiman trans.) 
Hastings L.J. 38 (1987), 805, 806
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Assuming that there is some sort of international commercial arbitration culture, 
what does it actually look like, is it the design and production of the grand old men 
or the technocrats? There are in some ways two general cultures, which represent the 
particular groups of players. However, there are similarities between the groups and 
the cultures, “this fight for power contains the true transformation that is taking place 
-  the passage from one mode to another for the production of arbitration and the 
legitimating of arbitrators.”80
In the original culture of the grand old men, the arbitration market selected those at 
the top of their domestic profession to become senior arbitrators: “high profile, high
Q |
visibility...national aura behind them.” Those arbitrators see arbitration as “a duty 
not a career.. .Arbitrators should render an occasional service, provided on the basis 
of long experience and wisdom acquired in law, business, or public service.” 
Arbitral decisions were not revered so much for their legal accuracy or precision, as 
for their sense of fairness and practical wisdom. These kinds of arbitrators were often 
an expert from the same industry as the parties, who exercised a sort of paternal 
authority.83
The arbitrator was expected to render a just and equitable result, even if that 
sometimes meant disregarding the express terms of the contract or the clear 
provisions of the chosen law. These modes of decision-making are sometimes 
described in terms of formal doctrines, such as amiable compositeur and ex aequo et 
bono,84 which expressly authorise arbitrators to disregard the stricture of so-called
Of
auxiliary rules, such as statutes of limitations, in order to do justice. The doctrine of 
amiable compositeur, which is often translated to mean “author of friendly 
compromise,” has been described as “allowing] arbitrators to decide cases in 
accordance with customary principles of equity and international commerce. This 
power permits arbitrators to arrive at an award that is fair in light of all
80 n 2 above, 39
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circumstances, rather than in strict conformity with legal rules [but] . . . generally 
[they] may not disregard mandatory provisions of substantive law or the public 
policy of the forum state.”86 The doctrine of ex aequo et bono is very similar to 
amiable compositeur, except that the powers of the arbitrators are slightly broader, 
enabling them to disregard even mandatory provisions of substantive law in order to 
reach an equitable outcome.
In the newer developing culture of the technocrats, the large Anglo-American law 
firms that have come to dominate the international market of business law have 
created an arbitration culture that is based on rationalisation of arbitration. This has 
facilitated their introduction into the ‘arbitration club’ and then allowed their legal 
techniques to establish their pre-eminence. The arbitration culture of the technocrats 
is similar to the court process with procedural and substantial law restraints and is 
certainly much more restrictive than the culture created by the grand old men. “The 
Anglo-American model of the business enterprise and merchant competition is 
tending to substitute itself for the Continental model of legal artisans and corporatist
oo
control over the profession.” The younger arbitrators strongly criticise the 
vagueness and uncertainty of lex mercatoria and emphasise the vital importance of 
technical sophistication, which of course they have.
Fuller argues that judicial function, and in the same way arbitration, lies not in the 
substance of the conclusion reached, but in the procedures by which that substance is
OQ
guaranteed. One does not become a judge by acting intelligently and fairly, but that 
is precisely why one becomes an arbitrator. Fuller feels that when arbitration started 
to become concerned with procedure, it lost its real purpose, which is a decision by 
an expert arbitrator that is familiar with the parties’ trade customs and that is 
respected and voluntary. “It was never about the procedures.”90
86 n 84 above
87 n 2 above
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However, the problem is that arbitration as practised today resembles litigation. The 
senior generation of arbitrators believe that the original success of arbitration was 
finding tailored solutions in order that the parties preserve their long-term contractual 
or business relationships. “The senior generations defended the status quo of 
informal, compromise-oriented arbitration close to businesses and the lex mercatoria, 
insisting that only very experienced and scholarly individuals, selected on the basis 
of their excellent legal careers, had the stature and judgment to resolve such cases.”91 
They say the technocrat’s model is a “highly litigious process.”92 The technocrats on 
the other hand argue, “arbitration can only be successful and legitimate if practiced 
in a more legalised fashion.”93
In my opinion, both sides can be argued, it all depends on what the parties want. If 
the parties want to protect their relationships, for example, then the grand old men 
arbitration culture is more appropriate but if they want an offshore court-like 
substitute, then the technocrats’ model serves the parties best. Commercial 
arbitration handles disputes among business people who are practical people more 
concerned with efficiency than theory, more with money than ideals. Thus, the 
dispute resolution device they prefer may acquire different characteristics than those 
in general use.94
When examining the arbitration landscape carefully, one sees a number of norms that 
are still in dispute between the two groups of arbitrators. One of these is the 
suitability of the arbitrator to carry out some form of mediation within the arbitration 
process. The debate revolves around whether an arbitrator should adapt his 
procedures to the case at hand, and even at times go as far as ignoring procedural 
limitations, if he senses that there is a possibility for a settlement. In some situations, 
it is appropriate to assume the role of a mediator and “exert the gentle pressure of 
threat of decisions to induce agreement.”95 Fuller distinguishes the moralities of 
arbitration and mediation. He says that mediation lies in finding an optimum
91 n 2 above, 10
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93 n 2 above 10
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settlement, where one party gives what it values less for what it values more. 
Arbitration, on the other hand, lies in reaching a decision according to the law of the 
contract. I think this distinction is artificial, there is absolutely no reason why these 
two processes cannot overlap or be used together to achieve the best results.
Parties in the Middle East, due to their history and culture, generally prefer and feel 
that they have more in common with the grand old men’s way, but find themselves 
forced into arbitrations that look more and more like an adjudication before a 
national court. The majority of recognised arbitrators in Jordan are highly 
experienced lawyers and engineers who have practised in commercial and 
construction cases. Their symbolic capital is their extensive experience in law and 
engineering. Now, more and more young lawyers recognise the potential success that 
arbitration can provide and use their bilingualism and western education as their 
form of symbolic capital. The more that they look like their western counterparts, the 
more successful they think they will be. Obviously, when foreign investors, 
companies and their lawyers, look for lawyers in Amman, they would rather deal 
with people that they think understand them. Thus, they recognise similar cultures 
and this becomes the template for social interaction, making it easier for them to 
work together.
The ‘arbitration club’ consists of key players who play both counsel and arbitrators. 
The international arbitration community, which is connected by personal and 
professional reactions, is cemented by conferences, journals and actual arbitration. 
These same individuals from each country possess very similar symbolic capital and 
are repeat players. This is true for both the Middle East and the West.
The professional status of international practitioners is in part what confers 
legitimacy, real and perceived, on the international commercial arbitration system. 
International arbitration is derived from party consent, which is orchestrated by 
international lawyers. It is the international lawyer who selects the rules, laws, sites 
and arbitrators on behalf of the client. International lawyers wield dramatically more 
power in the international commercial arbitration system than their counterparts do in 
domestic litigation. International commercial arbitration is a jurisprudence 
confidentielle, “a confidential or secret theory and practice of law, known to a few
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key lawyers who sometimes perform legal functions in accord with it.”96 The 
functioning of the entire system depends on party confidence (to select arbitration) 
and national court accreditation (to enforce arbitration agreements and awards). With 
expanding global markets, law is an ever more important tool for mediating trade
07when parties lack a common culture.
tViThis chapter explored the evolution of arbitration in the West in the 20 Century. It 
notes a clash between the ‘grand old men’ of arbitration and the ‘technocrats’. These 
two groups have very different perceptions of how arbitration should be conducted 
and more fundamentally what its aims and spirit should be. The arbitration world has 
recognised great players from either group and, to some extent, this has confused 
what could be seen as the culture of arbitration. However, certain norms and 
principles have been established within arbitration, most notably party autonomy and 
third party intervention, which is common to both sides. Whether there is an 
international commercial arbitration culture or not, there is certainly an arbitration 
community of recognised players with specific symbolic capital which is restrictive 
and closed and therefore perceived by non-westerners as potentially discriminatory 
and susceptible to bias. The interaction of this culture with the Middle East will be 
examined in chapter four after the longstanding principles of dispute resolution in 
Islamic law and tradition are outlined in chapter three.
96 W. M. Reisman, Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades and Reforms, (London: Collier Macmillan 
Publishers, 1979), 12
97R. L. Abel & P.S.C. Lewis, “Putting Law Back into the Sociology of Lawyers”, in R. L. Abel & 
P.S.C. Lewis (eds.), Lawyers in Society: Comparative Theories, (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 1989)
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Chapter Three 
Sulh: The Essence of Islamic Dispute Resolution
“Shall I  inform you o f merit greater than fasting, charity, and prayer? It 
is in the conciliation o f people”
Prophet Mohammad Sall-Allahu Alayhi Wa Sallam 
(s.a.a.w), Hadith of Abi al Darda reports
In part one, we explored the western rationality of dispute resolution and more 
specifically arbitration. In part two, I will outline the overarching principles of 
eastern rationality and how it interacts with the western version. In this chapter, the 
reconciliatory nature of the Middle Eastern dispute resolution will be traced back to 
pre- Islam and will show how it was confirmed and adopted by Islam.
Dispute resolution in Islam is closely bound to the textual language and the 
interpretation of both the Qur ’an and Sunna. In Islam, arbitration is the preferred 
dispute resolution process in any type of dispute including leadership, wars and 
marital disagreements. There are a number of examples in history to demonstrate the 
success of arbitration in the avoidance of bloodshed and crisis. Arbitration as a 
concept and as a mechanism has a long history and an entrenched position in the 
Arab and Islamic Middle East. Shari ’ah is not only a source of law, it also informs 
cultural, economic and political life in the Middle East. Majeed argues, “it is clear 
that tides in the vast ocean of commerce and law are changing. Increasingly, there is 
a questioning of legislation imported from Western sources, and calls for a return to 
the Shari'ah."'
The main divergence between conceptions of justice in the East and West is 
concisely explained by a Jordanian lawyer who was a former member of the World 
Bank Dispute Resolution Committee “Islam has a special understanding o f justice. 
The justice in the West is like maths; calculated. It is exactly what you agreed on, but 
in Islam it is very important to extract the bitterness o f the wronged party. This could
1 N. Majeed, “Good Faith and Due Process: Lessons from the Shari’ ah” Arbitration International, 
Vol. 20, No. 1 (2004), 97
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not happen except i f  he gets all his losses back and feels that the wrong has been 
corrected regardless o f the previous agreement. The injured party must be 
compensated for their actual loss regardless o f the a g reem en tOn the other hand, 
he also maintained that “arbitration in Arab and Islamic history has almost the same 
rules and principles as in our modern times. The most important principle o f 
arbitration is “In his house you go to the arbitrator ” which means you cannot have 
the arbitrator in an environment that will affect his impartiality and therefore the 
parties must respect the position o f the arbitrator and go to his house. This insulates 
the arbitrator from any pressure he may experience in another person’s house and 
confirms his special status and importance. This is one o f the most important 
principles o f arbitration which Shari ’ah insists on. Neutrality must be complete in all 
matters including the actual place where the arbitration takes place -  an arbitrator 
is a judge. These ancient principles are shared with modern principles
A distinct feature of Islam is the codified set of rules and regulations that regulate 
and control society in its behavioural aspects, as well as in its relations towards the 
state. Islam includes a just economic order, a well balanced social organisation and 
codes of civil and criminal laws. The fundamentals of Shari ’ah contain two parts; 
first rules governing ibadat (devotion of rituals), which are legislated by God and 
explained by the Prophet, and second rules which govern, for example, civil 
transactions and state affairs. Islam is not just a religion, it is a way of life. Din—the 
Arabic word for religion, “. . . encompasses theology, scripture, politics, morality, 
law, justice, and all other aspects of life relating to the thoughts or actions of men . . .  
it is not that religion dominates the life of a faithful Moslem, but that religion . . .  is 
his life.”3
This chapter explores “the duty to reconcile” imposed on all Muslims. Sulh 
(amicable settlement) is a settlement grounded upon compromise negotiated by the 
disputants themselves or with the help of a third party. In Islam, Sulh is ethically and 
religiously the superior way for disputants faced with conflict. Sulh is also a duty on 
any person who is adjudicating between the conflicting parties, whether a judge
2 Interview with Jordanian lawyer in Amman in June 2004
3 D.S. Roberts, Islam: A Westerner’s Guide-From Business and the Law to Social Customs and 
Family Life, (London: Hamlyn, 1981) 67-68
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(qadi) or an arbitrator (hakam). Sulh is a legal instrument intended not only for the 
purpose of private conciliation among individuals and groups in lieu of litigation, it 
is also the procedural option that could be resorted to by a qadi (judge) within the 
context of his courtroom or an arbitrator in his conference room. Thus, Sulh is part of 
every Islamic dispute resolution mechanism.
This chapter also traces the validity of arbitration in SharVah and clarifies its 
conciliatory nature. Arbitration is defined in SharVah as “two parties choosing a 
judge to resolve their dispute and their claim. Traditionally, the differences between 
arbitration and formal dispute resolution through judiciary...the parties themselves 
select the arbitrator and... the parties themselves must voluntarily accept and obey the 
decision of the arbitrator.”4 Like a judge, ultimately an arbitrator in Islam could 
impose his will on the parties based on the arguments presented before him and 
Shari ’ah. However, the fact that the arbitrator has been chosen by the parties lends 
legitimacy to his decision, more so than a judge appointed by the state. Therefore, 
arbitration is preferred to adjudication.
In the last part of this chapter, Jordanian arbitrators describe how important 
arbitration was and still is in the country and the region. They explain how arbitration 
has a long and honourable history within Arab and Islamic cultures, a tradition in the 
heart and mind of every Jordanian and Arab.
After the advent of Islam in the seventh century, the Arabian Peninsula became the 
geographical base for the Islamic state, ruled by the Prophet Mohammad (s.a.a.w) 
and his successors, the Caliphates Rashdeen5. There are two main sources of Islamic 
law, firstly, Shari *ah which is the Qur ’an that God revealed to Mohammad (s.a.a.w) 
who is considered to be God’s final Prophet. Then there is the Sunna, which is the 
words and deeds of Mohammad (s.a.a.w). There are also three secondary sources of 
Shari ’ah\ Ijma, Qiyas and Ijtihad, which will be explained in detail below.
4 H. Mahassini, “General Principles of Islamic Law relating to International commercial arbitration” 
The ICC International Court o f Arbitration Bulletin, Special Supplement, Vol. 3, No. 1 May (1992), 
21,23
5 Rashid means “wise”: those who immediately succeeded the Prophet
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Islam is a religion originating from the teachings of Mohammad (s.a.a.w) of the 
Qur'an and Sunna. The Qur’an contains 114 suwar (chapters) and 6616 ay at (verses) 
and 77,934 words which cover virtually all aspects of life and society. Mohammad 
(s.a.a.w) as the Prophet became the ruler and lawgiver of a new Islamic society first 
in Mecca and then in the Medina from A.D. 622. When Mohammad (s.a.a.w) acted 
as a judge in his community, he acted in the function of hakam (arbitrator). 
Mohammad (s.a.a.w) attached great importance to being appointed by the believers 
as a hakam in their disputes, as it renewed their belief in him as a Prophet and as a 
person. Therefore, as long as Mohammad (s.a.a.w) was alive, he was regarded as the 
ideal person to settle disputes between believers through conciliation.
The Sunna is the term used to refer to the normative behaviour, decisions, actions 
and tacit approvals and disapprovals of the Prophet. The Sunna has been heard, 
witnessed, memorized, recorded and transmitted from generation to generation (as 
the Arabs have a great oral tradition).6 The Sunna is the second source of Islamic law 
after the Qur ’an. The Muslim nation follows the Prophet and learns from him even 
today.
The Sunna was compiled into collections according to the recorder’s name and 
referred to as hadith.1 By the third Hijri (lunar) century, there were six recognised 
groups of hadiths which are considered to be accurate among the Muslims: al 
Bukhari (256/870), Muslim (251/865), Abu Daud (275/888), al Tirmidhi (279/892), 
al Nasa’i (303/915), Ibn Majah (273/886), with the first two collections being the
Q
most respected. The authenticity attributed to these collections was determined 
based on the scrutiny of references and the cross checking of witnesses employed by 
the respective collectors, as well as the isnad (credibility of the chain of authorities 
attesting to the accuracy of a particular tradition).9 These hadiths are an important 
part of Shari ’ah and thus Muslims’ lives.
6 M. C. Bassiouni and G. M. Badr, “The Shari’ah: Sources, Interpretation, and Rule Making,” 1 
UCLA J. Islamic & Near E. L. (2002) 135, 141
71. Faruqi and L. Faruqi, The Cultural Atlas o f Islam, (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1986), 114
8 n 6 above
9 F.M. Kutty, “The Shari’a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration” (2005) Bepress Legal 
Series, 875
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The companions of the Prophet would first consult the Qur ’an, and then the Sunna 
before deciding on any issue or problem in accordance with this aye:
“O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Apostle and those in 
authority from among you; then i f  you quarrel about anything, refer it to 
Allah and the Apostle, if  you believe in Allah and the last day; this is 
better and very good in the end. ”10
This process is still followed by Muslims. If these two primary sources are silent, 
then they resorted to extrapolating and deducing from the first principles gleaned 
from the two divinely inspired sources of the Qur’an and Sunna. To aid Muslims of 
that time and the future, the second Caliph of Islam, Umar ibn al-Khatt’ab, instituted 
the body of legal opinions of the companions of the Prophet as a tertiary source that 
could be consulted by later jurists (fuqaha).H It is clear that Islamic law has three 
distinguishable facets, namely revelation (the Qur 'an and the Sunna, which is also 
considered divinely inspired), interpretation and application.
Early Muslim jurists and scholars set out to canonize the Sunna and developed fiqh 
to systematize the development of the law.12 A distinction must be made between 
Shari ’ah and many of the technical legal rules derived from the Qur ’an and Sunna 
through f iq h 13 A faqih14, or jurist, derives these rules and thus his decision is not 
eternal, but open to re-interpretation in the light of, inter alia, new social, economic, 
educational and political circumstances and needs.15
The doctrines of the different sects of Islam have produced an immense wealth of 
differing opinions ranging from extreme conservative opinions to the most liberal 
ones, however, none of those opinions can contradict the Qur’an and Sunna. The 
field of the settlement of disputes is one of the richest fields of differing opinions 
between the sects of Islamic law.
10 Verse 59 in SuraNisa (Women)
11 n 7 above, 275
12 M. H. Kamali, “Source, Nature and Objectives of Shariah,” 33 Islamic Quarterly (1989), 211,212
13 ibid
14"A Faqih means a jurist; an expert in the field of law, who possesses outstanding knowledge of 
revealed sources and methodology, and the intelligence to make use of the basic sources through 
independent reasoning and the principles provided by the Shari 'oh.
15 A. G. Muslim, “Islamic Laws in Historical Perspective: An Investigation Into Problems and 
Principles in the Field of Islamization” 31 Islamic Quarterly (1987), 69
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It is important to note that the areas governed by strict, detailed and clear rules in 
Islam are relatively limited and are mostly related to religious practices such as 
praying and fasting. The relationship between members of society in different fields, 
including dispute resolution, is governed by general principles interpreted and 
explained by the three secondary sources of Islamic law; Ijma, Qiyas and Ijtihad.
The qiyas is reasoning by analogy to solve a new legal problem. The Ijtihad is 
defined as the intellectual effort by a mujtahid (one who is qualified to do ijtihad, a 
jurist consult) in deriving rules consistent with the first principles of Islam. Ijtihad 
could refer to the use of qiyas to extend a rule or independently taking account of the 
Maqasid al Shari ’ah (the higher purposes or objectives of the Shari ’ah). To carry out 
these techniques it was imperative that jurists, "be familiar with the broad purposes 
of the Law, so that when choices are to be made, they will be able to choose 
interpretations which accord with the spirit of the Law.”16 In principle, the Shari’ah 
permits legal rules to be changed and modified in accordance with changing 
circumstances. The justification for qiyas and ijtihad is found in the Qur ’an and 
Sunna. As evidence of his support for Ijma, Akaddaf cites the Prophet Mohammad 
(s.a.a.w), “[m]y nation will not agree unanimously in error.”17 Ijma or consensus of 
the community is a third source of Islamic law. Once a fresh ijtihad or qiyas has been 
reached and a consensus develops around it (ratification by the community), then it 
becomes part of the corpus jurist of Islamic law. Khaliq describes that qiyas are often
1 ftused to apply Islamic principles to the modem era.
The major schools of Islamic jurisprudence represent various regional and doctoral 
approaches to solving legal questions at the beginning of the first two centuries of 
Islam. All Islamic scholars agree that the Qur ’an is the main source of Shari ’ah and 
thus, whatever is stated in the Qur ’an must be followed by Muslims, as well as the
16 B. Weiss, “Religion and Law: Middle Eastern Influences Upon the West” The American Journal o f 
Comparative Law, Vol. 26, No. 2, Proceedings of an International Conference on Comparative Law, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. February 24-25, 1977 (Spring, 1978), 199,204
17 F. Akaddaf, “Application Of The United Nations Convention on Contracts For The International 
Sale of Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law 
Principles?”, 13 Pace Int’L L. Rev. 1 (2001), 18
18 U. Khaliq, “Beyond the Veil?: An Analysis of the Provisions of the Women’s Convention in the 
Law as Stipulated by the Shari’ah", 2 Buff. Jour. Int’L L. 1 (1995), 8
71
Part 2
Sunna. The primary differences between the schools lies in the circumstances in 
which their doctrines use the three techniques of interpretation.
“The great jurists of Islam --Shafi'i, Abu Hanifah, Malik and Ahmad ibn 
Hanbal -- all understood the compound term usul al fiqh -not as the 
general principles of Islamic law, but the first principles of Islamic 
understanding of life and reality ...The faqihs of the classical period were 
real encyclopedists, masters of practically all the disciplines from 
literature and law to astronomy and medicine. They were themselves 
professional men who knew Islam not only as law..."1
Numerous schools of jurisprudence developed and began along geographical lines, in 
Medina and Kufa (Iraq), but later evolved around individual scholars or jurists.20 The 
four schools of Sunna jurisprudence are named after the respective founders: the 
HanafI School (Abu Hanifah. d.767), the Maliki School (Malik ibn Anas, d.795), the 
Shafi'i School (d.819), and the Hanbali School (d.855) 21 Each developed its own 
scholarship by interpreting the Qur ’an and Sunna using the three techniques: ijtihad, 
ijma and qiyas regarding many areas of Muslim life including dispute resolution.
3.1 Reconciliation in Pre-Islam
The Arabian Peninsula was inhibited by tribes who descented from a common
99ancestor. “It was to the tribe as a whole that individuals owed allegiance and it was
93from the tribe that protection of interests was obtained.” Tribal justice was 
administered by the chief of the tribe based on “a body of unwritten rules”24. These 
rules were adopted to a form suitable to their way of life, which used arbitration and 
conciliation extensively.25 How this worked in Jordan will be explored in chapter six. 
Tribal law is built upon two basic principles: (1) the principle of collective
191. Al- Faruqi, “Islamization of Knowledge: Problems, Principles and Prospective” in Islam: Sources 
and Purpose o f Knowledge, Seminar on Islamization of Knowledge, (Herndon, Virginia: International 
Institute of Islamic Thought, 1988), 34
20 ibid 62
21 G. Makdisi, “Legal History of Islamic Law and The English Common Law: Origins and 
Metamorphoses” 34 Cleveland State Law Review (1985), 3, 6
22 N.J. Coulson, A History o f Islamic Law, (Edinburgh: University Press, 1964), 9
23 ibid
24 ibid
25 S. Mahmassani, The Legislative Situation in the Arab Countries: its Past and Present, (2nd ed., Dar 
El-Elm Lil Malain)
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responsibility; and (2) the principle of retribution or compensation. The objective is 
not merely to punish the offender, but to restore the equilibrium between the 
offending and the offended families and tribes.26
Amicable settlement and conciliation existed pre-Islam as will be shown in chapter 
five. There were many dispute resolution customs and traditions among the Arab 
tribes. “Within the framework of tribal Arab society, chieftains (sheikhs), soothsayers 
and healers (kuhhan), and influential noblemen played an indispensable role as 
arbiters in all disputes within the tribe or between rival tribes”27. The authority and 
stature of these men served as sanctions for their verdicts. The decision of the 
hakam was final, but not legally enforceable. It was an authoritative statement as to 
what the customary law was or should be and later Islamic principles. In fact, 
Schacht refers to a hakam in such situations as “a lawmaker, an authoritative 
expounder of the normative legal custom or sunna” The sole objective of these 
third parties was conciliation and the maintenance of harmony. Some arbitrators 
would go to great lengths to produce the necessary compensation or inducement, 
even out of their own pockets, in order to persuade the feuding parties to agree to a 
Sulh.30
Disputes within the tribes and between the tribes would usually be resolved by 
arbitration or conciliation. “A suitable ad hoc arbitrator (hakam) was chosen by the
*3 1
parties to settle the dispute” . The arbitrator did not belong to a particular caste; the 
parties were free to appoint any person on whom they agreed. A hakam was chosen 
for his personal qualities and reputation, for example, if he belonged to a family 
famous for their competence in deciding disputes or for his supernatural powers. “A 
popular choice being the kahin, a priest of a pagan cult who claimed supernatural 
powers of divination.”
26 R. Patai, The Kingdom o f Jordan, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957)
27 A. Othman, ““And Amicable Settlement Is Best”: Sulh and Dispute Resolution in Islamic Law”, 
Arab Law Quarterly, 21 (2007), 66
28 M. Hamidullah, “Administration of Justice in Early Islam”, 11 Islamic Culture (1937): 163
29 J. Schacht, An Introduction To Islamic Law, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964), 8
30 A. El-Tayib, “The Ode (Qasidah)”, in The Cambridge History o f Arabic Literature: Arabic 
literature to the End o f the Umayyad Period, A.F.L. Beeston et el. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 68
31 n 25 above, 10
32 ibid
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The parties agreed on the choice of arbitrator, the course of action, and the question, 
which they were to submit to him. All of which will be recorded. If the hakam agreed 
to act, each party had to provide a security as a guarantee that they would abide by 
his decision. The decision of the hakam, which was final and its enforcement 
depended entirely on the arbitrator’s respectability and stature within society. 
Arbitrators used persuasive means to ensure that an award was complied with by the 
parties, including making an award easy to follow and convincing the offender that 
he had committed a wrong.
However, party autonomy was fundamental to arbitration in pre- Islam and continued 
to be important in Islam, just like in the West:
“The Arabs of Jahiliya (pre-Islamic period) knew arbitration because 
adversaries (be they individuals or tribes) usually resorted to arbitration 
in order to settle their disputes....Arbitration was optional and was left to 
the free choice of the parties. Arbitral awards were not legally binding, 
their enforcement depended solely on the moral authority of the 
arbitrator.”34
The arbitral proceedings were effective means of resolving disputes and ensuring 
harmony between conflicting parties. The arbitrators insisted that the parties attend 
the hearing which was a necessary condition for the validity of the arbitration. The 
process of arbitration relied upon the claimant proving his case and the respondent 
basing his defence on his oath. If a claimant did not prove his case, then he could 
ask the respondent to swear an oath denying the claim. If the respondent did so, then 
the claim would fail. The tribes before Islam declared their oath before the statue of 
Hobel (an idol) that stood in the Kabeh in Mecca.
The Prophet Mohammad (s.a.a.w) was chosen as an arbitrator before he became a 
prophet due to his honesty and trustworthiness and sometimes he was referred to as a 
kahin. One of the most famous disputes during that time was in relation to the black 
stone. This was a dispute between the sheikhs of Mecca over the placing of a holy
33 Kitab al-Aghani, Bulaq, 1285, vols. II, 164
34A. Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries, (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 11
35 Section 76 in The Medjella of Legal Provisions
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black stone.36 There was fierce disagreement between the tribes as to who would 
have the honour of choosing the position of the stone. They could not resolve this so 
they asked Mohammad (s.a.a.w) to find them a solution. He took his abaeh (robe) 
and placed the black stone in the middle of it. Then, asked each sheikh to hold a side 
of his abaeh and told them together they could all place the holy stone in whatever 
place they agree on collectively. This resolved the dispute.
In some areas of the Arab world, dispute resolution was relatively structured and 
permanent. According to Coulson, “the general picture of primitive customary tribal 
law of Arabia in the sixth century requires some qualification.”37 Mecca, for 
example, was a flourishing centre of trade that had a rudimentary system of legal 
administration with public arbitrators appointed that applied some sort of commercial 
law. In contrast, Medina was an agricultural area with some elementary forms of land 
tenure which also had a basic justice administration.38 However in both these cities,
' i Q
the sole basis of law lay in the recognition of established customary practice. The 
adherence to customs continued within Islam. AJ urf wal adah is a rule that allows 
reference to customs and established practices as a legitimate source of law, as long 
as, they do not contradict Shari ’ah. Urf or custom is of particular significance in our 
context as many of the rules of international commercial arbitration have evolved to 
the level of custom.40
Many of the rules of conduct practised before Islam continued to be honoured after 
its rise, especially customs relating to personal honour, hospitality and courage. The 
Prophet also encouraged such values as kindness, mercy and justice, which 
developed the earlier customs and practices of the region. The Prophet’s moral 
teachings are summed up in a tradition ascribed to him, in which he declared that he 
was “sent to further the principles of good character.”41 Thus, many of the positive 
tribal customs were incorporated into Islamic teaching and jurisprudence.
36 The black stone have become a holy stone in Islam
37 n 25 above, 10
38 ibid
39 ibid
40 n 6 above
41 J.A. Bellamy, “The Makarim al-Akhlaq by Ibn Abi-Dunya” Muslim World, LIII (1963), 100, 119
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3.2 Duty to Reconcile {Sulh) in Islam
The Qur’an encourages parties to use Sulh in order to resolve their disputes. 
“Reconciliation between them, and reconciliation is better”42 and in another aye "If 
two parties among the Believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace between them . . . 
make peace between them with justice, and be fair : For God loves those who are fair 
and just. "43 The Prophet Mohammad (s.a.a.w) also insisted on Sulh and said it was 
more rewarding than fasting, praying and offering charity. The Prophet encouraged 
compromise and mediated disputes between fighting clan members as well as those 
between his Companions and their creditors.44 A well-known hadith of the Prophet 
warns:
“Tom bring me lawsuits to decide, and perhaps one o f you is more skilled 
in presenting his plea than the other and so I  judge in his favour 
according to what I  hear. He to whom I  give in judgment something that 
is his brother’s right, let him not take it, for I  but give him a piece o f the 
Fire.”45
Sulh was the method preferred by the Prophet, who made it plain that he was 
sceptical of judicial proceedings, which were devised by man and therefore fallible. 
Parties who won their cases by dint of eloquence at the expense of truth were 
threatened with the direst sanctions.46 “Thus, the trial process is not regarded as an 
ultimate truth-finding mechanism that will lead to substantive justice. It can be 
tainted and subverted by the imperfect nature of man”47, therefore, it should be 
avoided when possible.
The second Caliph of Islam, Umar ibn al-Khatt’ab was unequivocally critical of 
adjudication: he was reported as saying, “Dispel the disputants until they settle 
amicably with one another (yastalatu); for truly adjudication leads to rancor.”48 An
42 Verse 128 Sura Nisa (Women)
43 Verse 9 in Sura AlHujurat (The Chambers)
44 n 27 above
45 ibid
46 ibid, 64
47 ibid, 69
48 ibid
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important legal treatise49 written by Molla Khusrew in the fifteenth century indicates 
“[Adjudication] is needed [only] when there is no Sulh between two litigants.”50 
However, an arbitrator or a judge cannot turn the parties away if they cannot be 
reconciled. This was confirmed by Umar ibn al-Khatt’ab, “And strive for conciliation 
so long as the rendering of judgment does not become evident to you.”51 
It is preferable to reconcile and settle disputes through Sulh to maintain the ties of 
family, brotherhood and community. In Shari 'ah, al-khayr al- ‘am (general good) is 
an overarching principle which is implied in the Qur 'an. It is intended to promote the 
public welfare of believers; and guide men to do good and avoid evil. More 
specifically, Shari 'ah is designed to protect the maslaha (public interest), since man 
is not always aware of what is good for him and his people, only God knows that 
which is in the best interest of all. Consequently, another principle of Shari 'ah is the 
collective interests of the believers as a whole; the interests of the individual are 
protected only in so far as they do not come into conflict with the general interest. 
Another principle of Shari 'ah is makarim al-akhlaq (good character) and believers 
are commanded by God to observe these principles in good faith. And to educate 
individuals to inspire faith and instil the qualities of trustworthiness and 
righteousness and establish adl (justice), which is one of the major themes of the 
Qur’an.5* Thus, “[c]ollectivity has a special sanctity attached to it in Islam”55, which 
has resulted in a duty being imposed on any person who has been chosen to resolve a 
dispute between parties to try to reconcile them first and foremost.
49 Titled Durar al-Hukkam f i  Shark Ghurar al-Ahk
50 n 27 above
51 ibid
52 “Fighting is enjoined on you, and h is an object of dislike to you; and it may be that you dislike a 
thing while it is good for you, and it may be that you love a thing while it is evil for you, and Allah 
knows, while you do not know.” Verse 216 in Sura Albaraa (Cow)
53 “O my son! keep up prayer and enjoin the good and forbid the evil, and bear patiently that which 
befalls you; surely these acts require courage” Verse 17 in Sura Lokman (Name of Prophet) and “O 
you who believe! avoid most of suspicion, for surely suspicion in some cases is a sin, and do not spy 
nor let some of you backbite others. Does one of you like to eat the flesh of his dead brother? But you 
abhor it; and be careful of (your duty to) Allah, surely Allah is Oft-returning (to mercy), Merciful.” 
Verse 11 in Sura Alhojrat (The Chambers)
54There are at least 53 instances where the Qur’an commands adl.
55 A. K. Brohi, “The Nature of Islamic Law and the Concept of Human Rights” in Human Rights in 
Islam, Report of a Seminar organized by the International Commission of Jurists, University of 
Kuwait and the Union of Arab Lawyers (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1980), 48
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3.2.1 Is Sulh an Unequivocal Duty?
Sulh is permissible in any dispute except “a Sulh that makes haram that which is 
halal and makes halal that which is haram.”56 Also, only fair and just Sulh is 
allowed by the Qur ’an as shown in this aye “make peace between them with justice, 
and be fair: For God loves those who are fair and just."51 Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 
751/1350) warned that many people did not give due weight to the equitability of
fO
Sulh and reconciled upon wrong, unjust settlements (Sulh zalim ja  ’ir). Examples of 
balanced settlements are those mediated by the Prophet between his Companions, 
when both sides equally cooperated to meet each other’s claims.59
A question that seems to be posed here is, what is the limitation of the duty to 
reconcile within Shari ’ah. Although it is more commendable that parties to a conflict 
work out a mutual agreement on how to solve their problem, jurists are conflicted as 
to whether a judge should favour Sulh and suspend adjudication when it is clear to 
the judge which party is liable. It seems that the quote from Umar above60 authorises 
a judge to decide the case if he clearly sees that one party is liable. This argument is 
supported by a comment attributed to Sufyan ibn Uyaynah (d. 198/814), who 
qualified Umar’s precedent : “We lay this down as a principle (only) if there is a 
doubt, and when there is a kinship between the parties. As for when it is clear which 
way judgment should be given, it is not obligatory upon him to turn them away.”61
Al-Sarakhsi, a great Hanafi jurist, (d. 490/1097) cites Umar’s tradition on Sulh, 
saying that a judge is under no obligation to proceed immediately with judging “if he 
wants Sulh”. In cases where the parties are related or where it is unclear where 
judgement should lie then a judge should try to restore harmony and prevent hostility
56 Abu Dawud (d. 275/889), Sunan AbT Dawud (d. 275/889), under Kitab al-Aqdiya (Beirut: Dar al- 
Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1996), vol. 2 (3594); Ibn Maja, Sunan Ibn Maja, ed. Bashshar Awwad Maruf 
(Beirut: Dar al-JTl, 1998)
57n43 above
58 n 27 above
59 M. ibn AbT Bakr, Ilam al-Muwaqqim an Rabb al-Alamln in Billah al-Baghdadl, M. al-Mutasim (ed) 
(Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabl, 1998), 1:112
60 “And strive for conciliation so long as the rendering of judgment does not become evident to you.”
61 n 27 above
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between the disputants.62 However, if a judge can easily see who is the righteous 
party then he must give judgement and only consider Sulh if the parties consented.
Ibn STrTn64 argued that judges should only reconcile the parties if the case had some 
legal obscurity or contradictory evidence. He emphasized that the qadi should 
confine himself to his adjudicative duty, for which disputants resort to him in the first 
place.65 Al-KasanT argued that it is merely ‘unobjectionable’ for a judge to turn 
disputants away towards Sulh as it is propelling them towards goodness and avoiding 
harm.66 The judge is not to persist in deterring them from an adjudication, though, 
and should adjudicate between them according to the Shari ’ah if they insist on it, for 
“there is no benefit in turning them away.”67
Al-Shafi indicates that a judge should command disputants to attempt Sulh and try to 
facilitate their conciliation. But this could only be permissible with the consent of the 
parties. “Al-Shafi warns the judge against judging if the decision is not plain to him, 
for this amounts to oppression. The judge has the burden of ascertaining exactly
zo
where judgment should lie, no matter how long it takes”. Al-Shirazi insists that the 
judge must command the parties to attempt Sulh even if the righteous claim is 
obvious. If they fail then judgement is obligatory. The majority of jurists prefer for a 
judge to steer parties towards Sulh, even if it is clear how he should judge the case.69
Othman describes the Maliki School to be stricter with regards to a qadi considering 
Sulh, if it is clear to a qadi how judgment should be given.70 It will not be acceptable 
among Maliki jurists to allow the wrongful party to escape liability due to a judge’s 
desire to apply Sulh. Even when they apply Umar’s precedent described above, they 
say that a judge should not deter the parties from adjudication more than once or 
twice. This is because Umar’s precedent is contingent upon the judge’s inability to
62 ibid
63 ibid
64 ibid
65 ibid
66 ibid
67 ibid
68 ibid, 75
69 ibid
70 ibid
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discover where the truth lies.71 However, if that is clear then he must implement 
justice by giving a judgement. A Hanafi jurist, al-Sananl pointed out that there is a 
prophetic tradition that makes it clear a judge should give priority to the 
reconciliation of parties rather than proceeding to judge, regardless of whether it is 
plain to him where judgment lies.72
From the Malikis school offiqh, Ibn Farhun emphasised that sulh should be strongly 
recommended in certain types of disputants and cases, which are the parties are 
related, they are people of high reputation and good standing in society, the dispute 
and hostility may be exacerbated, and it is not clear to the adjudicator where 
judgement should lie.73 In these circumstances in particular judges and arbitrators 
should try to command Sulh.
There is a version of Umar’s tradition that is slightly different from the one cited 
above: “Dispel adjudication between blood relations so that they reconcile with 
another; verily the rendering of judgment creates rancor among the people”.74 Thus, 
making Sulh a real option for a judge especially if the parties before him are related, 
in which case the preservation of family harmony should receive serious 
consideration. “The judge similarly should suspend adjudication if they are virtuous 
men or if he fears the deterioration of an already hostile situation” . If the arguments 
of each side are of equal strength and the subject matter of the case is vague or the 
case is obscure and difficult, then a qadi should not judge and must lead the parties to 
Sulh. 77
Clearly, there are authorities indicating the negative and hostile effects of a 
judgment, thus championing Sulh as the best way to resolve disputes, especially in 
cases that are difficult to decide and the parties’ kinship and social reputations are
*70
affected. However, there are jurists who do not approve of Sulh when it results in a
71 ibid
72 ibid
73 ibid
74 ibid
75 ibid
76 ibid, 77
77 ibid
78 ibid
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benefit to an undeserving or untruthful party therefore disappointing the expectations 
of the legally entitled one. This is why the consent of the parties is vital in Sulh, no 
matter who facilitates it. According to Jindani, “for an agreement to succeed there 
must be a consensus to a resolution of a dispute” . The consent of the parties as to 
their adjudicator is also well established in Shari ’ah in the form of arbitration, which 
is outlined in the next section. The parties choose a hakam whom they respect and 
trust to resolve their dispute, thus, party autonomy is the core of Sulh and arbitration.
3.3 Sulh in Arbitration
Shari’ah has not completely separated Sulh and arbitration. Much of the Qur’anic 
authority and hadiths supporting arbitration could also be used as authority for Sulh. 
The Qur ’an and the Sunna approve arbitration in the form of a third person chosen 
by the parties to resolve their disputes either through conciliation or adjudication.
3.3.1 Qur’an
Arbitration is approved by the Qur 'an and referred to in a number of ayat (verses) as 
an acceptable dispute resolution mechanism. For example,
1And i f  ye fear a breach between them twain (the man and wife), appoint 
an arbiter from his folk and an arbiter from her fo lk  I f  they desire 
amendment, Allah will make them o f one mind. Lot Allah is ever Knower, 
Aware’.80
Also, this aye,
‘Surely Allah commands you to make over trusts to their owners and that 
when you judge between people you judge with justice; surely Allah 
admonishes you with what is excellent; surely Allah is Seeing, 
Hearing’.81
79 M. Jindani, The Concept of Dispute Resolution in Islamic Law, Ph.D diss., University of Wales, 
Lampeter, 2005,287
80 Verse 35 in Sura Nisa (Women)
81 Verse 58 in Sura Nisa (Women)
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The first aya confirms that arbitration must be used to resolve disputes between 
married couples before divorce is granted. It outlines the need for two arbitrators 
(one from each side). The second aya from the Qur ’an imposes a duty on any person 
who judges a case and apportions blame between parties to do so fairly and justly. 
This aye authorises those who judge to make decisions that are binding. These ayat 
could also be interpreted to impose Sulh between conflicting parties. Either way, the 
main aim of arbitration is to ensure that disputes between Muslims are resolved 
amicably and justly.
There are two schools of thought regarding the nature of arbitration which will be 
dealt with in detail below. The first one is arbitration through conciliation (Sulh) and 
the second is binding arbitration. The ayat have been interpreted as offering support 
for both schools, leaving the choice to the parties and making arbitration a voluntary 
process, unlike other obligatory rules in the Qur’an. This shows the flexible and 
evolutionary nature of Shari’ah which allows the parties to choose and adapt the 
process to suit them and their dispute.
3.3.2 Sunna
The Prophet Mohammad (s.a.a.w) developed the Sunna through teaching the people 
and tribes of the Arabian Peninsula. He tried to develop a climate where the Islamic 
nation resolved their disputes peacefully and without resorting to violence. The 
Prophet Mohammad (s.a.a.w) recognised that any case that could be resolved by
O'!
conciliatory arbitration should be, as this is better for the community. Schacht 
contended “[t]he arbitrators applied and at the same time developed the Sunna; it was 
the Sunna with the force of public opinion behind it, which had in the first place 
insisted on the procedure of negotiation and arbitration.”84Arbitration continued as a 
dispute resolution practice in the Mohammad (s.a.a.w) and post-Mohammad (s.a.a.w)
82 n 34 above, 17
83 n 7 above, 114
84 n 29 above
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eras. In fact, for a Muslim, “arbitration carries with it no better imprimatur than that
Of
given to it by the Prophet himself.”
Mohammad (s.a.a.w) advised both Muslims and non-Muslims to refer their disputes 
to arbitration. One of the first non-Muslims that followed this advice was the tribe of 
Bani Komata.86 Mohammad (s.a.a.w) acted both as an arbitrator and as a party who 
accepted the decision of an arbitrator. The prophet was the preferred choice of 
arbitrator, the “principle of referring differences or disagreements for determination 
by the Prophet is encapsulated in many verses of the Qur’an...However, the exercise 
of judicial authority whether of a conciliatory nature or of judicial nature, could 
under the provision of the Qur’an and under Prophetic tradition be delegated to other
o*7
persons” . Another example of the use of arbitration during the Prophet’s time was a 
clause in the Treaty of Medina, the first treaty entered by the Muslim community, 
signed in 622 A.D. between Muslims, Non-Muslim, Arabs and Jews which called for
oo
disputes to be resolved by arbitration.
The Sunni schools of fiqh have found the hakam's decision to be binding like a 
contract or akin to a judgement of the court. Even though the arbitral award may be 
weaker in comparison to a judgement, according to some schools of fiqh , this does 
not release the parties from following it, according to the rules of Shari ’ah. Thus, an 
arbitral award is binding in the same way as a contract. According to Shari 'ah, a 
contract is divine in nature, and there is a sacred duty to uphold one’s agreements:
“O you who believe fulfil any contracts [that you make] ...Fulfil God's 
agreement once you have pledged to do so, and do not break any oaths 
once they have been sworn to. You have set God up as a Surety for
OQ
yourselves. ”
85 A.J. Gemmell, “Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East”, 5 Santa Clara Journal o f  
International Law (2006) 169, 173
86 Libyan Am. Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Libyan Arab Republic (Apr. 12, 1977), 2 0 1.L.M., 1 (1981)
87 n 79 above, 67
88 n 34 above, 12
89 The Fatawa of Ibn Taymiya, III, 326
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This special position of contracts is best summed up by the Islamic maxim Al Aqd 
Shari’at al muta’aqqidin which essentially states, “[t]he contract is the Shari’a or 
sacred law of the parties.”90 This makes it abundantly clear that contractual 
relationships are viewed strictly under Shari ’ah. Indeed, all contractual obligations 
must be specifically performed, unless they contravene Shari’ah including arbitral 
awards or Sulh during arbitration or otherwise.91
The Qur’an and the Sunna confirmed the validity of arbitration, but the difficulty 
that arose was in the characteristics of implementation. Therefore, the four schools of 
Shari’ah explained the process of arbitration, which obliges each Muslim within 
each school to follow its teachings.
3.3.3 The Hanafi School
The Hanafi School confirmed that according to the Qur ’an, Sunna, Ijma and Qiyas, 
arbitration is a legitimate dispute resolution process because it serves important
09social needs and simplifies disputes. It is also less complex than the courts. The 
scholars in this school emphasised the contractual nature of arbitration and stated that 
it is binding like any other contract. Some scholars argue that an arbitrator has the 
same duties as a judge but others considered the arbitrator to be closer to an agent or 
conciliator.93
3.3.4 The Shafi School
According to this school, it is permitted for the parties to chose an ordinary person 
who does not possess any of the judge’s qualities to resolve the dispute, whether or 
not there is a judge available in the place where the dispute arose.94 The scholars 
within this school confirmed the validity of arbitration by giving an example from
90 M. C. Bassiouni, The Islamic Criminal Justice System (New York: Oceana Publications, 1982), 10
91 S. H. Amin, Commercial Law o f Iran (London: Vahid Publications, 1986)
92 n 9above
93 ibid
94 Al Mawardi, Adab Al Kadi, T. II, 382
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history that shows Muslims referring disputes to the Caliph Umar ibn al-Khatt’ab, 
who acted as an arbitrator on many occasions. It is pointed out that an arbitrator is 
inferior to a judge as the arbitrator could be removed at any time by the parties 
before an award is rendered.95
3.3.5 The Maliki School
This school placed arbitration as one of the highest forms of dispute resolution. It 
contended that an arbitrator decides a case based on his conscience, therefore it 
allowed one of the disputing parties to be appointed as an arbitrator if he was chosen 
by the other party.96 Unlike the other three schools, this School stresses that an 
arbitrator cannot be revoked after the commencement of arbitration proceedings. An 
arbitration award is binding on the parties, unless if a judge declares it to be 
flagrantly unjust.
3.3.6 The Hanbali School
The scholars of this doctrine hold that the decision of the arbitrator has the same 
binding nature as a court judgment. Therefore, an arbitrator must have the same 
qualification as a judge and must be chosen by the parties.97
3.3.7 The Medjella of Legal Provisions
The ‘Medjella’ of the Legal Provisions’ (the Medjella), the first codification of 
Shari ’ah under the Ottoman Empire, confirmed the conciliatory nature of arbitration. 
Its articles were drafted and derived from the science of fiqh (academic writings and 
case law) relating to civil acts and the prevailing opinion of the Hanafi98 doctrine. 
There was a whole section in the Medjella dedicated to arbitration. The main
95 ibid 385
96 n 34 above, 19
97 ibid 20
98 A Sunni school of jurisprudence
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provisions reflected the contractual nature of arbitration, which was closer to 
conciliation and compromise than to court judgements. Juries of the Medjella 
explained that an arbitral award was inferior to a court judgment, thus, a judge was 
authorised to invalidate an award if it was against his principles, whereas he was 
obliged to enforce a judgment given by another judge." However, this did not 
restrict the parties from enforcing Sulh between themselves, thus making it binding 
between the parties just like a contract.
The duty of an arbitrator closely resembled an agent authorised by the parties to 
obtain a conciliation order. This principle was outlined by two provisions in the 
Medjella. According to the first provision100, ‘should the parties have authorised the 
arbitrators...to conciliate them, the agreement of the arbitrators is deemed to be a 
compromise...which the parties must accept’ as if they had compromised 
themselves.” According to the second provision101 ‘if a third party settles a dispute 
without having been entrusted with this mission by the parties, and if the latter accept 
his settlement, the award shall be enforced by application of Article 1453, according
1 (V)to which ‘ratification is equivalent to agency’. Consequently, unlike a judgement, 
an award required the agreement of the parties and thus, a judge could annul an 
arbitration award if he saw fit, but could not annul a judgement.
The Muslim concept of arbitration, according to the Medjella, could settle disputes in 
a way that resembles conciliation. Article 1850 of the Medjella stated "legally 
appointed arbitrators may validly reconcile the parties if the latter have conferred on 
them that power.” Therefore, if each of the parties has given power to one of the 
arbitrators to reconcile them and the arbitrators terminate the case by a settlement, 
the parties may not reject the arrangement.103 The technique proposed by Article 
1850 enables each party to appoint its ‘arbitrator’ and the two arbitrators thus 
appointed are in turn authorised to settle the dispute by means of conciliation (Sulh).
99 A. Haedar, Dorar Alhokam fe  Sharah Majalet Alhokam, Judgements within the Provisions of the 
Medjella
100 Section 1844 in The Medjella of Legal Provisions
101 Section 1847 in The Medjella of Legal Provisions
102 Section 1853 in The Medjella of Legal Provisions
103 Code Civil Ottoman - Trad. D&n&rius Nocolaides 1881
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Muslim scholars have all agreed upon the legal principle of arbitration, although they 
have formulated different opinions in relation to the definition of arbitration and the
i
scope of its application. According to the first view, arbitration is a type of non- 
compulsory conciliation, however, the second thesis sees arbitration as similar to 
judgments, fair and binding on the parties. Either way, the validity of arbitration is 
unequivocal in Islam and the duty to reconcile the parties is imposed on anyone 
resolving disputes between Muslims.
A Muslim arbitrator has a duty of conciliation and a moral obligation to clarify the 
facts, establish the truth and find the appropriate principles of Shari ’ah to be applied. 
Islamic law allows the parties to confer upon the arbitrators the power to settle their 
disputes by a binding decision according to rules agreed upon or what the arbitrators 
consider just and fair.
The word hakam has been given different meanings. The word can be used in its 
broad sense to refer to an authorised person to dispose of rights, to settle differences 
between different persons by suggesting settlement or helping them to reach it, or by 
issuing a binding decision to settle the dispute. The agreement of the parties defines 
the type of authorization in each case.”104 It is noteworthy that even though the word 
hakam may refer to the conciliator or the arbitrator, Islamic law recognised the 
difference between the two. The word hakam refers in its strict sense to a person who 
is ‘authorised’ in a specific mission.105 Islamic law commands an arbitrator to try to 
reconcile the parties first before making a decision on their dispute. Islamic parties 
place themselves entirely in the hands of a person whom they know, respect and 
believe to be capable of helping them out of the deadlock.106 The overarching 
characteristics of any arbitrator, whether he is trying to reconcile the parties or to 
make a decision is to do so, are neutrality and justice.
Many of the Jordanian arbitrators reminded me of this during the interviews on the 
culture and history of arbitration in Jordan and the region. They were very proud of
104M.I.M. Aboul-Enein, “Liberal Trends in Islamic Law (Sharia) on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”, 
(2000) 2 J. Arab Arb. 3
105 ibid
106 G. E. Irani andN.C. Funk, ‘Rituals of Reconciliation: Arab-Islamic Perspectives’ (1998) 20:4 Arab 
Studies Quarterly 1,4
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this heritage and insisted that arbitration is actually the natural way of dispute 
resolution in the Arab world.
3.4 ‘Arbitration is Part of Our Culture’
Some interviewees were very keen on emphasising the history and culture of 
arbitration in Jordan. Arbitration has long existed in both the tribal and Islamic 
cultures of the country. A lawyer who joined the Bar in 1965 and an experienced 
arbitrator said “you need to remember that we have a culture o f accepting 
arbitration, especially between traders”.
A former member of the World Bank dispute resolution committee insisted that, 
“there are pages and pages o f thesis, research and books written on arbitration in 
the Middle East. Arbitration is a very important dispute resolution mechanism in the 
Arab world as it is the closest mechanism to our paternal, patriarchal and tribal 
society. Society insists that when a dispute arises, it is referred to arbitration. Thus, 
arbitration should flourish in the Arab world due to the culture o f the society. 
However, this is not the case as the situation is a mess. Civil codes and the lack o f  
understanding o f the legislature lead to chaos”.
An experienced lawyer with a PhD in international law from George Washington, 
who had also worked for 15 years in Kuwait explained, “I  won’t say that arbitration 
is alien to Middle Eastern culture because historically before the court system was 
created people used to know their arbitrators like that old merchant in Amman. In 
every village, there was someone people referred their disputes to. My grandfather 
was a ‘Muktar ’ and people came to him to solve their disputes. Historically, it was a 
man with high moral value and often it was done free o f charge. The introduction o f  
a sophisticated law such as UNCTTRAL law into the community shows that the 
community is changing -  what is left is how to adapt this tool to this community or 
the community to the tool. O f course arbitration is changing because Jordan itself is 
changing. It used to be a closed society, now it is opening up. There are large multi­
million construction projects. Amman is changing. It is no longer arbitration for the 
construction o f a two storey house. It is highway, dams, roads, multi storey
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buildings. The projects are more sophisticated’ therefore the concept o f arbitration is 
taking place more and more ”.
The old merchant mentioned earlier was a trader called Misbah Al-Ezmilah and he 
was described by the same lawyer as “an old merchant who carried moral weight in 
the community. He conducted arbitrations free o f charge like judges in Muslim 
history. He considered it a service to God. He used to say “the service o f rights is a 
service o f God”. Merchants used to go to him with their disputes and whatever he 
decided, they obeyed because o f his moral weight. He did not issue written awards
Islamic principles play a major role in Jordanian society. A lawyer for 35 years 
stated, the environment in Jordan has Islam very much part o f it and you will find  
Islamic principles in every walk o f life and in every process”.
A long standing member of Jordanian Bar Association and an experienced local 
arbitrator added “the main concept o f arbitration is personal freedom and this existed 
in our law and in Shari 'ah for many centuries”.
A young lawyer with a PhD from London does not however seem to see any 
difference between arbitration in Jordan and arbitration elsewhere. He claims “the 
lawyers that work in arbitration are usually educated abroad and have dealt with 
international clients who are commercial people that know the theme o f arbitration. 
This bridged the gap between Jordanian arbitration and international arbitration. It 
is therefore difficult to see a difference between the two ”.
Legal arbitration was also common in Jordan. A lawyer who has been practising 
arbitration for 25 years said “the first law o f arbitration in Jordan was in 1953. 
Arbitration is very old in Jordan and stable. All lawyers in Amman do arbitration or 
have the ability to do it. Disputes in trade, construction, sales contracts always use 
arbitration. It is always better. It should be advised by all lawyers”.
A lawyer and very experienced international arbitrator who has received two PhDs 
from Cairo and Bristol that explained Jordan “is one o f the Arab countries that has 
had arbitration for many years. Traders naturally refer to arbitration and ‘wasta ’. 
Also, the chamber o f commerce has panels o f arbitrators which resolve disputes
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between traders amicably by conciliation, which is not strictly arbitration, but they 
call it arbitration. Arbitration and ‘wasta ’ are part o f the culture
It is clear from this chapter that arbitration is very much part of the Islamic 
jurisprudence. Arbitration through conciliation and adjudicative arbitration are both 
recognised and authorised by the fiqh. However, mediation and arbitration through 
compromise are the more favoured options. The Jordanian arbitrators mostly agreed 
that arbitration is part of Jordan’s history and culture and it has been practised by 
various merchants for many years. In light of the Qur’an’s explicit blessing and the 
Prophet Mohammad’s (s.a.a.w) teachings, one would expect that a smooth and 
orderly transition into the modem workings of arbitration would have occurred in the 
Middle East, but this is not the case.107 The rocky journey of international 
commercial arbitration within the Middle East will be discussed in chapter 4.
There are growing calls, some say demands108 from the Islamic and Arab world for 
international commercial arbitration to become more inclusive of Islamic legal 
tradition and of the cultural sensitivities of the East. Islamic legal tradition is flexible 
and could easily be incorporated into the arbitration system. Kutty109 argues that the 
move towards democracy by many of the Islamic nations will increase the demands 
for an international regime that is encompassing and representative of other traditions 
beside, those of the West. Indeed, with the increase in democratically elected Islamist 
governments around the world some nations which were seen to have been moving 
away from Shari ’ah at one time appear to be returning to it.110
The concepts of ijtihad, ijma, qiyas, and urf combined with the divine characteristic 
attributed to contractual obligations make it possible to develop a viable and modem 
framework for international commercial arbitration within the bounds of the 
Shari ’ah. The real problem Kutty claims is whether “the advocates of international 
commercial arbitration .. .are prepared to engage in dialogue for a more inclusive and
107 n 85 above, 174
108 A. A. Shalakany, “Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Spectre 
of Neoliberalism,” 41 Harv. Int’l L. J. (2000) 419,420
109 n 9 above
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reflective international arbitration framework.”111 Whatever the answer to this 
question, it is certainly undesirable and may no longer be possible for the West to 
continue to impose their dominant position and values on the Arab Middle East and 
to continue to judge other societies using their own standards. It is unrealistic to 
expect that international commercial arbitration rules and practice will continue to 
have legitimacy in the Middle East and the larger Islamic world if Shari’ah 
principles and methodology are completely ignored or undermined. As Abul-Fadl 
points out, dominance cannot be equated with truth, although it no doubt benefits 
from the old confusion of right and might.112 Somarajah criticises the western 
attitude:
“[Those] latter views [third world objections and oppositions] are 
regarded as polemical and the Western views are regarded as acts of high 
scholarship which are to be repeated as often as possible despite the 
mythical foundations on which they rest.”113
But he admits, the developing world is forced to accept arbitration if they wish to 
receive any long-term foreign investment.
As the current international commercial arbitration framework is exclusively derived 
from western legal heritage, it is creating obstacles in the acceptance and continued 
legitimacy of international commercial arbitration in the Middle East, and even 
beyond in the other Islamic nations. This contradiction of the objectives underpinning 
international commercial arbitration, which are to ensure enforceability of arbitration 
agreements/clauses and arbitral awards and to insulate the arbitration process as 
much as possible from interference by domestic courts and other national or 
international institutions. “This can only be achieved when there is mutual respect 
and understanding of the various laws, practices, cultures and religious worldviews 
prevalent in the world today.”114
111 ibid 891
112 M. Abul-Fadl, “Beyond Cultural Parodies and Parodizing Cultures” (1991) 8:1 American Journal 
o f Islamic Social Sciences, 15
113 M. Somarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem o f State Contracts, 
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114 n 9 above, 894
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It is clear from this chapter that arbitration has a long history in the Middle East and 
that the conciliatory approach is preferred in Islamic jurisprudence. Bearing this in 
mind, it is no surprise that hostility arose in the 20th century in the Middle East when 
the western arbitration model was superimposed on this existing structure. The effect 
and results of Western rationality meeting Arab/Islamic heritage are described in the 
next chapter.
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Chapter Four 
Arbitration in the Middle East During the 20th Century
“Foreign and domestic pressure on regional governments to improve 
their country’s investment climate has produced widespread and 
competitive arbitration law reform throughout the Middle East”1.
The history and practice of arbitration in the Islamic Middle East was explored in the 
previous chapter. In this chapter, I explain the interaction between the western model 
of international commercial arbitration and the eastern reconciliatory approach to 
dispute resolution. There are many examples of hostility between the two. However, 
as time has moved on, some form of agreement seems to have developed, on the 
surface at least, between the West and the Middle East.
For many years, the rules and practices of international commercial arbitration were 
looked upon as being solely for the protection of the businesses of the western 
industrial world. This understandably led to led to great distrust in the developing 
and underdeveloped world. When public corporations from the Third World were 
unsuccessful in disputing claims against large multinational corporations, they 
always expressed their disappointment with the system, not with the merit or demerit 
of the cases which were lost.
Many newly independent countries of the Middle East experienced this 
unsatisfactory system and a number of countries, especially in the Gulf, issued 
ministerial decrees forbidding arbitration clauses in contracts with them. One of the 
first was the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which in 1963 issued a ministerial decree 
prohibiting all public corporations in the state from submitting either to a foreign 
law, or to the jurisdiction of foreign courts and even to foreign arbitration. Kadiki2 
offers an explanation for the hostile attitude of some of the Arab countries towards
1 P. Punwar, “Country focus: Arbitration in the Middle East”, Managing Partner 9(7) 11 Dec 2006 at 
http://www.mpmagazine.com/displav.asp?articleid=CE4288F6-3701-4C13-8E29- 
C94BC0EAD513&eTitle=Countrv focus Arbitration in the Middle East
2 K. Kadiki, “The Arbitration Clause according to the Islamic Shariah and the Positive Laws of Arab 
Countries” The ICC International Court o f Arbitration Bulletin, Special Supplement, Vol. 3, No. 1 
May (1992), 35
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arbitration. He contends that these attitudes were derived from political concerns 
“resulting either from dire experiences in certain cases or from awards which were 
considered as being unfair.”3
The cases Kadiki refers to are a number of arbitration cases surrounding oil 
agreements between a foreign investor and newly independent Arab state during the 
1950s and 1960s. The oil agreements contained an arbitration clause, but omitted a 
choice of law clause. One of the issues that had to be determined by the arbitrator 
was the proper law of the contract. Despite the proper law being an Arabic law, the 
arbitrator chose not to apply this. The effect these decisions had on the Middle East 
was that “even the majority of passionate supporters of arbitration have admitted that 
the arbitrators in the Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Aramco cases were biased and offered 
only a mere fafade of neutrality. It was an attempt to weaken the new development 
strategies of these states by subjecting these states to the jurisdiction of the biased 
international legal doctrines.”4 These cases created hostility in the Arab Middle East 
that is still felt today. Many western arbitrators are still seen as biased and ignorant a 
view which will be outlined in the final two sections of this chapter.
There is obviously more than one explanation for the hostility found in the Middle 
East towards international commercial arbitration. A number of these will be 
explored in this chapter, and further reasons are outlined in this thesis. However, 
during the intense period of early independence in many of the Arab states, 
international commercial arbitration was a foreign colonial mechanism. Its 
legitimacy was created by western players, as described in chapter two, and this had 
very little relevance to the Arab world as the players were unrecognised within the 
structures of the region. To add insult to injury, when these players were arbitrators
where the Arabs were a party, they seemed biased and hostile to them and their
/
systems, which confirmed Arab fears and apprehensions.
The three main cases which caused controversy during this time will be discussed 
below. Then, the recent apparent change in Middle Eastern attitudes towards
3 ibid 38
4 J. Paulsson “Third World participation in international Investment Arbitration”, 2 Foreign 
Investment L.J. (1987), 21
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arbitration will be explored. Many of the countries in the region have enacted 
modem arbitration legislation, ratified the New York Convention and created 
arbitration centres of their own. However, this does not mean that arbitration is 
accepted and that Arab parties are keen on it. There is still resentment towards 
arbitration felt by many of the Arab arbitration community towards some leading 
arbitrators in particular, and to some extent towards the ICC International Court of 
Arbitration (ICC). The final section of this chapter quotes Jordanian arbitrators on 
their views of international arbitration. These views are not particularly positive.
4.1 The Hostility
The cases that antagonised the Arab world started with the first Arab oil arbitration 
case, Petroleum Development Trucial Coasts Ltd. v Shaikh o f Abu Dhabi5, where a 
dispute took place in 1951 after 10 years of the signing of the contract. The contract 
was made in Abu Dhabi and wholly preformed in that country, but there was no 
choice of law clause. The Umpire, Lord Asquith conceded, “If any municipal legal 
system was applicable, it would prima facie be that of Abu Dhabi”. But he then 
declared “No such law could reasonably be said to exist...it is fanciful to suggest that 
in this primitive region there is any settled body of law principles applicable to the 
construction of modem commercial instruments and that the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi 
administers a purely discretionary justice with the assistance of the Quran.” He 
applied principles “rooted in good sense and common practice of the generality of 
civilised nations -  a sort of modem law of nature” as the criteria for the award. Great 
insult was taken at the arrogance of Lord Asquith’s presumption that “a sort of 
modem law of nature” was seen as more competent to deal with commercial 
transactions than the national legal system of a state that relies on principles that are 
hundreds of years old. Lord Asquith did not even request an expert on Islamic law. 
This award started the “cultural resentment among third world countries.”6
5 Case No. 37, ILR 1951; ICLQ 247
6 M. Al-Jumah, “Arab State Contract Disputes: Lessons From The Past”, Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 
17, No.3 (2002), 215,219
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The second arbitration in this catalogue of cases is Ruler o f Qatar v International 
Marine Oil Company Ltd1, the arbitrator, Sir Alfred Bucknill, held that the proper 
law of the concession agreement was the law of Qatar, as there was no choice of law 
clause, but also held it to be inappropriate to govern a modem oil concession. 
According to the arbitrator “there are at least two weighty considerations against the 
view [i.e. the adoption of the Islamic law]. One is that, in my opinion, after hearing 
the evidence of two experts in Islamic law, Professor Anderson and Professor 
Milliot, there is no settled body of legal principles in Qatar applicable to the 
construction of modem commercial instruments.” The arbitrator went on to say, “I 
am satisfied that the law does not contain any principles which would be sufficient to 
interpret this particular contract.” It was noted at the time that the experts’ opinions 
regarding Islamic law relied upon by the arbitrator were neither Muslims nor Muslim 
lawyers and arguing that there are no adequate contractual principles in Islamic law 
reflects great ignorance of this legal tradition. Islamic jurisprudence has sophisticated 
contractual and commercial principles that have served the Arab world for hundreds
Q
of years. Islam has always been a religion of trade and of world traders.
The third case was Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco case)9, the 
arbitration related to the interpretation of a Concession Agreement. It was clearly 
stated in the Agreement that in case of dispute, the Muslim law as taught by the 
Hanbali School would apply. However, the parties envisaged that matters beyond the 
jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia would be determined by the arbitration tribunal, a 
distinction that caused much controversy. According to the tribunal, chaired by 
Professor Sauster-Hall, based on the intention of the parties, it could be decided that 
they never intended to apply Muslim law, even though such a clause existed. The 
arbitrators thus applied general principles of law and they justified their decision on 
the basis that the law, which a reasonable person would apply, should be the 
applicable law.
7 1953 ILR20, P.534
8 L. Lim, Terrorism and Globalization: An International Perspective, 35 Vand. J. Transnat’L L. (2002) 
703, 704
9 27 ILR 117 (1958), 163 '
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There are mixed feelings about these arbitral awards. Al-Jumah contends, “it is to be 
noted that the arbitration should provide a guarantee to the company, but at the same 
time it should also be beneficial to the state.”10 Others have said that the arbitrators 
were protecting the foreign investor from the detrimental legislative or administrative 
actions of the host state and supporters of the state were using post colonialism as an 
attempt to legitimise their breach of contractual obligations.11 Al-Jumah makes the 
point that the arbitrators chose a side and designed the awards to “suit their need,
19especially in the choice of law clauses.” In some cases, the arbitrators incorporated 
international law into Arab state law in order to help foreign investors. In two
I 9
examples, the AMINOIL case where, Kuwaiti law was the applicable law, and the 
Pyramid Oasis14 case, where Egyptian law was the law specified in the contract, the 
arbitrators in both of these arbitrations supplemented these laws with general 
international law.
These cases show that even though there was clear stipulation in the contract as to 
the application of the Islamic Code, “it was rejected without even an attempt to get to 
know the adaptability of the Code to the situation which arose.”15 Al-Jumah offers an 
explanation to the above awards stating,
“The Western world is ignorant to the Islamic law and its legal system. It 
cannot be said that Islamic law is not developed to meet the needs of the 
present day situations. It is to be noted that Islamic law is not a primitive 
law, which does not allow any sort of development, but is susceptible to 
the needs of the society.”16
Another possible explanation for the arbitrators’ decisions in the above cases is that 
they were unimpressed by Islamic law for whatever reasons, so they decided the 
disputes according to laws that they were more familiar and confident in applying.
10 n 6 above, 217
11 ibid
12 ibid 227
13 Arbitration between Kuwait and the American Independent Oil Company (AMINOIL) [1982] 21 
ILM 976
14 S. Pac. Prop. (Middle East), Ltd. v. Arab Rep. of Egypt, 32 I.L.M. 933, 949 (1993)
15 ibid 238
16 ibid 239
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1 7The distrust of international arbitration according to Nariman was not confined 
only to the losers. In the Middle East, mistrust of international arbitration had deep 
roots and continued to cause misgivings. In a memoir18 presented at a Conference of 
the Sovereigns and Heads of State of OPEC countries in 1975, it was stated that 
‘Western arbitrators’, because they belonged to a certain hemisphere and social 
system, had a conception of law that was a reflection of their own system. ‘They 
have a tendency’, the memoir went on, ‘to consider that the arguments of the Third- 
World client are devoid of any legal basis, and hold them to be ineffective once they 
fail to correspond with their own conception of the law’ whether it is ignorance or 
bias, western arbitrators during these times damaged the image of arbitration not just 
in the Middle East but also in other parts of the world such as Latin America.
Professor de Castro, former judge of the International Court of Justice, wrote the 
arbitration clause “was imposed by the more or less hidden forces that direct 
international trade in order to free themselves from any legal provision that might 
stand in their way”19. He raised the spectre of a co-ordinated international campaign 
by industrial nations aimed at ‘turning arbitration into a mythical rite against which 
any criticism would be seen as the commission of an act of sacrilege’. Stark words, 
but they represent reservations about arbitration that are prevalent to this day. 
Another former judge of the International Court of Justice, Keba M’baye from 
Senegal, observed that “the notion that there is a system of international justice 
would not be shared by some countries notably in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
who still see arbitration as a foreign judicial institution imposed upon them” . He 
went on to note that it was seldom that developing countries were a venue of 
international arbitration or that they produced arbitrators.
17 F. Nariman, “East Meets West: Tradition, Globalization and the Future of Arbitration”, Arbitration 
International, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2004), 123
18 Memoir of 1975, quoted by Doyen Ahmed Mahiou, Professor of the University of Algiers, in his 
commentary on ‘Reconciling Arbitration with the Needs of Public Corporations while Preserving its 
Advantages’ in 60 Years On: a Look at the Future, 60th Anniversary o f the ICC International Court o f 
Arbitration (ICC, 1984), 198
19 Ariely, D, The Hidden Forces that Shape our Decisions, (London: HarperCollins, 2008), 36
20 Saunders, M and Salomon, C, “Regional Rumble: Growth in North/South Trade”, Legal Business 
Arbitration Report, 2008, http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Publication/e9fcd288-d6a2-4e84-9bl6- 
0139755elbl c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/906e9b20-e2f4-4dbd-b582-
0509542a! 8d0/AR08 DLA Piner.pdf. 27
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David21 contends that arbitration in the Middle East is seen as a form of justice 
administered in a foreign country, by foreigners who have a view of justice different 
from that held by an Arab. He goes on to argue that consent to arbitration is rarely 
free, the award rendered is frequently regarded as unjust, because it does not take 
into account facts, needs or ways of thinking which should have been appreciated in 
the opinion of a Middle Eastern lawyer or businessman. Some arbitration clauses are 
repudiated, because they are regarded as an inadmissible infringement upon the 
sovereignty of the state. “While the arbitral hermeneutics of these three awards had 
to be bewildering to Middle Eastern arbitral observers, they were baffling and remain 
so to Western scholars. Looking over the landscape created by these awards, it is no 
wonder that the Islamic legal world looked suspiciously at the ‘logic’ and ‘rationales’ 
used by the arbitrators in these cases which, in turn, led to a subsequent, and perhaps 
justifiable, distrust of the ‘Western’ arbitral process.”22 The profound and lasting 
impact of these arbitrations on the region’s arbitral psyche should not be 
underestimated. It is no wonder that ‘Western’ forms of commercial arbitration have 
not, to this day, become integral to the Islamic legal system.
4.2 The Shift in Attitudes
In the last decade, there have been some changes, at least on the surface, with regards 
to arbitration in the Middle East. There is evidence of developments that suggest that 
arbitration is going well in Arab countries at the legal level and that a climate is 
being created to go beyond the crises of arbitration that were caused by the famous 
awards of 1950s and 1960s.23 Developments include modifications to Arab 
countries’ arbitration laws and the creation of a number of arbitration centres. Also, 
according to Ahdab, a number of doctoral theses have appeared on the subject of 
arbitration in Arab Universities in a range of countries. All this leads to the view that 
recently the Middle East has started to re-engage with international commercial 
arbitration.
21 R. David, Arbitration in International Trade, (Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publications, 
1985)
22 A.J. Gemmell, “Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East”, 5 Santa Clara Journal o f 
International Law (2006) 169, 179
23 A. Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries, (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999)
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This could be due to the fact that people in the Middle East have discovered certain 
benefits to arbitration. There seems to be general consensus between observers that 
developing countries now perceive arbitration as crucial to attracting long term 
foreign investment. Thus, it seems that the distrust towards arbitration has 
progressively disappeared; most Arab countries have now ratified international 
conventions concerning arbitration or enacted laws or ordinances authorizing state 
agencies to provide for arbitration with respect to international commercial contracts. 
Also, Islamic scholars have backed arbitration and confirmed that “under Islamic 
law, the principle of arbitration is well recognized.”24
Also, during the previous period hostility, some Arab parties used commercial 
arbitration to their advantage. As an example given by Hunter, which he considers 
to be a typical experience during the mid- 1960s in the Arab states in the Gulf region, 
on several occasions when he would advise an Arab state that he could negotiate a 
more favourable outcome than the likely result of an arbitration award, the minister 
concerned would reply to the effect:
“But, Martin, the public view is that this project [it may have been a 
power station, a hospital, a road or whatever] was disastrously bungled 
by my Ministry. If I approve a settlement the newspapers and hostile 
deputies in the National Assembly will attack me. I will even be accused 
of being bribed to pay the contractor's claims. It is not my money. If the 
arbitrators make a big award against us it doesn't matter. I will simply 
send it down to the Ministry of Finance with a request for a cheque. In 
public I will say that the arbitrators were incompetent...”
The abundance of construction activity and foreign investment in the Middle East 
has led to the growth of arbitration in the region, including the proposed launch of 
arbitration centres in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Accession to international conventions 
by the majority of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and as well as other 
Middle Eastern countries has also increased support for arbitration. A notable 
exception, until very recently, has been the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where the 
absence of internationally recognised rules governing the enforcement of foreign
24 n 2 above, 38
25 M. Hunter, “International Commercial Dispute Resolution: The Challenge of the Twenty-first 
Century” , Arbitration International, Vol. 16 No. 4 (2000), 379, 380
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awards -  with the exception of treaties with France and the countries of the GCC -  
meant that foreign arbitral awards could not be enforced by UAE courts. On 21st 
August 2006 however, the UAE, finally, signed the New York Convention.
The President of the LCIA Arab Users' Council and Member of the LCIA Court, 
Essam A1 Tamimi, Founder and Managing Partner of A1 Tamimi & Company, one of 
the largest firms in the Gulf, explains; “Arbitration has provided international 
investors with a stage to settle their disputes without having to worry about local 
procedures or being acquainted with local courts...dispute settlement is the major 
concern for them and arbitration provides comfort. It not only provides the choice of 
venue, but also the choice of arbitrators who may be specialized in the concerned 
area.”26 With the young underdeveloped judicial and legal systems in the GCC 
countries, arbitration has been a critical factor in driving foreign direct investment. 
This is especially true for joint ventures set up with multinational companies to 
construct large infrastructure projects, which act as the foundation for continued 
economic growth and development. "It is evident that the GCC countries have made 
a political decision to be part of the international community and to bring their laws, 
practices and judicial system to the international level," A1 Tamimi continued. "They 
fully recognize that it is not possible to become international without recognizing the 
importance of arbitration in all sectors of international business whether industrial, 
banking or trade." The Arab world has clearly recognised the necessity of accepting 
arbitration in the global economy.
Another argument put forward for the emergence of international arbitration in the 
Middle East is that multinational corporations, pursue commercial activities without 
wishing to be tied down to state borders. They have attempted to subordinate 
political, cultural and ideological authority to the dictates of commerce and 
commercial practice. Because conflict is a by-product of business, the international 
business community has devised methods of dispute resolution that do not involve 
the nation state. This, I suggest, has been realised by the Arab countries and thus
26 E. A1 Tamimi, “UAE acceded to the New York Convention”, 15 July 2006, Dubai UAE, 
http://www.arbitrators.org/Institute/PR UAE Newvork.asp
27 R. Thirgood “ International Arbitration: The Justice Business”, Journal o f International Arbitration, 
Vol. 21, No. 4 (2004), 341, 341
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they have had to adopt western style commercial arbitration laws if they wanted ‘a 
slice of the cake’ in international commerce.
This argument of subordination is limited. The arbitration community could not 
ignore the national courts, as without the aid and assistance of local municipal courts, 
transnational arbitral awards could never be effectively enforced. Dr Herrmann, 
former Secretary-General of UNCITRAL, former President and current honorary 
President of the LCIA, describes international arbitration to be similar to reputations. 
It rests on public confidence and the principal member of the public whose 
confidence is essential to sustain a foreign award is the local judge in the court of 
enforcement -  and local judges react differently in different jurisdictions. “It is quite 
unfair to expect judges to attach too much significance to a piece of paper signed by 
an arbitrator, however eminent in some far away part of the world, of whose name or 
reputation the judge in the court of enforcement has not even heard!”28 Nariman 
states, “Since how national courts actually function depends a great deal on the 
knowledge, quality and equipment of its judges (and of the lawyers appearing before 
them and assisting them) the need for a widening of the awareness-base of the New 
York Convention becomes apparent, amongst both judges and lawyers.” Thus, 
judges are essential to effective functioning of arbitration.
Thirgood30 puts forward a combination of factors that contributed to the success and 
growth of international commercial arbitration, and I would say that some of these 
factors have clearly contributed to the positive reception of arbitration in the Middle 
East in the last decade. These factors include: the growth in international trade; 
commerce and investment; the inability of courts to adapt to modem, international, 
commercial practices and abandon local traditions and procedures; the reluctance of 
international business people to be judged in someone else's backyard; the 
improvement of judicial and legislative attitudes towards arbitration; and the 
establishment of an effective treaty network guaranteeing the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements and awards.
28 F. Nariman, “East meets West: Tradition, Globalization and the Future of Arbitration”, Arbitration 
International, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2004), 123,131
29 ibid
30 n 27above, 349
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The move towards arbitration within Arab countries was also a response to the ICC 
and other arbitral institutions quest or “battle”, as described by Legal Counsel of the 
ICC Secretariat, Mathew Secomb, “to ensure that arbitration becomes the norm in 
transnational dispute resolution. The aim is to educate governments and commerce of 
the benefits of actively supporting international commercial arbitration.” Ahdab 
optimistically states “Arbitration...can serve, as well as possible, the economy of our 
world, which has become a small village.”31 This seems to me the current widely 
held view of Arab countries that seek the benefits of arbitration in attracting foreign 
investment and commerce.
However, there remains a real problem which was crystallised by Redfem and 
Hunter as “the fear that arbitral tribunals, established under the auspices of arbitral 
institutions based in the world’s major industrial nations, will have an inbuilt cultural 
and social bias against them, however impeccable the intellectual integrity of the 
individual arbitrators may be.” Nariman advises both national judges and 
international arbitrators to ensure that arbitration does not suffer from cultural bias:
‘Judges in national courts raise their sights and adopt a transnational 
outlook, remembering always the true consensual nature of all 
international arbitration...international arbitrators adjust their sights as 
well, with robust judgement and a clearer articulation of the decisions 
made. A good arbitrator is one who writes acceptable reasons for stated 
conclusions, reasons that satisfy the loser as well as the winner.’33
Hence, an arbitrator who “imbued with his own legal culture and always [falls] back 
on it, is certainly an enemy of arbitration.”34 Nariman predicts “East must meet West
- j c
not in conflict or distrust as before, but in harmony -  a symbiotic harmony.”
Matters have changed considerably since the 1950’s and 1960’s not just within the 
legislative framework, but also on a practical level. In a survey conducted by
31 n 23 above, 5
32 M. Hunter & A. Redfem, Law and Practice o f International Commercial Arbitration, (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2004),.216
33 n 28 above, 126
34 n 23 above, 3
35 n 28 above, 136
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Bedjaoui36 on the cases of the ICC found serious improvements and a significant 
growth in popularity of arbitration. There were on average 69 cases involving Arab 
parties in the 1980s. This grew to 62 cases in the 1990s. These figures fluctuated 
over the ten years and the highest number of cases was in 1986 which was 108. 
Every Arab country without exception was a user of the ICC. Arab parties have not 
just been passive participants i.e., defendants (481), in the decade between 1981— 
1990. 279 Arab parties brought cases to the ICC as claimants. These arbitration cases 
are not only with European parties, but they included some inter-Arab arbitrations 
too.
With regards to the nationality of the arbitrators, statistics show that parties from the 
Asian and Pacific regions have overwhelmingly chosen western arbitrators in 
international arbitration cases: between 1987 and 1990, they chose, out 38 of their 
appointments, 35 arbitrators from Western Europe or North America. Bedjaoui 
suggests an explanation for the predominance of western arbitrators in ICC 
arbitrations: “knowledge of the applicable law, which would be western in character 
in the cases concerned and also to a lesser extent, in the choice of places in Europe or 
America as the venue for the arbitration.”37 He goes on to say that,
“Certain strata of the Arab business world remain dominated by the 
impression that their interests will be in better hands if entrusted to a 
western co-arbitrator. This can be seen as the expression of a more 
general reflex or phenomenon, whereby one seeks qualities of 
professionalism, technical acuteness and “know-how” to rely on, and 
attributes them more readily to a Westerner than to an Arab.”38
Nevertheless, whenever the ICC had to appoint a co-arbitrator where an Arab party 
failed to do so, it usually chooses a person with the same nationality as the Arab 
party. In the 1980s, it was practically unheard of for a national of an Arab country to 
be appointed as the chairman or sole arbitrator in a dispute. This has though changed 
significantly. In the first couple of years of the 1990s, Arabs have on 33 occasions
36 M. Bedjaoui, “ The Arab World in ICC Arbitration” The ICC International Court o f Arbitration 
Bulletin, Special Supplement, Vol. 3, No. 1 May (1992), 7
37 ibid 14
38 ibid
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been in the chair and the ICC Court was responsible for 29 out the 33 Arab chairmen 
or sole arbitrators.
When it came to choosing the venue for arbitration, Europe was a firm favourite with 
199 out 237 cases from 1986 to 1990 involving at least one Arab party. Meanwhile, 
the Arab world was the scene of 33 arbitrations: 17 in North Africa and 16 in the 
Middle East. Statistics show how in 157 cases, the applicable law was specified in 
the contract, and in 96 it was not specified. Islamic law, or more specifically Arab 
legislation, was specified rather more often (78 times) than European law (64).
4.3 The Reality
The ICC figures are encouraging, but it seems that the commercial arbitration model 
has not reached the grassroots in the Middle East. In other words, even if arbitration 
is practised in the Middle East, it is practised in a more conciliatory fashion, rather 
than in the adversarial western manner. On many occasions, the Arab parties choose 
to resolve their disputes using mechanisms that look like mediation or that are at 
least akin to arbitration by amiable compositeur.39 The arbitrator will conduct the 
arbitration more like a conciliation by a nominated third party, who tends to adopt a 
role more akin to that of a mediator sanctioning an agreement between the parties; 
his decision is final, although his mandate can be terminated before he gives it, since 
he is acting on the parties' instructions.
This tendency to resort to a mediated settlement is not generally found in the case of 
commercial or civil disputes in which one of the parties is a foreign natural or legal 
person. Here, the norm is recourse to adversarial arbitration. Unlike Arab arbitration, 
it is not spontaneous: whether domestic, international or foreign, it is triggered by an 
arbitration clause which the Arab party has signed and probably lost sight of since. It 
is a common occurrence for the Arab party to seem to be taken by surprise by a 
request for arbitration. To the Arab way of thinking, arbitration, whether foreign, 
international or even domestic, is regarded as a concession to the foreign party.
39 S. Saleh, “The Settlement of Disputes in the Arab World Arbitration and Other Methods- Trends in 
Legislation and Case Law”, 1(2) Arab L. Q. (1986) 198
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International or domestic arbitration is often seen by the Arab party as depriving him 
of the right to be heard by his duly appointed judges. International or foreign 
arbitration is generally held on alien territory according to foreign rules of procedure 
and substantive laws and before a majority of foreign arbitrators. It can almost be 
said that it is only when left with no alternative- and then racked by apprehension- 
that an Arab party will comply with an arbitration clause. Sometimes attempts are 
made to later have it declared null and void by the courts in his own country.
The fact remains that the western model of international commercial arbitration was 
just planted in the Arab/Islamic Middle East with no thought as to cultural and 
historic heritage and dispute resolutions that already exist in the region. Majeed40 
argues, “increasingly, there is a questioning of legislation imported from Western 
sources, and calls for a return to the Shari’ah.... The marriage between Western 
legislations and the cultural and religious underpinnings of the Shari ’ah often turns 
out to be an unhappy one.”41
The essence of arbitration lies in resolving disputes with mutual respect and 
understanding of the various laws and practices indigenous to each culture. However, 
the reality is very different and the world of commerce has not reached a truly 
international and comparative approach to international dispute resolution. In many 
parts of the Middle East, arbitration as a western model is seen as unfamiliar and 
unnecessary, causing great dissatisfaction when imposed by the foreign party.
This does not mean that the situation with regards to arbitration has not improved in 
the last ten to fifteen years, international commercial arbitration is becoming 
increasingly accepted in the Middle East. However, concerns are still being voiced 
from the developing and Islamic worlds with regards to the lack of cultural inclusion 
in the western model:
“Today, cries of foul play over arbitration are neither as vociferous nor as 
troubling as they were up to the end of the last decade. Why they occur 
now, as they occasionally do in the Arab Middle East, the oppositional
40 N. Majeed, “Good Faith and Due Process: Lessons from the Shari’ah” Arbitration International, 
Vol. 20, No. 1 (2004), 97
41 ibid 101
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claims are articulated increasingly in terms of a demand for incorporating 
the Islamic legal tradition in the international practice of arbitration.”42
The assumption and belief that Shari’ah is being sidelined, and that the current 
international commercial arbitration framework is exclusively derived from Western 
legal heritage may create obstacles in the acceptance and continued legitimacy of 
international commercial arbitration in the Middle East, and even beyond in other 
Islamic nations. The proponents of international commercial arbitration cannot afford 
to alienate people whose experiences, socioeconomic predicaments and 
cultural/religious norms may not align completely with Western conceptions.43 In the 
case of Islamic nations, we have seen that there is no inherent opposition to the 
concept of arbitration, yet, there are areas of tension and concern.
This is clearly not acceptable if we recall that the twin objectives of the legal 
framework underpinning international commercial arbitration are to ensure 
enforceability of arbitration agreements/clauses and arbitral awards and to insulate 
the arbitration process as much as possible from interference by domestic courts and 
other national or international institutions. This can only be achieved when there is 
mutual respect and understanding of the various laws, practices, cultures and 
religious worldviews prevalent in the world today.44
There is a clear need for dialogue in this regard between the proponents of both the 
Western and Islamic perspectives. The aim of such a dialogue will be to help develop 
an international commercial arbitration regime in which the business community can 
have confidence, while staying true to the core principles of tahkim under Shari ’ah.45 
This will help remove a potential crutch that may be used by those who oppose the 
international commercial arbitration movement as being one of purely Western 
import.
42 A. A. Shalakany, “Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Spectre 
of Neoliberalism,” 41 Harv. Int’l L. J. (2000), 420
43 D. S. Sullivan, “Effective International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and the Necessary 
Condition of Liberal Democracy,” 81 Geo. L. J. (1993), 2369.
44 F.M. Kutty, “The Shari’a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration” (2005) Bepress Legal 
Series, 875, 985
45 G. Sayen, “Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia,” 24 U. Pa. J. 
Int’l Econ. L. (2004) 905, 906
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Arbitration is still thought of as an ad hoc arrangement in which the choice of a 
specific person is a key consideration and, fairly often, as one which does not lend 
itself to collective decision-making. In the circumstances, what can be done to ensure 
that international arbitration is genuinely accepted by Arab parties? The answer is to 
be found not only in legislation, which can easily be imported from the West, but 
also on four levels. The first is economic: pressure of international trade; where such 
pressure exists, some momentum has already been gained. A second level is cultural: 
comprehension and assimilation of legislation by the bodies which adopt and 
implement it. Then there is the human level; the selection of Arab arbitrators, who 
should play a more active part in the settlement of disputes involving parties from the 
Middle East. Finally, there is the geographical level: it is not enough, in my view, for 
arbitrators to be exported to the West; facilities should be made available for 
international arbitration to be established and conducted in the countries of the Arab 
Middle East.
4.4 The Crisis
As described in chapter two, international commercial arbitration has become 
formalised with strict procedures, appearing much more like an ‘offshore’ court. This 
framework is seen in the West as lending the legitimacy to the process, however, this 
does not sit easily with Arab players. Arbitration has a long history in Arab and 
Islamic societies, as outlined in chapter three, and it is seen as a process of 
conciliation, based on the legitimacy of the arbitrator, who is respected and trusted to 
bring the parties together and produce a compromise. The new system of arbitration 
is adversarial and strict, which clashes with Arab norms of arbitration and over the 
years this has caused friction and further negativity, which in turn created the latest 
crisis of commercial arbitration in the Middle East.
At the start of 2007, there were certain parts of the community of arbitrators in the 
Middle East who felt that a number of prominent Swiss and French arbitrators who 
arbitrate a large number of Euro-Arab cases were biased and prejudiced towards 
Arab parties. The GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre based in Bahrain called on 
Comite Francais de 1’ Arbitrage in Paris to have an open dialogue with the Middle
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East on the subject of arbitration and to stop the campaign against Arab arbitrators in 
France.
An article was written by an Egyptian lawyer in September 2006 describing a 
number of cases where an Arab party was mistreated or prejudiced by a European 
arbitrator. One of the cases referred to was an arbitration case between the Lebanese 
Republic and a German company. The date of a hearing where ten Lebanese 
engineers had to attend to give evidence was fixed on the day of ‘Al Fitr* feast 
despite the requests of the Lebanese lawyers to delay the hearing by three days. The 
engineers attended the hearing as directed. Another case highlighted was submitted 
to the Court of Appeal in Cairo in a hearing held on 28 October 2003. This 
arbitration referred to a dispute between Saudi and Danish companies. Both parties 
nominated Egyptian arbitrators on their behalf and the two arbitrators nominated a 
Swiss arbitrator as chairman. Apparently, the Swiss chairman without any request 
from the parties or consultation of his co-arbitrators, appointed a Swiss expert. After 
a number of objections and sole decisions by the chairman, the arbitrator nominated 
by the claimant resigned. The claimant challenged the chairman before the Cairo 
Court of Appeal, but before the tribunal examined the merits of the claim, the 
chairman resigned. The author claims that the chairman “out of spite” followed the 
case and wrote an article in the Swiss Arbitration Association (ASA) Bulletin, in 
which he attacked the lawyers representing the Saudi company.
El Deen claims that there is a “club of beneficiaries from the Euro-Arab arbitration”, 
where the names of those arbitrators have somehow “became compulsory in the Arab 
arbitration cases.”46 It is claimed that “nine out of ten of the Arab parties lost their 
cases without any explanation or justification due to a blind bias in favour of 
European investors.”47 The reason for this situation is that Arab parties nominate 
European arbitrators and European lawyers “for security reasons and the arbitration 
becomes European as well as the awards...statistics show that one Arab arbitrator is
46 M. A El Deen, “Secrets About The Rise the Euro-Arab Arbitration Crisis”, El Watan Al-Arabi, 13 
September 2006, 38, 38
47 ibid 39
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nominated for every twenty Euro-Arab arbitration cases and that the Arab and 
commercial Arab companies lose their cases at a 29% rate in every ten cases”48.
After these complaints, emails were exchanged and the issue discussed and 
considered by lawyers involved in arbitration in the Middle East. The supporters of 
these claims, who want to get more Arab arbitrators involved in Euro-Arab 
arbitration, organised a conference in late 2006 in Spain excluding a number of 
Swiss and French arbitrators and another in September 2007 in Italy doing the same. 
I spoke to a number of prominent Arab arbitrators who explained to me that in some 
way there are now two main camps; one group that deal with the Cairo Regional 
Centre and that is trying to build a Mediterranean arbitration community and 
arbitration culture separate to the western bias of European arbitrators, and a second 
that are supporters of the French and Swiss arbitrators and deal with the ICC. This 
second group are considered to be ‘traitors’ in some quarters.
This article and the discussions since have led to concerns as to the future of 
commercial arbitration in the region. It seems that the hostility of the 1950s and 
1960s has returned but wearing a different mask and for now this is directed against 
certain individuals. However, the main difference between now and the previous 
phase of boycotting arbitration is that this time the Arab world is creating its own 
arbitration community with its own players, discourse and practice, excluding those 
who they consider to be biased or non-compliant.
4.5 International Commercial Arbitration through the eyes of Jordanian 
Arbitrators
The last part of this chapter outlines the views and feelings of the Jordanian 
arbitration community towards international arbitration and the ICC. These views 
were recorded during 2004 and 2005 and they show the great dissatisfaction by those 
players.
48 ibid 42
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4.5.1 International Arbitration
A lawyer that who been practising since 1985 and specialises in civil and commercial 
law explained, “as third world countries, clients cannot afford the expenses o f 
international arbitration. It is a heavy burden. International arbitration costs can 
reach several millions.”
A former judge, who has been a lawyer for 16 years warned “people in Jordan feel 
that they cannot afford to go to arbitration abroad and therefore may decide not to 
claim at all. The local party is always the weaker one. We need to protect them and 
the new Arbitration Act does not do so, as it allows arbitration abroad. In Jordan, 
the new law disadvantages the local party considerably. The law is wrong”
An experienced arbitrator and lawyer who specialises in commercial and civil law 
advises his clients to go to court whether Jordanian or foreign as it is always less 
expensive. For Jordanian clients, in particular it is not advantageous to go to 
arbitration. Arbitration is always imposed upon them by foreign parties. Only i f  the 
dispute is specialised or has complicated issues will it be worthwhile for the 
Jordanian party to go to local arbitration”
A young arbitrator said “foreign arbitrators have no knowledge o f Arab laws as they 
are not translated. They cannot do any research i f  they do not speak Arabic. In a 
case where the chairman was a foreigner and the applicable law was Jordanian, it 
was very difficult for him. He could only rely on second hand translation and 
information which made it very difficult. Now, in international arbitration there is at 
least one local arbitrator. In the 1960-1970s there were a lack o f competent Arab 
arbitrators, but now this problem does not exist anymore. I  have actually noticed 
that some o f the foreign companies appoint local arbitrators. The chairman is a non­
local usually. The foreign party appoints an arbitrator, who is fluent in the language 
o f the law and the local party also appoints a local arbitrator, then they appoint the 
chairman from a neutral country. This way all the information regarding the 
substantive law comes from two arbitrators, rather than one”
111
Part 2
An international arbitrator with an LLM and PhD in International law from George 
Washington University insists “the worst issue with arbitration is the cliques. There 
is an inherit bias towards Arab laws from foreign arbitrators. I  have filed complaints 
with the ICC. I  do not see any shortcomings in our laws and I  have never 
encountered any problems within Arab law as it deals with commercial disputes o f 
any kind. We have a well established system o f law, they are just ignorant. We never 
been hostile to arbitration, we are hostile to the bias”
4.5.2 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
The ICC is seen by all those interviewed as very expensive and therefore inaccessible 
to Jordanian parties. Most lawyers try very hard to avoid ICC arbitration. The 
criticisms of the ICC are not restricted to cost alone, some interviewees felt the ICC 
is unrepresentative.
A former judge said “there is no doubt that the ICC is a European Model”
A very experienced lawyer and a member of the committee of the Jordanian Bar 
explained “arbitration has been forced on Jordanian firms through western 
companies. This sometimes leads to ICC arbitration, which is beyond the financial 
ability o f Jordanian businesses. Jordanian business folds to western terms and 
pressure. The market in Jordan is small and there are always a number o f  
alternative parties that would accept the terms o f the western parties. The ICC is 
beyond all o f the financial means o f Jordanian business”
A young arbitrator says, “I  like the ICC and even in cases where it is not ICC, I  try to 
write terms o f reference as it focuses the effort and saves time. This way the main 
issues are identified and all the evidence. However, I  do not advise my clients to 
refer their disputes to the ICC because it is very expensive”
An experienced lawyer who works mainly in international arbitration said “the 
problem for Jordanian clients is the high fees. It is a very big problem”
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A lawyer with an LLB from School of Oriental and African Studies in London, who 
represents clients in arbitration cases explained “the ICC is causing great harm. An 
Arab party will always end up on the losing side and the reason for this is bias. I  try 
to avoid an ICC clause as much as possible. LCIA has a better track record. I f  I  had 
to choose between ICC and LCIA, I  would choose LCIA as they charge lower fees. In 
cases were there is only one European arbitrator among local arbitrators, the 
European is a prisoner to the local lawyers on the panel or to the expert.”
A lawyer that has a PhD from George Washington in international law has “a 
negative view o f the ICC in particular because that is my experience. ICC arbitration 
is populated by European arbitrators who are biased. I  am not saying they are 
prejudiced against Arabs; this mental set up is slanted against our ways. For 
example, i f  you take an English lawyer and present to him a provision in Jordanian 
law that it is different to English law, ‘it will take a lot salt for him to sallow it He is 
culturally and mentally slanted against what is not English.”
The engineers also agree, one engineer said, “The ICC is very expensive. The Arab 
party is in an environment that is very different. When a contractor who has been 
working in Saudi for a long time goes to arbitration in Paris, he starts to pretend 
that he does not understand Saudi ways and procedures. The arbitrators in the ICC 
certainly do not understand. Therefore, no wonder the Arab countries lose a lot o f 
cases that they should not lose.”
The journey of international commercial arbitration in the Middle East has been and 
in some ways still is an unhappy one. This bias always been caused by those who 
view Sharp ah to be too obscure, archaic and too different to be taken seriously. 
International commercial arbitration in the Arab world has been on a rollercoaster 
with occasional highs, but mostly lows. International arbitration has not won over 
Middle Eastern players. Many countries have adopted harmonising laws and signed 
international conventions begrudgingly, thus this apparent change seems to be ‘skin 
deep’. Recently, Arabs have started developing their own separate culture of modem 
commercial arbitration instead of trying to fit into the current international arbitration 
culture. The next two parts of the thesis will concentrate on Jordan and how these
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different cultures and rationalities work themselves out in the commercial arbitration 
environment of Amman.
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Chapter Five 
Jordan and its Tribes
“Jordan’s founding myth goes back to the 1916 Arab Revolt of coalition 
of tribes led by the Hashemite family against the rule of the Ottoman 
Empire.”1
In the parts one and two of this thesis, the competing rationalities of the West and the 
Middle East were described, as well as the result of their convergence. In the next 
two parts of the thesis, the two rationalities will be examined in the context of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This chapter will give a brief history of Jordan and 
how the tribes and their culture were intertwined into the fabric of the state as well 
as describing tribal justice. The effect of tribal heritage on modem Jordan is further 
examined in chapter nine. This chapter and the next are vital in order to give the 
background for understanding the heritage and culture of contemporary Jordan and 
the practice of arbitration within it.
The majority of the population of Jordan is a combination of people from East and 
West Banks of the Jordan River. The East bankers are largely descendants of the 
nomadic tribes who sallied around in the Arabian Desert, either to establish their 
tribal territories or to settle down in villages and towns within the present day 
boundaries of Jordan. The people of the West Bank, also have nomadic ancestry but 
their origin is much more heterogeneous. “Canaanites and Hebrews, Syrians and 
Greeks, Romans, Byzantines and Arabs, all the ethnic groups who invaded and 
settled in Palestine in the long pre-Islamic history of the country contributed to the 
racial picture of the West Bank.”2 The best way to describe the mixture of the
-j
Jordanian population is to use the words of Muhammad Afash ‘Idwan “Jordan is a 
conglomerate. Jordan is the bedu, the city dweller, the Palestinian, the refugee, the 
Circassian, the Christian, the Muslim, the American. It’s a melting pot.”4 This is in
1 Y. Alon, The Making o f Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State, (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2007), 2
2 R. Patai, Country Survey Series: Jordan, (New Haven: Human Relations Area File, 1957), 35
3 Information Minister in February 2003
4 n 2 above, 26
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terms of composition of its population, but it is certainly tribal in its identity and 
norms. This was caused by the fact that the Transjordan Emirate was excluded from 
the Jewish area of settlement and given its independence in 1923. Therefore, the 
country was not exposed to cultural change and old Muslim Middle Eastern 
traditions continued undisturbed in such areas as family, social and economic life.5
All Jordanians were originally identified (and in a lot of ways still are identified) by 
family, clan and tribal affiliation. This form of social organisation was created by the 
lack of urbanisation and distance from centres of power or economic influence 
during Ottoman times. “In the absence of state security, tribal forms of protective 
social and economic affiliation expressed through kinship...extended into 
agricultural regions and villages. Hence, tribalism in Transjordan was not limited to 
nomads; rather, the tribes of Transjordan filled every economic niche from nomadic 
camel breeders to settled farmers, forming a complex web of integrative social 
alliance.”6
Tribalism and the legitimacy of tradition are considered the foundations of the 
Jordanian state and central to its cultural heritage as well as the basis for legitimacy 
and survival of the monarchy. The role of tribes and tribalism, although transformed 
over the years, remains a fundamental pillar of both society and political culture. 
Although, numerically few Jordanians lived the traditional life of the nomadic 
Bedouin, the cultural traditions based on this life-style have hardly diminished. 
Indeed, conceptions of modem Jordanian cultural and national identity are deeply 
intertwined with the country’s Bedouin heritage.
The Hashemite ruling family needed tribal support for the process of state-building 
due to the specific historical context of the time. This allowed for the integration of 
the tribes into the modem state and their acceptance of the political order that was 
formulated by the Hashemites. According to Alon, “in the course of this process, 
tribal people developed a clear stake in the survival of the Jordanian state...It also
5 ibid 36
6 M.C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making o f Jordan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), 57
116
Part 3
allowed tribes to carve out a political role for themselves within the framework of the 
modem state.”
5.1 The Tribal Foundations of the Jordanian State
On the eve of the establishment of the Transjordanian Emirate in 1921, almost the 
entire country’s population was organised along tribal lines and adhered to tribal 
values and customs. The tribe determined practically every aspect of people’s lives, 
forming in most cases “their principal frame of reference.”8 The forging of political 
alliance, control over land and water, seasonal migration, the provision of personal 
security, conflict resolution and marriage arrangements all took place either within 
the tribal system or in accordance with its conventions. Before the arrival of 
Abdullah, powerful tribes were the country’s effective rulers.
Sharif Abdullah bin Husayn, the second son of Sharif Husayn of Mecca and one of 
the leaders of the Arab Revolt in 1916 arrived in Ma’an in Transjordan from the 
Hijaz on 21 November 1920.10 The Husayn tribe descended from Quraysh, the tribe 
of the Prophet Muhammad. Abdullah arrived in Ma’an with 2,000 tribesmen and 
stayed there to gather support and discuss strategy with those who made the trip to 
Ma’an to meet him. He was welcomed by the tribal leaders and the sheikhs of the 
Huwaitat tribe, one of the biggest tribes in Jordan.11 Also, traditional leaders from the 
general area of Transjordan and sheikhs of tribal segments of various sizes and 
importance, community leaders and other local notables visited Abdullah in Ma’an. 
Their positions of leadership were based on a combination of inherited familial 
prestige, personal merit and wealth. They were in control of Transjordan south of 
Amman, the territory within which Abdullah had first to establish a base. If they 
were openly hostile, his claims to leadership would be difficult to establish, 
something Abdullah was very aware of. He was fluent in tribal customs and 
conventions, which aided him to a great extent when he realised that if he was to rule
7 n 1 above, 1
8 ibid 13
9 Means noble and indicates descent of a direct lineage from the Prophet Mohammad (s.a.a.w)
10 n 6 above
11 ibid
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Transjordan, he must secure the loyalty of the tribes, which he achieved in his first 
four months in the region.12 The gravity of the Hashemites in Arabian politics in the 
aftermath of the First World War and their mantle as Islamic leaders, recognised 
descendents of the Prophet strengthened Abdullah’s appeal. Also, Abdullah’s own 
political experience and skills in tribal politics certainly played a role and soon he 
was universally acknowledged as sheikh mushayekh13.
Six months after his arrival in Ma’an, on 1 March 1921, Abdullah moved to Amman 
and chose it to be the seat of his government. On arrival, he was welcomed by a large 
number of sheikhs from all the surrounding districts. In April 1921, the first 
government was formed in Transjordan.14 Abdullah was careful to establish and 
maintain alliances with the strong nomadic tribes. For that purpose, he removed 
tribal affairs from the authority of central government and governed them personally 
or through the Department of Tribal Administration headed by his cousin and 
confidante, Emir Shakir bin Zayd. The result was the emergence of two almost 
separate systems of government. Nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes were under 
Abdullah’s personal rule and enjoyed the persistence of a chieftaincy- like pattern of 
rule, whereas the settled population was controlled by the central government along 
modem lines.15
Abdullah needed the support of the tribes for his own survival, as he was dependant 
on the strong tribes who held physical control over the country. He therefore 
established eight governments, which were organised along tribal lines. By securing 
the support and co-operation of only a few dozen notables, Abdullah managed to 
achieve a degree of control over the population as a whole. Abdullah also relied on 
the tribes’ military power, as he did not have an army of his own. This was necessary 
in order to assert his control over the country and to defend it from external threats.16
12 n 1 above
The leader of all the Sheikhs
14 n 6 above
15 ibid
16 ibid
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The weakness of central government and the small number of British personnel made
17it necessary to control the population indirectly via local leaders. In their capacity 
as the recognized leaders of tribes, villages and town quarters, sheikhs and notables 
became part of the state apparatus and fulfilled administrative chores, working 
closely with government officials. Later on, Abdullah appointed some of the tribal 
leaders into the government and the administration in order to create a new role for 
the sheikhs and maintain their privileged status, while gradually limiting their 
autonomy. However, this did not mean an eradication of tribal identity, on the 
contrary, state policies enhanced existing tribal modes of politics. In the later years of 
the mandate, within the general framework, the administrators learned to take
advantage of the tribal system to facilitate efficient and economical control over the
18country.
At the time, the political life of the country was dominated by four main forces: the 
palace, the bureaucracy, the British and the tribes.19 Abdullah played the role of 
arbitrator between the different tribes and maintained a balance between them so that
7fihe could remain in power. He relied on the British for protection from Wahhabi 
raids and to suppress the defiant tribes who refused to pay taxes and extend 
allegiance to the new government.21 The Emir, desperate to consolidate his regime, 
started to woo the Bedouins by land distribution and tax exemption. The chiefs 
enjoyed free access to the Emir, who acted on their behalf in government affairs. 
Abdullah maintained a chieftaincy-like political system based on close personal 
relations, an open-door policy, mediation, wasta and conciliation.
77The concept of the state was not new to the tribal chiefs, according to Alon , and 
they were not inherently opposed to it. The late Ottoman era proved that the tribes 
were amenable to state patronage. Providing the new administration allowed the 
sheikhs a degree of autonomy, and room to exercise their leadership over their fellow 
tribespeople, they would co-operate with it. In addition to securing the sheikhs’
17 ibid
18 n 1 above
19 ibid
20 n 6 above
21 n 1 above
22 ibid, 41
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allegiance, Abdullah encouraged their participation in the building and strengthening 
of his rule and consequently of the Emirate. Abdullah entrusted the sheikhs with 
administrative tasks, as a form of recognition of their leadership of their tribes.
The government took advantage of three characteristics of society at the time: the 
notion of tribal solidarity, the tribe as the basic unit of organisation and identity and 
the leadership role of the sheikhs.23 The tribe were recognised by the government as 
the basic administrative unit. This served purposes ranging from tax distribution, 
collection or exemption to the control of the spread of diseases or organising the 
elections to the Legislative Council. Many of the tribal chiefs sat on the Council, 
which further tied them to the state.24 They enjoyed handsome salaries, immunity 
during sessions, public recognition and a platform to express themselves. The tribal 
practices of conflict resolution were also endorsed to achieve better public security 
and chiefs were employed as mediators between the government and the tribesmen in 
order to achieve control. The government unable to secure law and order in tribal 
areas demanded that the sheikhs guarantee security in their area of influence 
themselves, to prevent crimes of all kinds and to arrest or report on criminals or 
suspects.25
As the political, military and economic dominance of the state grew, tribal society 
was relegated to a position of dependence on the government. However, tribal 
identity did not disappear. On the contrary, tribal organisation and ethos remained 
the main feature of society. This was partly due to the policies of the state that 
choose to rule indirectly through already established channels within the tribal 
structure (as this was easier and cheaper). This was achieved by keeping the tribe as 
a basic administrative unit and ruling via the sheikhs and continuing to delegate 
responsibility for maintaining law and order, collecting taxes, settling disputes and 
distributing state largesse. “Sheikhs thus remained the main link between the central 
government and the population, maintaining their relevance as important political 
actors even as the power of the central government increased.”
23 n 1 above
24 ibid
25 ibid
26 n 1 above, 139
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The next ruler of Jordan was Abdullah’s grandson Hussein who took power in May 
1953 after his grandfather’s assassination. Right from the start, King Hussein 
intended to convey a sense of accessibility, thus, his first state act after his 
grandfather was assassinated was to travel throughout the country along with other 
prominent members of the family to hoist the flag in a characteristic Bedouin way
9*7signifying a formal summons to the local sheikhs and tribal leaders. The visits to 
the Bedouins and remote areas continued throughout his rule. The king wrote about 
these visits, “I looked forward eagerly to my periodic trips into the desert to visit my 
tribes. What a different life! I was their king but with them, I did not feel lonely, I 
felt one of them. I was Hussein to them. The only protocol was that of the Bedouin, 
whose life is based on three concepts- honour, courage and hospitality...I think I 
keep a special watch for anything the Bedouin needs...the Bedouin consider me the
9fthead of their tribe.” To cement Bedouin allegiance to the Hashemites, in February 
1955, King Hussein distributed eight thousand dunams (2,000 acres) of prime Jordan
9QValley land to Bedouin who participated in his grandfather’s Great Arab Revolt. 
During his first decade, King Hussein relied on steadfast tribal support by reserving 
some key cabinet posts for men known for their loyalty.
Mindful of the intensely personal nature of his ties with the Bedouins, King Hussein 
visited them often, socializing in their tents and playing the role of paramount tribal 
sheikh. As people of Bedouin origin constituted a disproportionate share of the army, 
disproportion continued at the higher command levels in the mid-1980s. The 
legitimacy of tradition, considered almost synonymous with Bedouin or tribal 
culture, has been defended as part of the near sacrosanct foundations of the state and 
as central to cultural heritage. The role of tribes and tribalism, although transformed, 
remained a fundamental pillar of both society and political culture in the late 1980s.
As in the days of the Emirate, tribal values and culture continue to be appropriated 
by the regime and actively promoted. There is no doubt that the Kingdom’s centre of
27 S.H. Fathi, Jordan: An Invented Nation? Tribe- State Dynamics and the Formation o f National 
Identity, (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient- Institute, 1994)
28 H. bin Talal, Uneasy Lies the Head, An Autobiography, (London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1962), 53-54
29 R. Patai, The Kingdom of Jordan, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), 57
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gravity is a powerful monarch, who alone can delegate authority. This prerogative 
was established with Abdullah I’s power to nominate all posts. The highest executive 
power, which is the government, is nominated by him and therefore completely 
dependent on his support. Therefore, real power rests in the King’s court.
The lack of any influential political parties and the weakness of parliament after the 
post 1957 reforms, led to a growing stature and importance of the new elite-based 
powerhouse of Jordanian politics,- the royal court or diwan. The diwan fulfilled a 
variety of functions and was populated by a stratified elite called the ‘king’s men’ or 
‘the palace elite’. This included members of the extended Hashemite dynasty, 
notable families and tribal leaders. The diwan has been described “as influential as 
the cabinet ...and as an executive council in a vital sector of domestic politics.” 
According to King Hussein, its principle function was to play a “mediating role
o 1
between him and the cabinet.” Part of the diwan, is a special department “called 
the Tribe’s Council, whose task is to liaise between the monarchy and the 
Bedouins.”32 This council emphasises the King’s image as a patron-ruler and 
continues the tradition that Abdullah established in 1920s of a super-tribal leader. 
The council provides the link and facilitates the involvement in the network of state 
patronage. This inter-dependency has served the King and the Kingdom well.
In the later years of King Hussein’s life, the diwan grew as a reflection of the King’s 
personal authority. He called “most of the shots often hiding behind a fa9ade of a 
superficially empowered Prime Minister.”33 There no doubt that the legitimacy of the 
regime in Jordan after 1957 is tied inextricably with the role of the local elite and the 
important base of support it created for the King. The officials of the diwan were 
able to represent the monarch’s policy directly back in their localised spheres of 
power and use this in turn to keep the King in touch of the grassroots. King Hussein 
was also able to maintain this connection by personally receiving all visitors to the 
Royal Court and by frequent visits to all parts of the country. The Royal Palace is
30 S. A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, !987), 12
31 S. A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War, Ph.D diss. University of Reading, 1985, 50
32 ibid 52
33 B. Milton-Edwards and P. Hinchcliffe, Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy (The Contemporary Middle East; London: 
Routledge, 2001), 40
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regarded by the people of Jordan as al-bayt al-amm or the ‘House of all Jordanians’ 
because as they say, bayt al-Sheikh bayt al-umum; ‘the house of the Sheikh is the 
house for all the tribe’. They look at the King as they would to the sheikh al- 
mishayik.
There are certain characteristics that can be identified within Abdullah I, which 
continued through Hussein’s rule, and later with Abdullah II. The Emir ruled Jordan 
with many characteristics of tribal chieftaincy. One of them was unmediated personal 
politics. Abdullah I’s long camping among the tribes turned into Hussein’s ziyaras,34 
During his long tours of the country, visiting the different tribal communities, he 
allowed every tribesmen or woman to approach him and raise complaints, pleas for 
assistance or just enjoy the opportunity to meet him in person. During the 1950s, 
King Hussein was working daily in his Basman Palace in Amman, where he was 
always available to all who wished to see him and often in the afternoon, he would 
travel up and down the country seeing to everything himself, meeting farmers, 
soldiers and workers.36 Even today, King Abdullah II spends much of his time 
visiting the country, addressing large gatherings of public leaders from different 
sectors of society or meeting tribal leaders.
Bedouin society is strongly characterised by equality. Leaders are recognised, but are 
not given strong authority based on other assets such as economic power. An 
example of this equality is that King Hussein is addressed by his first name when he 
visits Bedouin camps; he is treated as the first among equals rather than as royalty. 
To prove this, a story is told about the poet Mustafa Wahbah al-Tall, who invited 
Emir Abdullah I to his house and offered him lentil soup for lunch saying, “Oh 
Abdullah, you are going to eat what your people eat. You are no better than they.”
Today, the three groups in charge of the country are; the King as the political and 
social father of the whole country, officials who implement his directions and
34 L.L. Laybe, Home and Homeland: the Dialogics of Tribal and National Identities in Jordan (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 145
35 ibid
36 J. G. Sparrow, Modern Jordan, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1961)
37 Jordan Times (Amman), 13 & 19 June 2005,12 October 2005, 13 March 2006
38 n 2 above, 57
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provide a link with the population and the people, who are represented by their 
sheikhs well versed in their social life and tribal concept. Fathi argues that 
Hussein’s legitimacy formula was particularly effective with the Bedouin because 
they attach great importance to traditions. The formula consisted of Hussein’s 
Sharifian descent and the historical role of the Hashemites. Therefore, Hussein’s 
repeated appeal to Jordan as a family was very significant for a culture where the 
family and clan are central. King Hussein, in his memoirs confirmed, “When I think 
of my family, I think with pride of everyone in Jordan, who was standing by me as 
we faced the storms, inspired me in serving them. When I think of the tribe to which 
I belong, I look upon the whole Arab nation. My life is dedicated to an ideal, just as 
the Hashemites have been throughout history.”40 King Hussein had a number of 
qualities that the Bedouins expected in their leader, for example, personal courage, 
eloquence and beautiful command of Arabic.
King Hussein will always be a descendent of the prophet and therefore was 
especially qualified to serve as a supreme tribal leader. The older Bedouin and those 
in the armed forces identified with the King on a personal level and their loyalty to 
Hussein was grounded in this highly personal relationship. “King Hussein 
symbolises his state...Jordan is a Hashemite kingdom in name, but Hussein’s 
kingdom in the public mind as it was Abdullah’s kingdom before his 
assassination.”41 The Bedouin in particular love the king and identify with the 
success of Jordan and take pride in its heritage.
King Hussein protected the tribe and their tribalism and it could be argued that any 
attack on the tribes could be considered an attack on the king, due to the perceived 
close connection between them. He replied to negative articles in the Jordanian press 
during the early 1980s “launching attacks on our social institutions and their customs 
and values. I have not been happy about this attack. Most recently, I have noticed 
that some articles have been directed against tribal life, its norms and traditions. This 
is most regrettable because it harms a dear sector of our society. I would like to
39 n 27 above
40 n 28 above, 81
41 P.A. Jureidini & R.D. McLauren, Jordan: The Impact o f Social Change on the Role o f the Tribes, 
(Washington: Praeger, 1984), 55 & 56
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repeat to you what I told a meeting of tribal heads recently, “I am al-Hussein from 
Hashem and Quraish, the noblest Arab tribe of Mecca which was honoured by God 
and into which was bom the Arab Prophet Mohammad.” Therefore, whatever harms 
our tribes in Jordan is considered harmful to us, as this has been the case all along 
and it will continue so forever.”42 The King’s stress on his tribal and Islamic origins 
signalled the continued and strong base tribal allegiances play in Jordan. He said in 
an address to the Badiyah Police Headquarters in 1976, “We are Arabs and we shall 
not neglect our worthy customs and lose our distinctive characteristics inherited from 
our noble ancestors...the traditional customs, of which we are justly proud, will 
continue to be observed”43
Although numerically only a few Jordanians live the traditional life of the nomadic 
Bedouin, the cultural traditions based on this life-style have hardly diminished. 
Indeed, conceptions of modem Jordanian cultural and national identity were deeply 
intertwined with the country's Bedouin heritage. Scholars have acknowledged and 
emphasised the centrality of the tribe and tribal political culture to the Hashemite 
monarchy and in turn to present-day Jordan.44 Milton-Edwards et al argue that “the 
rulers of the new state would have to expend considerable energy in creating and 
establishing a new level of national identity which was Jordanian in character and yet 
managed to respect pre-existing loyalties and ties.”45 Anderson refers to successive 
decades where the Hashemites engaged in the construction of an “imagined 
community”, a form of national identity and nationalism whose foundations lay in 
historical myth and a rolling definition of what it means to be Jordanian. The paradox 
is caused by the Palestinians who hold Jordanian citizenship, but uphold their right to 
return to their country, thus, producing uncertainty and confusion in identity.46
It is clear that even today, most Jordanians still define themselves in terms of their 
‘tribal’ and regional origins. Also, Jordanian national identity has come to symbolize
42 Jordanian Times, January 28, 1985
43 A.S.S. Oweidi, Bedouin Justice in Jordan (The Customary Legal System of die tribes and its 
integration into the framework of state polity from 1921 onwards), Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 
1982, 86
44 Y. Alon, “The Tribal System in the Face of the State-formation Process: Mandatory Transjordan, 
1921-46”, Int. J. Middle East Stud. 37 (2005), 213
45 n 33 above
46 B. Sakijha, National Integrity Systems [NISJ Country Study Report: Jordan 2001, (The Hague: The 
Netherlands Ministry of Justice and Transparency International, May 2001), 4
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the Bedouin tribes. The notion of ‘tribe’ has plural resonance in the Jordanian 
context. At times, it referred to Jordan’s past, where the tribes were important to the 
political and social situation of the region known as Transjordan. It also linked to the 
background and special relationship to the ruling Hashemite family. At other times, 
with reference to Jordan’s present, it validates certain moral virtues that characterize 
the Jordanian people and represents the legacy of tribal social life. Sometimes the 
term is used to criticize aspects of contemporary society and culture deemed 
backward and outdated. Whichever definition of tribalism is taken, one phenomenon 
is clear, that the Jordanian people are still famous for their loyal attachment to 
family, distinctive rituals of hospitality and conflict mediation and arbitration, as well 
as effective and flexible kin-based collectivity in lineage or tribe.
Ties grounded in patriarchal kinship, with their attendant networks of social and 
economic obligations, continue to lie close to the surface in contemporary Jordanian 
society. The modem effect of this collectivity will be explored in detail in the context 
of transaction formation and dispute resolution in chapter 9. In the next chapter, the 
tribal justice system that was part of the Jordanian state until the late 1970s will be 
described. This system served the tribes well and helped them to live together in a 
certain level of harmony for centuries.
5.2 Tribal Justice and Dispute Resolution
“The Arab tribe was and in most cases still is so democratic as to be
almost entirely lacking in discipline”47
The journey through Jordan’s history and cultural make up started with the outline of 
the tribes’ role in the building of the Hashemite state. It would be unconceivable to 
talk about the tribes of Jordan without exploring their sophisticated justice system 
and dispute resolution, which is the aim of the rest of this chapter. This is because 
this system dealt with conflict in a way that Jordanians still use and cherish. Third 
party intervention is an important part of this dispute resolution practice.
47 B. J. B Glubb, The Story o f the Arab Legion, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948) 176
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As outlined before and will be shown again, Jordanian identity is based on kinship 
and family. This is due to the fact that the original habitat in the desert of the tribes 
was violent and the harsh. There was relentless competition for resources and a lack 
of state authority. This led the tribes to function as a single unit with strict rules and 
tradition , in both war and peace. The tribes co-operated with and fought each other 
from time to time to secure their existence. Thus, the rules and norms of dispute 
resolution, including punishments for offences, evolved to strengthen the unity 
within the tribe itself and place the welfare of the group at the forefront. There were 
also rules that dealt with conflict between tribal members themselves. These customs 
were recognised among the tribes, and while some of the customs differed from tribe 
to tribe, the general principles were the same. For example, in all the tribes the 
sheikhs and judges decided and ruled on any dispute or issue that arose between the 
tribes. Tribal people relied on their sheikhs for their strength and discipline.
Arranged hierarchically, the Arab tribal society comprises of the ashira (tribe) - the 
largest descent group-followed by the hamulas, the fakhds, the lazam and finally the 
extended patriarchal families.48 The largest politico-administrative unit is the 
hamula. Every hamula has an elder as a mediator and a wasta. The more prominent 
hamulas were headed by a Pasha during Ottoman rule who was chosen by the 
authorities to mediate on their behalf.49 Members of hamulas usually choose their 
elders on the basis of wisdom, age and generosity. Each ashira is headed by a sheikh 
and an elder is responsible for the welfare of his hamula. It is the sheikh’s duty to 
represent his tribe, to act as an arbiter and a judge in litigation, to give consent for 
marriages and divorces, to protect the feeble, to receive guests and to protect the 
honour of the tribe.50 For example, if there.are disputes within the hamula in which 
kinsmen cannot resolve, then the elder intervenes. If a dispute or homicide takes 
place between members of different hamulas or ashiras, then a jaha will be formed. 
The jaha ensures that the matter is resolved quickly and the harmony between the 
families restored. The elders were looked upon as the upholders of tribal norms and 
values.51
48 F. Al-Kalani, Shariah Al- ashaer f i  al Wattan Al-arabi (The customs o f the tribe in the Arab 
countries), (Amman: Aldar Alarabia, 1985)
49 ibid
50 ibid
51 ;u ; a
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Even today, the sheikh is assisted by the majlis (tribal council) composed of the 
heads of the various subdivisions of the tribe, the majlis meets daily in the guest tent 
of the sheikh when the tribe is encamped. At its sessions, which last from 
midmoming to about noontime, there is an informal discussion of questions such as 
when to break camp, where to find grass, news of other tribes and cases of 
litigation.53 No vote is taken, and the sheikh in his capacity as chairman is able to 
influence the deliberations only through the force of his personality, wisdom and 
understanding. The position does not carry any power to compel the members of the 
council against their wishes. Traditionally, the position of a sheikh depended upon 
the good will of the elders and his tenure was ultimately in their hands.54
The position of a sheikh is usually inherited, however, the rules are not rigid. For 
instance, it is not expected that the first-born son of the sheikh should always succeed 
him upon his death. When a sheikh dies and sometimes even prior to his death, if he 
is ill or old and weak, the tribe will be strongly preoccupied with the question of 
succession and usually a consensus will be reached as to which one of his sons, 
nephews or other close relatives is the most suitable to step into his shoes.55 In cases 
where the sheikh has a preference for one of his sons, he may entrust him with the 
responsibility of handling tribal affairs guided by his prestige and advice, thus, 
giving him a chance to prove himself. In cases where two members of the tribe aspire 
to become the sheikh and both have a considerable following, it could result in the 
tribe breaking up and forming two separate tribes.56
Tribal law (urf or add) is the local customary law. It varies from tribe to tribe and it 
is orally transmitted inter-generationally.57 Conformity is expected of every member 
of the tribe as a matter of course. The repository of the traditional laws in each tribe 
is the sheikh or sometimes a body of specially elected elders who act as judges when
52 ibid
53 ibid
54 ibid
55 A. A. Abadi, Jraam Aljinyat alkubrah aind alashaaer Alardoniaia (Major Crimes in the Jordanian 
tribes), (Amman: Aldar Alarabia, 1986)
56 ibid
57 ibid
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cases arise and whose decisions are respected. The office of tribal judge (arifa) is 
hereditary in certain families. Judges specialise in certain areas dealing only with a 
certain, clearly defined category of cases. There are judges of: blood affairs, money 
matters, cases relating to horses, financial arrangements in connection with divorce,
co
disputes between sheikhs, howdah-rights, differences arising out of raids etc. 
Another type of hereditary office is that of the peace-negotiator, the qalid, whose 
duties include the rendering of guarantees that his tribe will loyally adhere to the 
conditions laid down in a concluded peace treaty.59
Tribal law is built upon two basic principles: the principle of collective responsibility 
and the principle of retribution or compensation. The objective is not merely to 
punish the offender, but to restore the equilibrium between the offending and the 
offended families.60
The principle of family solidarity, asabiyya alkabalya, informs the collective 
responsibility concept and thus makes it an important part of the tribal society and 
justice system.61 The extent of tribal support for a person is a function of the degree 
of kinship or the extent of other social relationships and the closer the degree of 
relationship, the stronger the asabiyya to that person. The asabiyya for the brother is 
stronger than the asabiyya for a nephew and the asabiyya of the nephew is stronger 
than the asabiyya for the cousin. This is well described in a famous tribal adage “I 
against my brother; my brother and I against my cousin; my cousin and I against the 
outsider.” The asabiyya is the fundamental base of tribal society connecting and 
pulling together the tribal members to each other and creating for each person certain 
responsibilities and corresponding duties. Thus, each member will back the other 
expecting the other person to do the same. Also, when a member supports his tribe 
then he will presume that they will back him, even if he were the offender. The tribe 
takes responsibility for the member if he offends and avenges him if he were harmed. 
This is summarised in the tribal saying “Aid your brother whether oppressed or
58 n 43 above
59 ibid
60 n 29 above
61 n 48 above
62 n 55 above
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oppressor!” Ibn Khaldun63 (1332-1407 CE) stated in his introduction to Arab history 
that this protected the tribes and caused fear in their enemies. This was also referred 
to in the Qur’an about Yousefs brothers, who said to their father “surely it grieves 
me that you should take him off, and I fear lest the wolf devour him while you are 
heedless of him.”64 The strength of asabiyya within the tribe, and its demonstration 
to other tribes, acts as a deterrent. The absence of asabiyya is seen as a sign of 
weakness and vulnerability.
The asabiyya defines the collective responsibility of tribal society and ensures its 
continued existence. It is “a social code where the overriding necessity is that tribe or 
clan hold together and defend each other in order merely to survive in the face of 
other foreign and marauding nomads, and in the face of severe desert conditions 
which make this survival impossible except through the unity, co-operation and 
symbolic divisions of roles in tightly-knit but necessarily permanently-mobile groups 
of families.”65
There are two types of asabiyya. The asabiyya albaseeta (simple) relates to the 
loyalty of the Bedouin to his close relatives. This appeared in pre-Islamic times when 
groups of people lived together in small units. An individual would not think of 
overriding these small units.66 This form of asabiyya did not join with other units 
because of the competition between them. Therefore, these small units were 
independent and lived in isolation from other units.
As time went by, another type of asabiyya developed, which is the asabiyya murakab 
(multiple). Small units of asabiyya joined other small units and became a big 
asabiyya. The loyalty of the small units was transferred to the larger unit.67 Thus, the 
tribe became large and so did the asabiyya. This form of asabiyya developed during 
Islamic times and the larger tribes became the ruling tribes in that era. This played an 
important part in Islamic history and the spread of Islam. The large units that the
63 Ibn Khaldun, (The Muqaddimah) An Introduction to History, trans. Rosenthal, (ed.) Dawood (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), 128
64 Verse 13 in Sura Yousef
65 G. bin Muhammad, The Tribes o f Jordan: At the Beginning o f the Twenty-first Century, (Jordan: 
Jamlyat Turath al-Urdun al-Baql), 22
66 n 55 above
67 n 48 above
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smaller units joined were usually Muslim, and all the members of the smaller units
AHconverted to Islam. Problems arose when the newly formed asabiyya wanted to 
choose their sheikh. Each member owed his loyalty to the candidate from his smaller 
unit. This was one of the most dangerous disputes that faced the asabiyya murakab. 
Usually, these disputes were resolved in accordance to SharVah, which mandated 
arbitration. The sheikhs of the small units would arrive at a consensus as to who 
would be the sheikh of the collective unit.69
It is important to discuss the foundations of the asabiyya alkabalya. The first and 
main foundation is the blood tie. The second is an alliance connecting two or more 
tribes with common interests, including the common goal of stopping injustice and
nr\
securing safety within society. An example of this would be of the small units 
getting together in Mecca and forming the Korish to support the offended and deal 
fairly with the offender. The young prophet Mohammad (s.a.a.w) attended this 
meeting and he was impressed with this treaty. This type of alliance with a number 
of smaller tribes added to the stature and the dominance of the powerful tribes.71 If a 
member of the powerful tribe is killed then his diya (blood money) is double that of 
members of lesser tribes. In certain circumstances where a small unit joins a 
powerful tribe for protection, the protecting tribe has the authority.72
Sometimes, the alliance will be confirmed by laaket aldam, where the sheikhs put 
their hands in a container full of blood. A famous instance that occurred in Mecca 
related to the placement of the holy black stone. The dispute between the tribes 
reached a boiling point and blood was likely to be spilled. Two tribes of Mecca 
formed an alliance to defend and protect each other until death and they 
demonstrated their allegiance by using laaket aldam.73
The third basis of the asabiyya is the attachment of one tribe to another and the 
amalgamation of them into one. One of the tribes will detach from their kinship and
68 ibid
69 ibid
70 n 55 above
71 ibid
72 n 43 above
73 ibid
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join another tribe and become part of it and its asabiyya, transferring loyalty to the 
tribe they have joined.74 The fourth and final source is slavery and this occurred 
when individuals who were slaves or prisoners, and their fedyya (ransom) has not 
been paid, become part of the tribe. This form of asabiyya was forbidden after the
nc
emergence of Islam.
The effectiveness of tribal mechanisms in containing disputes can be attributed to a
7  fk“complex system of special customs and regulatory procedures within each group.” 
The concept of collective responsibility, extending either to tribe as a whole or to the 
tribesman’s extended family up to five generations removed (khamsa), offered all 
individuals a measure of protection. Collective responsibility is a two edged sword. 
On the one hand, it could potentially turn a conflict between two individuals into a 
war between two families or tribes and on the other hand, the knowledge that a 
person’s actions might drag the whole tribe into a bloody conflict also restrained 
individuals.77 When a crime is committed, collective responsibility facilitates quick 
settlement, as the culprit’s entire tribe are liable to pay compensation to the victim’s 
family. Compensation, in cash or in kind, is the chief means of settling disputes, 
hence the existence of elaborate protocols of compensation. Third parties stand to 
gain much in terms of prestige if their intervention and mediation (wasta) lead to the 
settlement of a dispute.78
Bedouin have traditionally have placed great importance on the concept of honour 
(ird). Slight or injury to a member of a tribal group was an injury to all members of 
that group, likewise, all members were responsible for the actions of a fellow tribal 
member.79 Honour inhered in the family and the tribe and in the individual as the 
representative of the family or tribe. Slights were to be erased by appropriate revenge
unless a third-party mediated to facilitate reconciliation based on adequate
80compensation.
74 ibid
75 ibid
76 n 43 above, 40
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5.3 The Tribal Legal System
The main sources of Bedouin law are81: Islamic Shari’ah\ the awayid (custom) 
judicial precedent; Ijtihad (creative judgement); the judge’s experience and wisdom 
and the opinions of the tribal elders.82
Bedouin judges aim to satisfy the litigants, to dispense justice and achieve Allah’s 
will. When the parties come before a Bedouin judge, they remind him of Allah and 
adjure him to be honest and fair.83 In deciding the case, Bedouin judges adhere to the 
Islamic principle that states “the plaintiff has the onus of proof and on him who 
denies the charge (the defendant) is the necessity of taking the oath” because the aim 
of judicial proceedings is the discovery of the truth, and not merely apportioning 
blame. When deciding the case, Bedouin judges observe more than one source of 
law.84
The awayid were passed down from generation to generation. Two types of Bedouin 
awayid are recognised according to Oweidi85. The first deals with major criminal 
offences such as homicide, which are recognised as crimes in all the tribes, though 
the degrees of gravity and penalties for these crimes differ from tribe to tribe. The 
second type of awayids are more particular in that each tribe has its own to suit their 
circumstances and it could conform or conflict with other tribes’ awayid. However, 
the fact that all of them broadly faced a similar habitat implied a basic coherence of
0 7
rationalities, facilitating dialogue and consensus building.
Judicial precedent (al-sabiqah) is used extensively in the Bedouin legal system. The 
ratio of precedents is derived from decisions in similar cases and important decisions 
by Bedouin legislating judges.88 When a judge pronounces his judgement, he 
supports his decision by reference to previous decisions in similar cases, whether by
81 n 43 above
82 ibid
83 n 55 above
84 ibid
85 n 43 above
86 ibid
87 ibid
88 ibid
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him or by another judge. The precedent must not conflict with the tribe’s awayid and
on
must be from a judge within the tribe or tribes allied to them. Judges have to cite 
sabiqah as this gives them greater legitimacy among the tribe. Precedents are also 
used in influencing the parties to accept judgements, especially in complicated and 
serious cases.90
The Turki al-Haydar case demonstrates the importance of precedents within the 
Bedouin legal system.91 In October 1945, Turki al-Haydar, a member of the Bani 
Sakhr tribe, murdered two slaves belonging to the al-Zabn clan of the same tribe. 
Turki also killed a mare that the slaves were caring for. The mare belonged to 
Mikhlid, a bodyguard of Emir Abdullah. Mikhlid claimed his right to mithani 
(compensation) for his dead mare from the dead slaves’ masters, al-Zabn, since they 
received the diyah (blood money) for the salves and the mare. The Al-Zabn clan 
rejected Mikhlid’s demands and contended that Turki (the murderer) must pay the 
mare’s mithani to Mikhlid. Turki refused since he had paid the diyah of the mare 
directly to al-Zabn. The case was brought before a tribal judge, Muhammad al-Zhayr 
of the Bani Sakhr. Addub al-Zabn supported his argument with reference to a 
precedent that confirmed that the one who killed a mare must pay the mithani to the 
owner. Relying on this precedent, the judge pronounced that “since this precedent 
took place among the Bani Sakhr in two analogous cases, Turki (the killer) must pay 
the mithani to Mikhlid, who has no right to ask al-Zabn (the victims’ master) to pay
Q*Jhim that, even if they received the mare’s diyah”
Al-Ijtihacf3 within the tribal legal system means a new creative judgement without a 
precedent, made by a specialist judge, whose special area of jurisdiction involves 
legal and theological issues. An example of this is the case of Lafi and Jazza al- 
Halabi. Lafi and Jazza al-Halabi of the Bani Sakhr tribe shot and seriously injured 
Ali al-Sibilah, also of the same tribe. The crime took place when Ali was the dakhil 
(one seeking protection) of the sheikh Hadithah al-Khurayshah of the Bani Sakhar. 
Hadithah alleged taqti al-wajh (crime of dishonouring a person) against Lafi and
89 n 48 above
90 ibid
91 n43 above , 157
92 ibid
93 This is the usual meaning of the word. In this sense it defined within the tribal legal process.
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Jazza and demanded that the attackers be expelled from the tribal territory and 
compensation be paid to both the wounded man and Hadithah himself. The case was 
brought before the tribal judge Muhammad al-Zhayr, who formulated a new ijtihad 
to deal with these issues in general, since he was authorised to do so. His ijtihad was,
“The person who [attacks] another and [causes] a serious injury must be 
expelled from his tribe’s territory until the wound has healed. After the 
wound has healed, the wrongdoer must seek protection from one of his 
tribe’s sheikhs or any other notable person, in order that they intervene 
on his behalf to obtain the acceptance of a settlement by the injured 
party. Should the wounded man refuse the jaha, the two parties must 
present their case to a judge who is experienced in the assessment of 
injury cases, in order to assess the compensation to be paid for the wound 
and to arrive at a settlement of the case. The crime of taati al-wajh takes 
priority in the settlement over the case of serious injury.” 4
The above ijtihad established a new principle in cases of serious injury accompanied
by taqti al-wajh.
From childhood, the Bedouin attend judicial processes that are open to the 
tribepeople. This gives them the chance to hear the case including the pleas, the 
judge’s summing-up and findings. A Bedouin judge preparing his son or close kin to 
be his successor would send his potential successor to attend cases before other 
judges within and outside the tribe. This would allow him to observe the judicial 
process and benefit from the other judges’ experience.95 The protegd would be 
expected to come back and discuss the judicial proceedings and the findings that he 
was sent to observe with the judge who sent him. Apart from facilitating the teaching 
of a potential judge, such practices also help the sitting judge in expanding their 
horizons by learning about the principles and procedures used by other judges. “The 
legal experience of Bedouin judges represents the sum total of the experience both of 
the judges and the Bedouin. Experience is for judges and people alike a highly 
valued source of tribal legislation.”96
It is not just the judge who makes the law. Tribal elders do so too. They include all 
persons holding responsible positions within the tribe such as sheikhs and notables.
94 n 43 above , 158
95 n 48 above
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Elders have the authority to formulate new laws of which they are the principle 
source due to their wisdom, experience and interest in a tribe’s affairs. In 1960, a 
dispute over land in al-Fjayj took place between the al-Dhyabat and al-Hidban clans 
on one side and the al-Tuwayhah on the other. All the parties belonged to the 
Huwaytat tribe. These clans accepted and approved without question their sheikhs’ 
decisions, because sheikhs “are our elders and whatever decision they make would 
be acceptable to us without reservation.”97
Bedouin judges are responsible for enforcing tribal law and order and maintaining 
harmonious social relations within the community, in order to achieve justice. 
Therefore, the person who is honoured with such a position must have all the 
appropriate qualifications and additionally his family must possess virtuous qualities. 
The Bedouin judge must be of high social standing within the community reflecting 
strong kinship ties, spiritual standing and/or descent from a respected family. The 
position that a judge holds and enjoys within his own family and the wider kinship 
relations plays a major role in determining his seniority and functioning. Any 
weakness within his family diminishes the enforceability and effectiveness of his 
decisions, while the strength of his kin improves his public standing and increases 
public confidence in him. The Bedouin judge must also be a man of great 
importance, highly respected, effective, with high moral standards, selflessness, 
proven impartiality, non-materialistic and pious. He must be well informed and fair-
QQ
minded. He must have a sharp mind and be intelligent enough to deal with any type 
of case within his jurisdiction. He should gain people’s confidence by giving a 
convincing and satisfactory exposition of his decisions. He should be well informed 
about tribal awayid and must have adequate experience in settling tribal disputes. He 
must also be wise and farsighted.99
The Bedouin judicial system has a highly sophisticated system of classification. 
Tribal judges fall into categories according to their power, role and the subject of 
their specialisation. Oweidi100 has re-classified the complex nomenclature used by
97 ibid 161
98 ibid 190-194
99 ibid 195
100 ibid 202
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the tribes into three main categories. The first is the judge with powers to legislate. 
The second is the judge who deals with serious and important tribal cases and is 
referred to as the “cutter of the truth”. The third is the judge of first instance who 
deals with simple cases or prepares cases and transfers then to a more competent 
judge. If a case falls outside the judge’s jurisdiction, then the judge will send it to 
another specialising in that particular type of case.
A judge may also consider it necessary to refer the dispute to arbitration. An 
arbitrator, mutually agreed upon by the parties, would be appointed who is well 
acquainted with the subject of the case. The arbitration may be performed by one or 
more arbitrators called hakam/muhakkim. Arbitration takes place in cases involving 
disputes over marriage, ownership of land, horses or camels and where both parties 
have a strong case and are unprepared to compromise. In disputes regarding 
marriage, the arbitrators are usually two from each side in accordance with Shari ’ah. 
The two arbitrators try to bridge the gap between the parties and create an 
atmosphere for settlement before they give their decision. The aim is for the 
arbitrators to provide a solution that will be binding upon the judge, as well as 
reinstating good relations between the two sides.
Oweidi101 summarises the main principles underlying Bedouin legislation as follows: 
Bedouin legislation and law are subject to Bedouin awayid. The accused is 
considered neither innocent nor guilty until the case is proven. Justice must be seen 
to be done. Judicial decisions are subject to appeal. The law is preserved by 
conciliation and by settling disputes in such a way as to satisfy both parties in 
litigation. The law is applied with flexibility, according to tribal principle and 
customary practice. A case must be presented before the judge at the appointed time 
and place.
Judicial decisions are subject to appeal, if one of the parties felt that the judgement is 
unfair. Further, any member of the Bedouin community has the right to appeal 
against any judicial decision of any tribal judge. The tribal appeal system is also a 
form of judicial review which ensures that judges are just and reasonable. In the mid-
101 ibid
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1960s, for example, Muhammad al-Fayiz and Awwag as-Sattam both of the Bani 
Sakhr tribe, went to judge Sharari al-Bikhit of the same tribe and asked him to give 
his judgement with regards to their dispute. Sharari gave his judgement in favour of 
Awwad. Mohammad appealed against the decision and the case was transferred to 
two other judges of the Bani Sakhr tribe, Zahir al-Dhiyab and Ali al-Khurayshah, 
who acted as a tribal Court of Appeal. They decided that the judgement of Sharari 
was unfair, since he did not accept the testimony of Mohammad’s brother in favour 
of Mohammad. The judges’ acceptance of Mohammad’s appeal and the rejection of 
the decision of Sharari was based upon the Bani Sakhr’s underlying principle of 
giving testimony and evidence on oath. The appellate judges said, “Sharari should 
have accepted al-Nuri al-Fayiz’s testimony whether it was favourable to, or against 
his brother Mohammad, since the Bani Sakhr’s principle of testimony is that the 
testimony of a witness should not be rejected unless it is untruthful or the witness 
himself be unreliable.”102 The judges also rejected the earlier judgement because the
103Sharari accepted the yimin (oath) of Awwad, but rejected that of Mohammad.
The decisions of Bedouin judges are implemented by kufala (guarantors) appointed 
by both parties. The kufala make sure that both parties follow the judgement and 
adhere to what is ordered. They also pay the diyah (blood money) if their party were 
to default. If a party refuses to implement a final judgment, then the violator is 
condemned by the community and becomes an outlaw and forfeits his tribal rights. 
Non-compliance is considered contrary to tribal law and a flagrant violation of the 
tribal code of social discipline. A severe punishment, such as ostracism, is deemed 
necessary to maintain social control and to ensure social equilibrium.
It is important to note that a dispute does not directly go to a tribal judge. There will 
be a number of stages prior where conciliation and arbitration are tried between the 
parties. When the parties appear before a judge, they do so with their next of kin, 
elders, witnesses and kufala.104 This clearly shows the involvement of the whole 
community in the proceedings. The judge again tries to reconcile the two parties. If 
this is unsuccessful the judge hears both sides and their witnesses and then
102 ibid 166
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pronounces a judgement which is binding on the loser. The judge sits alone, but may 
consult experts on certain matters.
“Bedouin judicial system and legislation is highly sophisticated”105 because the 
judges also have to restore friendly relations between the parties after the case has 
been resolved. It is very important for a judge to reconcile the parties. This is one of 
the main reasons why the Bedouin are reluctant to admit to the jurisdiction of civil 
courts.106 Decisions of the civil courts are enforced by coercion, whereas the 
decisions of the tribal judges are implemented through conciliation and arbitration by 
the kin of the parties. This is demonstrated by a Bedouin saying “the state is the state 
and the Bedouin are the Bedouin” symbolising two totally different and separate
107approaches towards justice.
According Owidi, bedouin judgements are nearly always accepted by both parties 
and are given public approval by Bedouin society.108 The effect of this is to promote 
reconciliation between the kinsmen of the conflicting parties. The convicted party 
and his kinsmen must follow the awayid by sending a highly respected jaha to the 
injured party’s family to express their sympathy and ask for forgiveness in order to 
re-establish good relations between the two clans.109 In contrast, the civil courts 
operate within the law of the state and only recognise individual responsibility and 
do not involve the kinsmen.110 Another Bedouin saying that outlines this point is “the 
state courts neither heal the sick nor quench the thirsty”. In other words, they do not 
give the parties and the wider community full satisfaction according to Bedouin 
concepts of justice.111
The ordinary tribal sheikh has no authority to enforce compliance. The tribal law is 
based on an absence of central authority and, furthermore, punishment. It is solely 
based on different forms of compensation and methods of maintaining harmony.112
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In tribal law, there is only the aggrieved seeking justice with the support of his tribe 
and his extended family. It is also noteworthy that the perception of the same crime 
differs according to the circumstances and the identity of the victim. For example, if 
a person were to kill a man from a friendly tribe, it would cost him seven camels in 
compensation. However, if he killed someone from his own tribe then it will cost
111
him fifty camels and other expenses. These other expenses could include a girl 
(known as ghurra), a rifle, a camel and in olden days, a slave. The significance of 
these items is that the murderer deprived the victim’s family of a valuable asset in the 
form of a fighting man. The blood-money is intended to make good the loss. The girl 
is to be married to the nearest relative of the deceased and to produce a male child. 
The slave, the rifle and the riding camel are the accoutrements of a warrior.114
Another aim of paying blood money is to reestablish good relations between the kin 
of the offender and the victim. Blood money was paid in installments over three 
years under the umbrella of the guarantors for both parties to ensure that they would 
not fail in their obligations. During the three year period, the two parties to the 
conflict would have a mutual need for each other; the victim’s party a need for 
compensation and the culprit’s party a need for security and protection from 
avenging kin of the victim. As a result, they would be obliged to maintain friendship 
and good relations with each other.115 Also, it would be very difficult for the Bedouin 
to pay a heavy penalty all at once. In some situations, the installments are divided 
among the kin, which strengthens the ties within the tribe.
In all tribal trials, the oath plays an important part. The cases are to be decided on the 
oath of innocence of the accused. Glubb Pasha describes how an accused man 
pleaded passionately in his own defense, but refused to swear by his innocence, 
where a single oath would have secured his acquittal.116 After Islam spread among 
the Jordanian tribes the oath became “by Allah”. This form of evidence is still used 
in Jordan’s civil courts when the party does not have any documentary evidence.
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A custom that was widely used within tribal justice is trial by fire or bish ’ah. This is 
a supernatural means of revealing the identity of a culprit, unknown to the injured 
party, which was highly effective in the social milieu of Jordan tribes. This custom 
was forbidden by official flat and eventually died out when the last mubesha (the 
person administering the trial by fire) died in 1974. The right to administer this test 
was usually passed down from father to son. Only professional mubeshas were 
capable of carrying out the trial. The mubesha would bring a flat spoon, the size of 
half a crown, sat on the ground in front of the fire and place the spoon in the heart of 
the embers. The accused would sit beside him, while the other parties and the 
witnesses sat round and watched. The heating of the spoon took a long time, and the 
mubesha would keep taking it out of the fire until it was red hot, looking at it, turning 
it over and putting it back in front of the offender. During this process, the mubesha 
would talk continuously, expounding to the accused and the others witnessing the 
ceremony the certainty of the revelation of the guilt and the pain of burning. 
Meanwhile, he watched the face of the accused. At last the spoon would be ready, 
and the accused was required to put out his tongue, and the hot spoon was laid 
quickly upon it. An interval of some minutes was allowed, and then the accused was 
asked to put out his tongue once more. A blistered tongue established guilt; the 
contrary, of course, was innocence if the tongue were not blistered.
117Glubb found the process of immense value when working as a magistrate. He says 
the mubesha would not, of course, consent to reveal the secrets of their hereditary art, 
but in many cases in which there were no witnesses, Glubb had found the bisha ’ah 
was helpful in identifying the offender. The mubesha took the trouble to enquire into 
the case before it was referred to him, and obtained a shrewd idea of the identity of
1 1 o
the criminal. Then, during the intentionally prolonged process of heating the 
spoon, he talked continuously to the accused and watched his face closely. Glubb 
suspected that the mubesha made up his mind whether the accused was guilty or not, 
and pressed the spoon on his tongue or touched it lightly according to the result 
which he wished to produce.119
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In practice, more than half of the accused persons who set out to lick the spoon lost 
their nerve while the spoon was in the fire, and voluntarily confessed their guilt, thus 
avoiding the blistering of their tongues.120 A further twenty-five per cent ended up 
with blistered tongues, and twenty-five per cent were declared innocent. The
1^ 1
efficiency of the process depended, of course, entirely on the skill of the mubesha.
5.4 Tribal Justice after the Jordanian State
Up until 1976, people legally defined as Bedouin were subject to special laws. This 
included the members of nine named tribes. The definition of who was considered to 
be a Bedouin was revised in the Bedouin Control Law of 1929 and again in the 
Tribal Courts Law 1936, as well as in a number of electoral laws over the years. 
During the 1920s and 1930s, the state passed a number of laws in order to bring 
tribal justice within its power and control.
Thus, after the formation of the Transjordan Emirate in 1921, the government 
enacted a law requiring all tribal judgements to be collated and recorded.122 Then in 
1924, the Emirate passed other laws to regulate Bedouin justice. The laws mandated 
that all tribal judgements must be written and recorded. In the Tribal Courts Law of 
1924, Bedouins were obliged to register their claims in a designated court. The 
government became even more concerned with the recording of judgements in 1936, 
thus, section 12 of the Tribal Courts Act 1936 mandated that all judgements must be 
written and sent to the mutasaref (chief). Section 6 of the same Act states that “the 
court must give one of the parties upon his request a certified copy” of judgement 
and section 9 states that “whether the decision of the tribal appeal court declares the 
defendant innocent or guilty, all judgements must be certified by the Emir.”
The Tribal Courts Law of 1924 included five sections relating to tribal judges. 
Section 3 states that the judge deciding the case must be recognised by the state. The 
tribal leaders chose a list of six tribal judges, of whom the government had the power
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to confirm two as permanent judges and two as reserves to sit in the tribal court. The 
Tribal Courts Act of 1936 in section 3 states that “one judge will sit permanently but 
the parties could choose two further judges to sit with him in order to resolve their 
disputes.” The parties had to choose their judges from a list approved by the Emir. If 
a judge who was not on the approved list decided a case, his judgement was 
considered void and the parties could ignore it without an appeal. These provisions 
imposed the state’s authority on tribal justice.
Even though the state controlled the composition of the panel of judges, the parties 
had the freedom and the obligation to negotiate and again to agree upon the judge to 
decide their case in accordance with section 10 of 1936. An example, of how the law 
worked during these times is as follows. On 17 December 1940, a chief of police 
sequestered two individuals in different rooms in the police station and asked their 
respective sheikhs to attend. When they presented themselves, he asked them to 
choose three judges from the approved list, which they did, but they later found out 
that these judges were unavailable. They therefore returned to the police station and 
chose another set of three judges to resolve their dispute. The parties did not confirm
173two of the three judges and confirmed one to decide their dispute.
The chief of police, upon receiving a complaint, was expected to decide on the 
importance of the case and refer it to the appropriate tribal judge to deal with. After 
the judge decided the case, he would send the written judgement to the chief of 
police. All judgements were pronounced in the name of the Emir and any judgment 
that included excessive punishment or compensation was to be approved by him. 
Since 1948, when the Emirate was changed to the modem state of Jordan, 
judgements have been pronounced in the name of the King and any excessive 
punishment or compensation has had to be approved by specific authorities. The 
enforcement of judgments given by tribal courts was the responsibility of the leader 
of the Arab Legion according to the laws of 1929 and 1936. After 1948, this 
authority was transferred to the police generally and the Bedouin police specifically.
123 n 43 above
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All judgements were to include details of the place and the date of the hearing. 
Hearings could only be conducted during the daytime, thus, if sunset occurred while 
the case was being conducted then the hearing had to be adjourned to another day. 
The judge had to also include the subject matter of the dispute, the evidence and 
authority relied upon in his judgement. The judge had to pronounce his judgement in 
the presence of the parties and justify it on the basis of precedent and awayid. For 
example, a judge in an arbitral award satisfied the above conditions as follows, “we 
are the chosen panel to resolve this dispute. After our deliberation, we unanimously 
decided...We relied on our knowledge of our traditions and awayid and the strength 
of family ties between the disputing parties and the importance, past, present and 
future...”124
Witnesses were to be identified by name and if that were not possible, then they were 
to be pointed out to the judge. Before judgement was given, and before any 
agreement, the Bedouin appointed guarantors in order to ensure compliance. The 
guarantor, promised to pay the compensation or diya if the party were to default. 
There was also another kind of guarantor, whose role was to ensure that the offended 
party did not seek revenge and offending parties thus felt safe after the matter had 
been dealt with by a judge. This has changed over the years and now it is the state 
that acts as the guarantor. Judgements are usually accepted by the Bedouin as the 
judge, in all probability, is also their sheikh, and his decisions are expected to be 
complied with by the parties.
It is clear that the state recognises the Bedouin and the Bedouin accept the state’s 
authority. By including Bedouin justice within the legal system of Jordan, the state 
has acknowledged the Bedouin way of life, but reserved some aspects, such as appeal 
and enforcement, to itself. The acceptance of the Bedouin is reflected in their 
agreement to submit all judgments to the government and have their choice of judges 
approved. Due to this partnership, all Bedouin judgements have come to be recorded, 
unlike in the more distant past when they were just orally given. These written 
judgments are referred to, when necessary, forming the corpus of a common law
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system and, incidentally, also provide a valuable source of history of Jordan and its 
tribes.
5.5 Tribes and Dispute Resolution
Karameh or ‘honour’ is intrinsic and fundamental to Bedouin life. A well known 
Bedouin adage- ‘I will not live if affronted and neither will my affronter’ - testifies to 
this. For instance, it is commonly held that life bearing an insult and hence without 
honour is worse than death. The very freedom of the Bedouin is dependent on his 
honour and therefore, a Bedouin will not accept imprisonment or the authority of 
another.
One of the important constituents of Bedouin karameh is the ar *d\ the honour of their 
women. Broadly understood ar ’d  involves grace and virginity for the unmarried 
and grace and sexual fidelity for the married. A Bedouin woman’s good reputation is 
dependent on and stems from the reputation of her family. Thus, it is incumbent on 
the men in her family to protect and look after her and her ar’d. Because a man’s 
reputation is reflective of and reflected by the reputation of his family and tribe, 
protection of the ar’d  of a woman is taken as an important and vital element of the 
protection of the reputation of the whole tribe. Offence to a woman, in any shape or 
form, is considered a major crime and indicative, metaphorically, of the death of the 
whole tribe. Death is preferred to living with such an offence. Thus, for instance, if 
any person were to commit adultery, he or she could be sentenced to death or, if 
certain extenuating circumstances were present, then ordered to pay compensation as 
if a murder had taken place. An adulterous woman is considered as good as dead by 
her tribe and an adulterous man is lost forever as if he was never bom.
In the 1970s, the state started to be involved in the processes of dealing with such
I ^
crimes. For example, it started ordering a couple involved in adultery to marry in 
order to protect them from tribal law. Some tribes refused to accept such state 
intervention though a few accepted begrudgingly. There are two types of crimes in
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the Bedouin worldview. One type encompasses attacks on the physical persona and 
the other type encompasses crimes such as injustice, crimes against property and 
injury to honour. The crimes of murder, ar’d  and karameh are considered to be major 
crimes by the Bedouin.
An individual’s life is considered to be an element of the collective life, thus the 
individual and the collective are considered to be one and the same. Therefore, any 
attack on the individual is considered to be an attack on the group and vice versa. If 
an individual injures another then the offender’s whole tribe is held responsible. 
When the offended tribes claim their compensation or revenge they direct their 
claims against the offender’s tribe as a whole, not just the individual. The payment of 
compensation is treated as if from the whole of the offender’s tribe and is usually 
paid from the resources of the relatives of the offender. This responsibility parallels 
the responsibility of the offended tribe to seek revenge. Hence, any member of the 
offended tribe can discharge this responsibility by killing any member of the 
offender’s tribe, not just the offender himself. All are collectively responsible for the 
punishment, revenge or compensation of any member of the tribe. All are jointly and 
severally responsible for the compensation, punishment or revenge.
There are no differences of inherent status between the male members of the tribe. 
All of them are equal whether a sheikh or not, each individual is on a par in 
Jordanian tribes. Because of this equality, the diya or compensation for a crime 
committed against any of them is roughly the same. The basis of Jordanian tribes is 
equality and collective responsibility.
An example of the collective responsibility in Jordanian tribes would be the 
following case from 1948.127 One of the sons of a tribe killed a man from a 
neighbouring tribe and the tribal court ordered the compensation be paid by his 
father, two brothers and his relatives up to the fifth degrees of kinship whose names 
were recorded in the judgement. This shows that compensation was to be enforced 
against and to affect the whole tribe and would thus play an important part as a 
control mechanism of tribal society. The individual was expected to know that if he
127 Interview with a tribal elder and criminal lawyer in Amman, August 2005
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were to commit a wrong, he has wronged his whole tribe, therefore he must consider 
all the serious consequences that follow for his whole tribe, before committing a 
serious offence such as murder.
The exceptions to both collective and individual responsibilities were instances of 
killing in self defence, to protect money, to defend one’s home or in guarding a 
woman’s ar’d.m  In such circumstances, he was thought of as defending his right to 
life. Whenever a crime is committed, there are certain procedures to be followed. 
They are atwa (temporary truce), jaha (delegation of responsible elders) and sulh (an 
agreed settlement). If the accused is found guilty, his family and his tribe would be 
expected to pay compensation, which is the diya. In situations where a person is 
killed while raping a woman or unlawfully entering someone’s home (hormet a l’ 
bayet), then it is expected that his blood would not be compensated. However in 
certain circumstances, a jaha will be constituted by the offending party to restore the 
friendly relations between the parties, with sulh and diya ordered depending on the 
gravity of the crime.
In Jordanian tribes, major crimes are dealt with by attempting to arrive at sulh and 
resolving the dispute in order to contain the issue and stop the offended party from 
reacting violently. Atwa Jaha  and sulh are used in the same way in small disputes as
190in major crimes. Because time and the propriety of the process are of essence, any 
wrong or mistake committed during the jaha could lead to severe consequences and 
exacerbate disputes and defeat the purpose of the jaha.
When a major crime is committed, the first practice is the ja la ', in which an offender 
leaves the area where he lives to stay somewhere else. The purpose of ja la ’ is to 
reduce the attendant tensions of the situation and avoid retributive offences. If one of 
the relatives of the offended party were to see the offender, he may become 
impassioned and commit the same or a more serious crime against the offender. Such 
unwelcome consequences may be visited upon the offender’s relatives of the first 
degree, as well as other relatives, such as uncles and cousins on both paternal and 
maternal sides. Thus, the ja la ’ usually applies up to the fifth patriarchal and
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matriarchal degrees. Once the offender and his extended family leave the area, it is 
followed by a period of atweh, in which there is a ceasefire between the parties and 
they prepare for negotiations with the aim of arriving at a sulh.
5.5.1 Jala’
The ja la ’ has three types. The first is kasry (coercive) ja la ’, which is when the
1 moffender and his tribe are removed from the area to protect them. When the state 
became responsible for enforcing this, it would imprison the offender in order to 
protect him. In certain situations, where the tribe of the wrongdoers refused to leave 
because they did not believe they deserved that or due to confidence in their strength 
and asabiyya or because they believed that their relative did not commit the wrong 
but the other side were the ones responsible then, the sheikhs and notables of the area 
would intervene and deport the victim’s family with or without their approval. After 
the state was created in the early 1920s, it took on the responsibility of enforcing this 
type of jala ’ and ensuring the security of all parties.
The second type is jala ’ tilka ’a (willing) which is when the offender and his relatives
1^1decide to leave their home immediately after the crime is committed. Usually, the 
offender would inform his family of his crime and seek refuge in a sheikh’s home or 
gives himself up to the authorities. His relatives to the fifth generation move to a safe 
place and others approach a notable neutral in order to accompany them to the 
victim’s family to request atweh. Otherwise, the victim’s family has the right, after a 
period of three days and a third of a day (fooreat dam) to attack the wrongdoer’s 
relatives and their property. In general, these acts became much rarer because the 
government began to impose financial penalties and, in some situations 
imprisonment. This right is only available if the offender’s family do not jala' or do 
not adhere to the conditions of the atweh.
The third is aktiyaryan (voluntary), which occurs when the offended family choose 
to leave to avoid any confrontation and they remain away until the jaha and the
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judiciary deal with the matter. In this situation, no damage to person or property 
would be allowed.
The period of jala ’ differs according to the type of crime and its seriousness. In the 
case of murder, the usual period of jala ’ is seven years. In certain situations, this may 
extend to 25 years or a lifetime. When the offender returns, he must requests sulh and 
the offended family are obliged to accept it. If they do not, then they must leave their 
homes, i.e. jala In circumstances when the ja la ' is for life, then the offending tribe 
joins another tribe away from their original area. A father from the Bani Sakhr killed 
another from the same tribe while having an argument over a camel. Immediately, 
the father took his family and left his tribe and joined the Huwaytat tribe. About 25 
years later, after the death of the father, the eldest son, who was an army recruit, 
requested the chief of the army to head a jaha to the Bani Sakhr to secure a sulh. 
After securing sulh, the children and grandchildren of the offender returned to their 
original tribe.133
When a person wounds another he must leave the tribe until the wounds have healed. 
Once the wound of his victim has healed, the wrongdoer asks the sheikh to constitute 
a jaha to the wounded and his family. If the jaha is refused, then the wrongdoer 
would be wounded in the same way or monetary compensation would be assessed. In 
cases were the victim is physically marked or his bones were broken, the attacker 
must depart the tribe and only return after the matter was resolved, i.e. when the jaha 
has achieved settlement.
The person leaving his tribe must go to a tribe that is neither a friend nor an ally of 
his original tribe, regardless of distance. The ja la ’ to an enemy tribe is a painful 
punishment. The person lives as a stranger without relatives, friends or allies and 
among enemies. Thus, he will not be able to respond to an insult and ask for 
assistance from his original tribe as they are both geographically and socially remote.
132 ibid
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5.5.2 Atweh
The atweh is an agreed period of peace given by the offended family to the offender 
and his relatives and it is guaranteed by the guarantors.134 Since 1921, the agreement 
has to be in writing and signed by the parties, the guarantors and the witnesses. In a 
case involving two soldiers where one wounded another, a first atweh was given for 
a certain period; but, at the end of that period, the wrongdoer’s family requested an 
extension for the atweh as their jaha was not ready and the wounded solider had not 
fully recovered. Usually, when a second atweh is granted, it is given subject to 
conditions. In this case, the condition was that the family leave the tribe (jala ’) until 
the matter was completely resolved. The following matters were found in an atweh
1 o r
bond that was recorded on 30 June 1955:
1) the date of when the atweh was given
2) period of atweh
3) the names of both parties
4) the place where the atweh was given
5) the names of guarantors and the nobles and sheikhs of the jaha
6) Witnesses and attendees
7) Signature of the parties, guarantors and witnesses •
8) Certified by the government’s deputy
9) Conditions (occasionally)
There are a number of types of atweh and these depend on the stage in the 
procedures for hudna (truce) and sulh, as well as the nature of the offence.136 The 
first is atweh fooreat dam where a jaha is sent immediately to the victim’s family 
requesting a truce. In circumstances where a jaha could not be gathered, it is 
permitted for one person from the offender’s side to meet another from the offended 
side and agree on an atweh for a period of three days and a third of a day. The second 
is atweh amniyya, where the police enforce a truce for a minimum of one week and 
to a maximum of three months. The third type is atweh haak’ where both sides grant 
the other a period of peace until the matters have been investigated or a judge decides
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who the wrongdoer is. The fourth is atweh shaaraj.\ which relates to attacks on 
women and their honour and the male relatives of the woman insist that the atweh is 
referenced in these terms in order to make clear to everyone that the woman was a 
victim and not a consenting participant. The fifth, atweh yadeeyah (normal), occurs 
in instances of non-serious or minor injuries. The sixth is atweh hay ’ mayeet (alive or 
dead) and it relates to situations where the victim is in a critical condition and it is 
unknown whether he will recover. If a person dies then a relevant atweh from the 
above types takes place, but if he pulls through then atweh yadeeyah takes place. The 
seventh type is atweh imhaal, where a period is given for the offender’s tribe to 
discuss among themselves how they will go about resolving the dispute. This may be 
extended a number of times until the final atweh, which is called atweh ikbaal, where 
the two sides meet and negotiate the final agreement, sulh.
The atweh occurs when the offender’s relatives, not including those within five 
degrees of kinship, visit the offended family as a jaha requesting a truce. The 
wrongdoer’s tribe must seek the atweh whether it is accepted or not. If this does not 
occur it is seen as a major insult to the offended tribe and becomes a cause for greater 
problems. The atweh is seen as the first step towards restoring honour. In most 
situations, the atweh is granted, however sometimes in the case of major crimes such 
as murder, the atweh can be refused. In this situation, the police intervene and 
imprison the assailant for his protection and his family try to secure the atweh again. 
If it is refused a second time, the police have the power to imprison the victim’s 
family if it is perceived that they do not want sulh. If the police were to intervene, 
then the offender and his relatives up to five degrees of kinship depart the tribe and 
seek protection from the sheikhs of other tribes.
The victim’s family assembles their friends, allies and the sheikhs of the tribe to 
receive the jaha from the offender. A cup of black coffee is offered to the designated 
speaker of the jaha, who is expected to refuse to drink it saying “we will not drink 
your coffee until you grant our requests.” The noble on the other side says, “Let’s 
hear your requests.” After the requests are outlined and the atweh is granted, the 
speaker of the tribe receiving the jaha says, “You are most welcome, drink our 
coffee.”
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5.5.3 The Negotiations
Negotiations between the two parties are conducted either directly or indirectly 
through a third party.137 The third party, called the waseet (mediator), must be agreed 
upon by both parties. Usually, a respected and diplomatic person is appointed as a 
waseet. The waseet explains to each party the other’s side point of view excluding 
any insults or negative comments that he might have heard. He will be prepared to 
tell ‘white lies’ and the saying; Tying is the salt of men though lying is shameful’ is 
indicative of this. In other words, the waseet is permitted to misrepresent the truth or 
even lie if this will help the parties to settle. The wasta (mediation) could be started 
by the waseet himself or by either of the parties, but usually he is asked by the 
wrongdoer. The waseet discusses with the party who appointed him what he can 
provide the other side in the form of concessions. He hears in detail the truth of what 
happened from the person who approached him. Typically, the waseet acts tactfully 
and with integrity as the proper resolution of the dispute impacts his reputation and 
social status. The more his reputation grows, the more he will be asked to intervene 
and resolve disputes in his community. The waseet could be one person or a 
maximum of three. The waseet attends the offended tribe to discuss the matter and 
work out how they will reach sulh. This would usually occur after either atweh 
imhaal or atweh ikbaal, which gives the green light for sulh. The offended family 
will tell the waseet their conditions and he will inform the other side. The family of 
the victim discusses these and decides if they will accept. If not, then they make an 
offer and the waseet will go back to the offender’s family with this offer. This 
process may last several weeks or months until a final settlement is reached and 
agreed upon by the conflicting parties.
In other situations, the parties may choose to go to a tribal judge for a decision as to 
who the wrongdoer is, the seriousness of the crime, the punishment and the amount 
of compensation.138 In certain circumstances, the sulh can occur immediately if the 
jaha attends the victim’s family without any previous arrangements and consists of 
very important and noble men. For example, a jaha that was headed by Prince Naief
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bin Abdullah (the uncle of King Hussein) secured the sulh, in a case, without any 
previous negotiations or disagreements or even any compensation. The nobility of 
the members of the jaha showed the respect and honour that the offender’s family 
were demonstrating to the victim’s tribe.
In major disputes between tribes, the state may intervene to act as a waseet, to get 
them to agree to a settlement. If that were not possible, the case is referred to a tribal 
judge. In a case dated 17 December 1940, the two parties were brought to the police 
station and placed in two different rooms away from each other. Their tribal sheikhs 
and the police chief discussed how to resolve the dispute and it was agreed that a 
tribal judge would resolve the matter.140
After the negotiations are completed in any of the above circumstances, the parties 
agree upon the time and place for sulh and the amount of compensation to be paid. 
At this point, the offended must forgive the offender. The meeting for sulh is the sole 
responsibility of the offender’s tribe and they must make all the necessary 
preparations to receive the jaha for confirmation of sulh. This may include food, 
drink and transportation for all the nobles and sheikhs attending the jaha.
5.5.4 Sulh
The processes and ritual of settlement and reconciliation are similar in format in most 
disputes. For example, in cases of murder, the family of the murderer will act quickly 
in order to thwart any attempted blood revenge. First, family members will call for 
atweh and proceed to engage village elders and notables who possess sufficient 
status to qualify as waseet. Each individual who accepts the plea of the perpetrator's 
family, becomes a member of a delegation of mediators called a jaha.m
The delegation initiates a process of fact-finding and questioning of the disputing 
parties and any witnesses. The task of the jaha is not to judge, condemn or punish the 
offending party, "but rather, to preserve the good names of both the families involved
139 n 133 above
140 n 43 above
141 n 48 above
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and to reaffirm the necessity of ongoing relationships within the community. The 
sulh ritual is not a zero-sum game."142 The purpose of the ritual of sulh is to satisfy 
the community's need for peace and stability, to satisfy the needs of each family for 
dignity and security, to compensate the victim’s family, even if this is largely 
symbolic and to pre-empt reprisals and as far as possible, save face.
Sometimes, a single murder may turn out to be linked to a sporadic blood feud with a 
long history. Many practitioners of sulh and musalaha deem such cases difficult to 
settle, but not insoluble. Where the statuses of the victim and perpetrator are clear, of 
course, the task of settlement is usually easier and provided the close relatives of the 
victim can be persuaded to overcome strong feelings of resentment and ignore the 
pressure to show strength through retribution, a blood price is paid to the family. The 
payment usually involves an amount of money, diya, set by the mediators. This 
‘blood money’, or the transfer of goods (sometimes animals or food etc.) may prove 
quite costly to the family of the perpetrator, but the symbolic significance of 
compensation is at least as important as the substance of the payment. The transfer of 
money or goods is a substitute for possible death; the family that forsakes revenge 
gains in standing, while the family of the murderer is humbled and indebted by this 
act of forbearance and magnanimity.
The ritual process of sulh does not end with a payment to the victim's family, which 
may on occasion refuse to accept material compensation and thereby further raise 
both its standing and the symbolic indebtedness of the perpetrator's family. The ritual 
usually ends in a public ceremony of musalaha (reconciliation) performed in the 
village square or some other public meeting place. First, in a public act of 
reconciliation, the families of both the victim and offender line up on both sides of a 
road or path, exchange greetings, and accept apologies (which are due, in particular, 
to the more aggrieved party). Next, members of the two parties shake hands under 
the supervision of the muslihs or jaha. Often, the murderer must directly approach 
the family of the victim, in what amounts to a humbling act of atonement and a test 
of the ability of the victim's family to forgive. Following these public displays of
142 L.E. King-Irani, “The Power of Transformation and the Transformation of Power: Rituals of 
Forgiveness and Processes of Empowerment in Pos-War Lebanon” in W.I. Zartman, ed. Traditional 
Medicine, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999)
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reconciliation, the family of the murderer typically visits the home of the victim to 
drink a cup of bitter coffee. The ritual then concludes with a shared meal hosted by 
the family of the offender.143
Jordanians, especially villagers, continue to follow a tribal mode of conflict 
resolution as defined by ‘tribal law’ (al-qanun al-asha ari). Tribal law as outlined 
above is an unwritten code of procedures emphasising intermediaries and 
intermediation (wasta), delegations (jaha), dyadic diplomacy, compensation, truce 
(atwa) and final reconciliation and peace-making (sulh). The process of tribal 
conflict resolution is based on the principle of collective responsibility on the part of 
a stipulated and limited set of patriarchal kinship. The sulh ritual, "stresses the close 
link between the psychological and political dimensions of communal life through its 
recognition that injuries between individuals and groups will fester and expand if not 
acknowledged, repaired, forgiven and transcended."144 For this reason, the ritual is 
still used to achieve reconciliation, especially following blood feuds, honour crimes 
and cases of murder.
According to a Jordanian judge, Abu-Hassan, there are two types of sulh processes: 
public and private sulh.145 Public sulh is similar to a peace treaty between two 
countries in that its purpose is to "suspend fighting between [two parties] and 
establish peace, called muwada'a (peace or good relationship), for a specific period 
of time."146 This usually takes place because of conflicts between two or more tribes 
that result in death and destruction affecting all the parties involved.
Given the severity of life conditions in the desert, competing tribes long ago realized 
that sulh is a better alternative than endless cycles of vengeance. When sulh is 
enacted, each tribe initiates a process of taking stock of its losses in human and 
material terms. A tribe with lesser losses compensates a tribe that has suffered more. 
According to tradition, stringent conditions are to be set to settle the tribal conflict
143 G. E. Irani and N. C. Funk, ‘Rituals of Reconciliation: Arab-Islamic Perspectives’ (1998) 20:4 
Arab Studies Quarterly 1, 4
144 n 142 above
145 M. Abu-Hassan, Turath al Badu’ al Qada (Bedouin Customary Law), (Amman, Jordan: 
Manshuraat Da’irat Ath-Thaqafa wa al-Funun, 1987), 257
146 M. Khadduri, “Sulh” in C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs and G. Lecomte, (eds.) The 
Encyclopaedia o f Islam, Vol. IX, (Leiden Holland: Brill, 1997) 846
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definitively. The most famous of these conditions is that the parties in conflict pledge 
to forget everything that happened and initiate new and friendly relations. The 
consequences and effects of public sulh apply whether the parties that perpetrated 
crimes have been identified or not at the time of the sulh}*1
Private sulh takes place when both the crime and the guilty party are known. The 
family of the victim and the family of the offender may be of the same tribe or from 
different tribes. The purpose of private sulh is to achieve restorative justice and to 
make sure that vengeance will not be wreaked against the family of the perpetiator, 
leading to an escalation of conflict.
An individual or a wasta delegation of elders (Jaha) would be sent by the 
perpetrator's family to the victim's family to mediate or intercede on their behalf and 
to inhibit revenge being taken following an incident involving personal injury. Tie 
jaha seeks a truce between the parties, with the hope of an eventual agreement to 
resolve the conflict. The lazam, which is a patrilineal unit that traces its descent to 
the fifth paternal grandfather i.e. to the fifth agnatic generation, is responsible for 
paying the atwa (truce money) and the diya (final reconciliation money). Those wfo 
have to pay as well as leave the area until the final reconciliation takes place arj fie 
first three generations. The fourth and fifth generations pay a certain amomt if 
money and in return they are allowed to stay in the area with a guarantee if 
protection. In modem times, only the offender will be imprisoned, rather than ha^ e 
him leave, and after the final reconciliation takes place he is released.
Wasta, mediation, has a long and honourable history and is still practised in mofen 
Jordan. As was shown in chapter five, the traditions of solidarity and kinship arepat 
of the Jordanian identity and society, and so are many of the tribal dispute resohticn 
mechanisms described in this chapter. In criminal cases in particular, the tibil 
system functions in parallel to the court system and is officially recognised b} tfe 
state. Present day Jordan has adopted many features of tribal society, especial^ i$ 
dispute resolution and the overarching principle of reconciliation. The final pat <f
147 n 145 above
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this thesis will explore the formal and informal forms of dispute resolution in 
contemporary Jordan with its distinctly tribal flavour.
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Chapter Six 
Formal Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
“Frequently you have a clash between the more sterile letter of the law 
and the justice that underlies it, and I think one of the things I've been 
trying more or less, where it was possible, is to go with the justice rather 
than the letter of the law.”
Harold H. Greene, federal judge for the US 
District Court for the District of Columbia, in an 
interview in March 1990
In the previous chapters, the tribal heritage and dispute resolution were explored. In 
this chapter, I will focus on the formal arbitration system in Jordan. The Jordanian 
legal landscape, especially arbitration, is Western in character. The law was 
developed along similar lines as the UNCITRAL Model Law and the principles 
applied in Jordanian courts relating to the enforcement of arbitral awards are 
international principles that have been imposed on the courts through international 
treaties. This is the Western model of international commercial arbitration being 
overlaid onto the history, tradition and customs that were described in chapters three 
and five. In order to provide some context to the formal arbitration system, I start by 
describing the Jordanian judicial landscape and the judges’ backgrounds.
6.1 The Judiciary
The Jordanian legal system is mainly European in origin, especially at the textual 
level, as well as based on Shari'ah (Islamic law). During the nineteenth century, 
when what is now geographically Jordan was part of the Ottoman Empire, some 
aspects of European law, especially French commercial law and civil and criminal 
procedures, were adopted. English common law was also introduced during the 
mandate years from 1921 to 1946.
During the Ottoman, Shari’ah was enforced in the towns and settled countryside. 
However, in the desert customary tribal law was the dominant system. For the non- 
Muslims, the Ottoman regime used the millet system, which accorded communities 
the right to manage their personal affairs according to their own religious laws. Even
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Today, religious courts in Jordan are still divided. The Muslims use the Shari'ah 
courts and non-Muslims have their own special tribunals. “SharVa Courts have 
jurisdiction over personal status matters relating to Muslims, as well as cases 
involving blood money where parties are Muslim or where one party is Muslim and 
the other agrees to the jurisdiction of the Shari'a Court. Appeals lie with the SharVa 
Court of Appeal in Amman.”1
The other two categories of courts established are the civil courts (nizamiyya) and 
‘special tribunals’. The nizamiyya courts have three levels. Claims are made to either 
primary or magistrate (conciliation courts (sulh)) courts according to their 
seriousness. The sulh courts exercise jurisdiction in cases involving small claims and 
offences punishable by small fines or up to two years’ imprisonment. The more 
serious cases are heard by the nizamiyya courts and they exercise general jurisdiction 
in both civil and criminal matters. The nizamiyya court also hears appeals from the 
sulh courts. The highest court of the land is the Court of Cassation which is Jordan’s 
Supreme Court. There are also the Courts of Appeal. There are also a number of 
special courts that deal with specific matters such as state security, the interpretation 
of the Constitution, or the judicial review of governmental decisions.4
Jordan has a civil law system and the current Civil Code was enacted in 1976 which 
drew from Syrian legislation, which in turn was modelled on the Egyptian Civil 
Code of 1948.5 The Jordanian system was influenced by the Ottoman, French and 
British legal systems, as well as by Egyptian and Syrian. The sources of Jordanian 
law are legislation, constitutional law, Islamic law and custom.6
The independence of the judiciary and the courts is enshrined in the Constitution; 
“judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions, they are 
subject to no authority other than that of the law.” Article 101 states, “the courts
1 http://www.law.emorv.edu/ifl/legal/iordan.htm
2 ibid
3 http ://country studies, us/iordan/5 7 .htm
4 http://www.legal500.eom/c/iordan
5 M. Burgris, "Judicial Reform and the Possibility of Democratic Rule in Jordan: A policy Perspective 
on Judicial Independence", ALQ 21 (2007) 135
6 ibid
7 Article 97 of the Jordanian Constitution
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shall be open to all and shall be free from any interference in their affairs.” However, 
the judiciary remains subject to pressure and interference from the executive branch. 
The Higher Judiciary Council appoint judges, determine their advancement and 
dismisses them from the judiciary. The Council consists of 12 senior judges who are 
appointed by the King. It is overseen day-to-day and funded by the Ministry of 
Justice.8
Kilani9 suggests that the executive power given by law to deputise judges and 
recommend pensioning them would challenge the judiciary and their independence. 
This authority could be abused to pressure judges to deliver the desired rulings. 
Senior judges could also order desired rulings as the Jordanian judges are monitored 
by them. Also, notables would ask judges to change their minds or determine a case 
in a certain way.10 There are also weaknesses with regards to the recording of the 
court’s sessions’ minutes and disorder in keeping cases with one judge.
In order to curb the above problems a higher committee for the independence of the 
Judiciary was formed in 2001. It was involved in the promulgation of two laws: the 
Judicial Independence Law and the Fundamentals of Criminal Hearings Code, 
enacted in February 2001. It is important to note when reviewing the opinions and 
views of the Jordanian arbitrators later in this chapter with regards to the courts and 
the judge, that there are about 740 judges in the Kingdom for a population of just 
under 6 million people. Therefore, judges are over stretched and have a very heavy 
caseload.
6.1.1 The Judicial Institute of Jordan
Jordan has a ‘career’ based judiciary and the Judicial Institute of Jordan is the official 
institution in the Kingdom responsible for judicial education and training. It was 
established pursuant to Law No. (3) in 1988, which remained in effect until the 
issuance of the Judicial Institute of Jordan Regulation No. (68) in 2001 and its
8 F. Kilani “Independence of the Judiciary”, Arab Archives Institute Jordan Press Foundation, 
January 2001
9 ibid
10 ibid
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amendments in accordance with regulation No. (68) in 2005. The Judicial Institute of 
Jordan prepares qualified persons for judicial positions through its Judicial Studies 
Diploma programme, and offers a Continuing Legal Education (CLE) programme 
designed to raise the competence of judges and to keep them abreast with the latest 
legal, judicial and specialized developments in their field.
I interviewed the head of the Judicial institute and he stated that there are two main 
aims of the institute: preparatory and continuous training. The Judicial Studies 
Diploma programme is a two-year programme consisting of 25 courses over the 
course of four mandatory academic terms. Students are also required to attend a five- 
month practical training programme at regular courts during their fourth term. They 
are also required to submit a specialized research paper.11
Students at the institute must cover a number of subjects including communications 
and investigative skills, judgment drafting, trust, independence and ethics, 
international law and all the treaties Jordan is a signatory of. They are also trained in 
the use of technology such as DNA and crime scene investigation and cases requiring 
specific technical knowledge such as IT crimes, banking, GATT, intellectual 
property and ADR; arbitration, mediation and case management. Students sit for 
examinations in all these subjects and submit a dissertation at the end of the two year 
diploma. In the final term of the course, students sit next to a judge in a court to get 
some practical experience. They also attend placements in the Central Bank,
1 9insurance companies, banks and with the coroners.
The entry requirements for the Institute consist of an entrance examination- both oral 
and written, followed by an interview. The number of people admitted each year is 
based on the needs of the judiciary. In 2005, 25 students were admitted from a total 
of 310 applicants. In the same year, 23 students graduated, 5 of whom were women. 
In 1996, the first woman judge was appointed in Jordan. Today, there are about 60 
women judges in Jordan but they are all in the lower courts.
11 The Judicial Institute of Jordan Course Outline
12 ibid
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Both sitting judges and administrative staff in the courts undergo specialised training
tas “the success of judges relies on their administrative staff and vice versa.” 
Training consists of lectures and workshops. Each judge has a yearly plan of training.
The head of the Judicial Institute told me that they “live in a different world from 30 
years ago, cases are different, numbers are larger and the types of cases are much 
more varied. Cases are more complex and far reaching. The judges have a very 
heavy workload. The majority of judges are very good. We try to improve all the 
time.”
Judges are appointed on nomination by the Minister of Justice, the decision of the 
Judicial Council and the endorsement of the King. Any person appointed as a judge 
must meet the general requirements set forth in the Judicial Independence Law of 
2001. The appointee must be a Jordanian national and at least twenty-seven years of 
age. He/ she never have been convicted of a felony and never have been convicted by 
a court or a disciplinary board for a matter that contravenes honour, even if it was 
included in a general pardon. The appointee must exhibit laudable conduct and 
maintain a good reputation.
The Council has the power to appoint the person they see fit, from those nominated 
by the Minister of Justice, to a judicial position at any level, taking into consideration 
his/her credentials and experience. Such an individual shall not be appointed at a 
higher level than that of his peers who graduated in the same year and possess the 
same credentials as him/her.14
6.1.2 Case Management in Jordanian Civil Courts
The case management department at the Amman First Instance Court was officially 
launched on 1 October 2002 as an initial step towards expanding it to the rest of the 
first instance courts in the Kingdom. The case management department was 
established in accordance with article (59) of the Civil Procedures Law which stated 
that: "a judicial administration unit called the civil case management department
13 Interview with the Head of Judicial Institute in Amman in July 2005
14 Judicial Independence Law 2001
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would be established in a first instance court provided that the Minister of Justice 
determines in which courts would these departments be established in".
“Civil case management is one of the modem management techniques designed to 
speed up the litigation process, ensure optimal utilization of court time and shorten 
administrative and judicial procedures that used to cause delay in case adjudication 
and compel the trial judge to adjourn a case several times before disposing it.”15
Case management provides for early judicial control over a case by placing it from 
the beginning under the direct supervision of a first instance judge, starting with case 
filing, organizing pleadings, processing notifications, completing evidence filing, 
holding a case management conference with the parties, determining points of 
agreement and disagreement and defining the main point of conflict and preparing 
the complete case file before going to the trial judge for processing.
6.2 Jordanian Lawyers16
In 2008, there are about 8000 lawyers registered with the Jordanian Bar Association 
and about 19 per cent of them are female. There are over 2000 trainees registered 
with the Association and over 26 per cent of them are women. The applicant to the 
Bar Association must hold a Jordanian Nationality and must have done so for at least 
10 years and must have a minimum age of 23 years old. He/ she must be a resident of 
the Kingdom of Jordan, enjoying full civil capacities and exhibiting laudable conduct 
and maintain a good reputation. The applicant must hold a law degree from a 
Jordanian university or an equivalent law degree from a foreign law school, provided 
the certificate and its source are acceptable for registering as a lawyer. He/ she 
cannot be employees of any government department or municipality and have no 
criminal record or have been convicted by a court or a disciplinary board for a matter 
that contravenes honour.
15 http://eng.moi.gov.io/Home/tabid/36/Default.aspx
16 All the information in this section was obtained from the Jordanian Bar Association, Ministry of 
Education and various conversations with Jordanian lawyers.
163
Part 4
A graduate of a first degree (BA) will have to train for two years in a law practice 
with a lawyer who has been in practice for more than five years. People with 
postgraduate studies have to train only for one year.
The trainee lawyer will have to pass an oral and a written test, then complete a 
dissertation which he/she will present to his colleagues, and be examined by 
specialised lawyers in the field of his dissertation as with a viva.
There are 21 universities in Jordan. Eight of them are public, but only six have law 
schools. There are 13 private universities and only one does not have a law school. 
The majority of older lawyers in Amman acquired their law degrees from Syrian and 
Egyptian universities, and very few continued to postgraduate studies. The few that 
did, usually wanted a career in teaching at the University of Jordan, a public 
university. The younger generation of lawyers are mostly trained in Jordanian 
universities. The students that can afford postgraduate studies (usually children of 
lawyers) study masters in the UK, France and a few in the USA, usually specialising 
in commercial, banking or shipping law. There are a small number of lawyers who 
go on to do PhD, especially later on in their careers.
There is no real specialisation in the Jordanian legal market. Lawyers in general only 
specialise in family and criminal law and the majority of the law practices are either 
sole practitioners or a small firm of under five lawyers. The landscape is changing 
and the younger generation of lawyers are trying to set up larger law firms with 
specialised departments along the same lines as English and American firms. The 
first and most recognised firm in Amman along those lines is Ali and Sharif Zu’bi 
Law Office. The minimum requirements for employment of any new lawyer in 
established practices in Amman are fluency in English and IT skills. A Masters' in 
law from Europe or the USA is considered to be a good basis for a successful career 
in the new culture of lawyers in Amman.
The legal profession seems to be inherited. Almost every successful lawyer in 
Amman has, at least, one of his children as a lawyer. The name of the practice 
changes from the name of the father to the joint names of the father and the child, 
usually a son. There are very few partnerships, except between siblings. Lawyers
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working in firms or single lead offices, who are not sons or brothers of the owners, 
are never recognised on the letter heads.
In the past, almost every Jordanian lawyer, no matter how long he/she had been in 
practice, would be at the main court house at least two to three times a week, even if 
they did not have any cases. This was the way the older generation of lawyers 
interacted and socialised. This was the main social scene of all the lawyers. There 
was an impression that if you were not regularly seen at the court house, then your 
practice had no cases and this gave the impression that of an unsuccessful lawyer. 
This phenomenon is now reducing and many lawyers attend court very rarely. The 
perception that is now popular is not to be seen at the court house because that gives 
the impression that you have international cases and work in banking and commerce, 
which is seen as more prestigious than local legal work.
When looking at the dispute resolution landscape in Jordan, it is important to 
understand both formal and informal dispute resolution methods and their respective 
institutions. The judicial institutions of Jordan have been outlined here, the formal 
and informal dispute resolution processes will be explored later in this chapter and 
chapter seven respectively.
6.3 Arbitration Act 2001
The Arbitration Act, number 31 of 2001, which repealed Act number 18 of 1953, 
which was based on English Arbitration Act 1950, was modelled on the UNCITRAL 
Model Law 1958 and the Egyptian Arbitration legislation, number 27 of 1994 with 
some modifications. The legal committee in charge of examining the different 
statutes around the world and drafting Jordanian law found the Egyptian version the 
closest to the Model Law and, at the same time, the most suitable for the Jordanian
1 7legal climate. The few amendments that were made to the Egyptian text are aimed
1 fiat making the statue suitable to Jordanian reality. It is noteworthy that Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia are the only two Arab countries that have chosen to have their
17 Explanatory document of the Arbitration Act 2001
18 ibid
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arbitration law in a separate statute and not as a part of the Civil Law Litigation 
Code.
Jordan was among the leading Arab countries that ratified the 1954 Convention on 
the Enforcement of Judgments between the Arab Countries19, which was later 
replaced by the Riyadh Convention for Judicial Cooperation of 198320. In 1972, 
Jordan joined the Washington Convention, which established the International 
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). A few years later, in 
1979, Jordan also joined the New York Convention.
The debate in the Jordanian Parliament on the arbitration act was generally not 
contentious. However, article 36 that dealt with the substantive law of the arbitration 
caused fierce debate. Part (a) of the article allowed the parties to choose the law of 
arbitration, whether Jordanian or not. Some Members of Parliament said that this 
gives foreign investors and companies the power to impose their law on the 
Jordanian party, even though the contract is performed in Jordan and is closely 
connected to Jordan. One Member of Parliament explained that many foreign 
companies that contract with a Jordanian party have also got foreign funding for the 
project, thus the Jordanian side does not get to negotiate the terms of the contract as 
the terms come with a ‘take it or leave it’ invitation to sign. Thus, some members felt 
that they needed to protect the local party. A well respected lawyer and former judge 
for 25 years agreed; “People do not go to arbitration outside Jordan because it is 
very expensive. Clauses with regards to dealerships and franchises, for example, 
always have an arbitration clause in the country o f the parent company. These 
clauses are usually unfair and will be enforced in Jordan, whether fair or not. The 
foreign party always formulate a contract that takes away the rights o f the Jordanian 
party as the contracts are usually standard contracts”
These arguments did not succeed as the chairman of the legal committee explained 
that the contract is the highest law in commerce and that Jordan could not 
compromise on this principle under any circumstances. The importance of this
19 Convention on the Enforcement of Judgments between the Arab Countries of 1954, 1195 Jordanian 
Off. Gaz. (Sept 1, 1954)
20 Riyadh Convention for Judicial Cooperation of 1983, 3329 Jordanian Off. Gaz. ( July 16,1985)
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debate is that it indicates that many people in Jordan and certainly in the wider 
Middle East feel that foreign companies impose both the process and the law on the 
Arab party, which I believe contributes to the distrust and negative feelings towards 
arbitration in the region outlined in chapter 4.
A former judge, who has been a lawyer for 16 years, warned that the “people in 
Jordan feel that they cannot afford to go to arbitration aboard and therefore may 
decide not to claim at all The local party is always the weaker party. We need to 
protect them and the new Arbitration Act does not do so as it allows arbitration 
abroad. In Jordan, the new law disadvantages the local party considerably. The law 
is wrong.”21
A very experienced lawyer and arbitrator feels that the “Jordanian companies have 
arbitration forced upon them when contracting with foreign companies. I  try for my 
part to include the Jordanian law or the jurisdiction o f the Jordanian courts in the 
arbitration clause, but that is often refused. For example, with a $250 million 
contract in Iraq, the Arab party wanted to use Jordan as a neutral forum for the 
arbitration, but the western party refused; it was make or break for the deal. The 
only thing we achieved is avoiding the International Chamber o f Commerce 
(ICC).”22
Part (b) of Article 36 of the Arbitration Act, deals with circumstances when the 
parties do not agree on the substantive law of the dispute, then the article says that 
the tribunal must decide “which law is the most connected law to the dispute” instead 
of using the -conflict of laws principle as outlined in the Model Law. A Member of 
Parliament suggested that “we should draft something that will allow this part to fall 
within the Jordanian reality and situation.” Another member suggested that the law 
must impose on the tribunal when deciding the applicable law, to give priority to 
Jordanian law.24 This was not approved as it was argued that this would contravene 
the spirit of arbitration. One member pointed out that none of the Jordanian laws are
21 Interview with Jordanian Lawyer in Amman in March 2004
22 Interview with Jordanian Lawyer in Amman in May 2004
23 Slamah Al-Ehyari, Parliamentary debate, 67
24 Parliamentary debate of Jordanian Arbitration Act 2001
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actually 100 per cent Jordanian. They are all based on foreign laws from all over the 
world, which makes it suitable for international commerce.
An interesting feature of article 36 is part (d), which allows the parties to agree to 
authorise the tribunal to impose sulh on the parties, as well as to decide the dispute 
according to the principles of justice and equity without being restricted by any laws. 
This article seems to be used regularly by some of the arbitrators I interviewed in 
Amman.
Jordanian arbitral awards are enforceable through the Jordanian Court of Appeal 
according to article 53 of the Act. The court allows 30 days for the other party to 
apply to set aside the award, after the expiry of this period, the award is given the 
necessary form for enforcement after the court checks just two matters; firstly that 
nothing within the award contravenes Jordanian public policy and secondly that the
7 f \award was notified to the losing party appropriately. The decision of giving the 
award an enforceable form is not reviewable and cannot be appealed. On the other 
hand, if the Court of Appeal refused to enforce the award, then the applicant could 
appeal to the Cassation Court to review that decision, according to article 54 of the 
Act. Many lawyers have criticised this disparity as contravening the doctrine of 
‘equality between litigants’. A respected arbitrator explained “The Court o f Appeal 
does not understand its role in the applications for annulment. The judges act in a 
supervisory capacity not as an appeal forum, even the language they cannot get 
right. Also the issue that only the party that had an award annulled, can appeal to
77the Cassation Court is simply unfair.” Another arbitrator said “Therefore there is
yo
no justice among the parties. ” Article 54 was confirmed by the highest court of 
Jordan on 13 May 2005, confirming the decision of the Court of Appeal, which
70allowed an award to be enforced as final and binding without any right to appeal.
The effect of Article 30 of the Arbitration Act is also criticised by some arbitrators in 
Jordan. One experienced arbitrator, who attended his first arbitration in the 1950s, 
explained; “ When an award is set aside -  then the arbitration clause is null and we
25 ibid
26 Arbitration Act No.31 article 54 (a)
27 Interview with Jordanian Lawyer in Amman in May 2004
28 Interview with Jordanian Lawyer in Amman in March 2004
29 Judgement No. 4211/2004 given on 13th May 2005 by the Cassation Court
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have to start from point zero at court -  I  don’t understand that, after the parties
AA
spent one to two years in arbitration, they have to go court”
Another criticism of the Act surrounds the lack of any guidance as to what happens if 
one of the arbitrators in a tribunal of three or more resigns from the arbitration, 
whether for genuine reasons or as a delaying tactic by the appointing party. Articles 
38 and 41 allow majority findings by the arbitrators with regards to both interim and 
final awards. However, the law does not deal with situations where at the time of 
making the award, there are only two arbitrators rather than three. A case described 
to me highlights this issue, after the arbitration process had lasted seven years, two of 
the arbitrators agreed on an award but the third disagreed and subsequently resigned. 
According to the law, a lawyer said “we must appoint another arbitrator; however the 
party that appointed this arbitrator had appointed four arbitrators before him who had 
also resigned. It seemed like delaying tactics. So, we asked that the arbitrators give 
their award by a majority decision, but they refused. So now the matter is before the 
courts.”31
Article 48 makes it clear that arbitral awards are not subject to appeal but an 
application to set aside the award could be made subject to articles 49, 50 and 51. 
The grounds for this application must only relate to procedural matters, which are 
restricted to the grounds within the law.
A damning assessment of the Act was given by a very experienced lawyer and 
arbitrator. “The Act is missing some key features in order to help push arbitration 
forward. When the Act was enacted, people were excited about arbitration. When the 
gaps started to show in the Act, people started to shy away from arbitration. The Act 
gives the arbitrators complete freedom on procedural matters -  including mandatory 
rights o f justice -  for example we saw arbitrations where arbitrators produce an 
award without even seeing the parties- they would decide the case on the documents 
alone and not even have one hearing. This is against the ABC o f adjudication. It is 
important that the parties get to present their case and have their say. The future o f 
arbitration is worrying, except i f  the law is reformed in order to fill the gaps that
30 Interview with Jordanian Lawyer in Amman in April 2004
31 Interview with Jordanian Lawyer in Amman July 2004
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have been identified in practice.” Other lawyers and arbitrators feel that the law 
works well. One said “/  think we have the right tools in the form o f the law. That is 
good, but we need the people to implement it in the right way and make good use o f
u.”M
6.4 Foreign Awards
A foreign award can be defined as an award made outside the country where 
enforcement is sought. The losing party will often attempt to either appeal against the 
award or have it set aside. This can be done either directly, by appealing against the 
award itself, or indirectly, by attempting to persuade the court not to enforce the 
award. The courts are not authorised to review the merits of the dispute or the 
reasoning of the arbitrator. Rather, the courts may examine the award only to 
determine whether certain procedural requirements have been met, or to determine 
that the award does not violate public policy.34
There are three possible routes to enforce foreign arbitral awards in Jordan. If an 
award had been given leave for enforcement by the judicial authority of the country 
where it was made, then the party trying to enforce it must apply to the Jordanian 
courts under the Enforcement of Foreign Judgements Act, No. 8 of 1952, unless, the 
award was granted in one of the Member States of the Riyadh Convention. In 
circumstances that the award has not been given the necessary judicial authority, then 
the New York Convention will apply. It is noteworthy that international treaties and
■3/
conventions are supreme to national law and are given priority in implementation.
6.4.1 Enforcement of Foreign Judgements Act
Under the Enforcement of Foreign Judgements Act of 1952, the applicant must apply 
to the High Court for a hearing on the enforcement of an arbitral award. The
32 Interview with Jordanian Lawyer in Amman in May 2004
33 Interview with Jordanian Lawyer in Amman in August 2004
34 Judgement No. 2996/1999 given on 30th May 2000 by the Cassation Court
35 Judgement No. 768/1991 given on 6th February 1992 by the Cassation Court
36 ibid
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procedural Rules of the High Court are applicable to such proceedings. The court 
could refuse enforcement of the foreign judgement under specific grounds outlined in 
Article 7 of the Act and these are:
a) If the court that gave the judgement has no jurisdiction.
b) If the losing party was not a national or a resident in the jurisdiction of the 
court that produced the judgement or the party did not recognise the court’s 
jurisdiction.
c) If the plaintiff did not inform the defendant of the proceedings and if the 
defendant did not attend the litigation even though he was a national or a 
resident of that jurisdiction.
d) If the judgement was granted by fraud.
e) If the losing party convinced the Jordanian courts that the judgement before 
them is not final or it contravenes public policy and morals.
Article 7(2) outlines that the Jordanian courts may refuse to enforce a judgement 
where the state of the court that produced the judgement does not enforce Jordanian 
judgements. In other words, the country where the award has been made should 
exercise reciprocal enforcement of Jordanian court and arbitration decisions.
Once the court has agreed to enforce the judgement, it will be enforced in Jordan as
'xnif it were a Jordanian judgement.
6.4.2 The Riyadh Convention
The Riyadh Convention is a regional multilateral convention between Arab States. 
Therefore, it applies only to foreign awards made in another Arab member State. It 
concerns enforcement and recognition of not only arbitral awards, but also court 
judgements. The Riyadh Convention affirms the executory character of arbitral 
awards made in a member state without taking into account the nationality of the 
winning party. The enforcing court cannot examine the substance of the dispute 
when the judgement or award is referred to it for enforcement; it can only accept or
37 Article 9 of the 1952 Arbitration Act
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refuse (in certain cases) to enforce it. For an award made in one Arab State to be 
enforced in another, the Riyadh Convention requires that the enforcement order for 
the award be granted by the judicial authority of the country in which the award was 
made. Thus, the Riyadh Convention requires two enforcement orders, one from the 
country where the award was made and one from the country where the enforcement 
is sought.
Article 37 of the Riyadh Convention provides that arbitral awards from Originating 
States will be recognised and enforced in Recipient States, subject to the exceptions 
set forth in Articles 28 of the Riyadh Convention and to the following additional 
exceptions:
a. If under the law of the Recipient State, the dispute that is the subject of the 
arbitral award from the Originating State is not arbitrable;
b. If the arbitration agreement upon which the arbitration was based was void or 
had expired;
c. If the arbitrator(s) was not competent under the terms of the arbitration 
agreement or the laws under which the arbitral award was made;
d. If both parties to the arbitration were not duly summoned to appear; or
e. If the terms of the arbitral award are such that the enforcement of the arbitral 
award would be against the public policy of the Recipient State.
Article 30 also has a list of grounds for the court to consider before enforcing an 
award or judgement:
a. The judgment is contrary to Islamic law or the Constitution or public order of 
the Recipient State;
b. The judgment is a default judgment and the defendant was not properly 
notified of the case or the judgment;
c. The dispute in respect of which the judgment was issued:
i. Was previously finally adjudged in the Recipient State;
ii. Was referred to the courts of the Recipient State before it was referred 
to the courts of the Originating State and is still before the courts of 
the Recipient State;
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d. The judgment is against the government of the Recipient State or an official 
of the Recipient State for acts arising out of the performance of his duties as 
an official of the Recipient State; or
e. The enforcement or recognition of the judgment would be contrary to an 
international agreement or convention in force in the Recipient State.
6.4.3 The New York Convention 1958
Unlike the Riyadh Convention, the New York Convention applies to foreign arbitral 
awards, but not to judicial decisions. Article 3 of the New York Convention 
provides that each contracting state will recognise arbitral awards and enforce them 
in accordance with the Contracting State's rules of procedure. The New York 
Convention applies not only to the recognition and enforcement by Contracting 
States of arbitral awards made in other Contracting States, but also to the 
enforcement by Contracting States of arbitral awards made in non-Contracting 
States, provided that such arbitral awards satisfy the basic conditions set down in the 
New York Convention. Certain countries have excluded this provision, but not 
Jordan. The Jordanian Cassation Court confirmed that the Jordanian Courts will 
enforce awards under the New York Convention regardless of whether the State 
where the award was made reciprocally enforces Jordanian judgements and awards 
or not.38
A Contracting State may, however, pursuant to Article 5 of the New York 
Convention, decline to recognise and enforce an arbitral award:
a. Where the party against whom the arbitral award is invoked can prove that:
i. The parties to the arbitration agreement were under some incapacity 
according to the law applicable to them;
ii. The arbitration agreement was not valid under its governing law;
iii. It was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or 
of the arbitration or was otherwise unable to present his case;
iv. The arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not 
falling within the terms of the submission to the arbitration;
38 n 35 above
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v. The composition of the arbitral authority was not in accordance with 
the arbitration agreement; or
vi. The arbitral award is not yet final or has been set aside or suspended 
by the jurisdiction of the seat of the arbitration; or
b. Where the competent authority of the Contracting State where enforcement of 
the arbitral award is sought finds that:
i. The subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of the Contracting State where enforcement 
of the arbitral award is sought; or
ii. The recognition or enforcement of the arbitral award would be 
contrary to the public policy of the Contracting State where 
enforcement of the arbitral award is sought.
A party enforcing an arbitration award in Jordan could choose to enforce it under the 
New York convention first. If this was not possible, then the Riyadh Convention and 
then the Act would be used. This is due to the fact that an award under the New York 
Convention can be enforced without the authority of any other national court. The 
Riyadh Convention requires this and so does the Act.
6.5 The Mediation Act
“Mediation is a method of alternative resolutions aimed at reducing the demand on 
courts and reduces the time, effort and expenditure on all parties to the litigation 
process. It also contributes towards providing a conducive and competitive 
investment environment in line with the quantitative and qualitative developments 
witnessed by the Kingdom in various areas.”
The Mediation Act for Civil Disputes Resolution No. 21 of 2006 came into force on 
16 March 2006, but cases were not referred to mediation until 1 June 2006. The first 
mediation department was established in the Amman First Instance Court on 1 June 
2006 as an initial step towards establishing mediation departments in other courts 
across the Kingdom in pursuance of the Act. The Act sets up a judicial section called
http://eng.moi.gov.jo/Home/tabid/36/Default.aspx
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the “mediation section” which consists of mediation judges from both First Instance 
courts as well as the High Court. They are chosen by the Head of the High Court for 
a period determined by him.
There are also private mediators appointed by the Head of the judicial committee on 
recommendation from the Minister of Justice. Private mediators are chosen from 
retired judges, lawyers, other professionals and people with relevant experience and 
who are known to be fair and impartial. The litigants must agree that their case be 
referred to mediation.
Part 3 (b) of the Act gives an incentive to encourage parties to settle their disputes 
amicably by refunding half of the court fees paid by the claimant, which the 
defendant must pay back if he loses. There is a three month period given to the 
mediator to resolve the dispute. If the dispute is resolved in part or completely, an 
agreement is written down and signed by both parties. This agreement will then be 
sent to the case management judge or the first instance judge and it becomes final 
and binding. If the parties do not reach a solution then the mediator must provide the 
court with a report detailing the level of co-operation of each party during the 
mediation. If one of the parties did not attend the mediation, then article 7(d) gives 
the court the power to impose financial penalties on that party or its representatives. 
All the negotiation and discussion in the mediation is confidential and cannot be used 
in future litigation.
From June until December 2006, 136 cases were referred to mediation from the 
judges of the Amman Court. 74 cases were settled by mediator judges. In 2007, 273 
cases were referred in total, and 256 were settled. It is important to note that 
mediation is only available in the main court in Amman. It is expected that other 
courts will start mediation some time in 2008. However, there has not been any 
mediation by any of the private mediators. A judge I spoke to explained that litigants 
do not feel comfortable in referring their disputes to a private mediator. It seems that 
in some ways this is obvious, as the disputants would have tried private mediation 
among friends and family which failed and that is why they ended up in court, so 
they feel that there is no point referring the dispute to a person who does not have the 
authority of the state. The mediating judge it seems is seen as a judge and the parties 
seem to feel much more comfortable complying with his suggestions. All the
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mediators, both private and judiciary, were sent by the Jordanian government to the 
USA to train in mediation along American lines.
Many codes of civil procedure include more or less effective provisions for judicial 
mediation. Jordan adopted the Mediation Act (2006), which is inspired by Western 
models but this is in no way sufficient to modify paradigms.
A particularly well-informed lawyer attributes this failure to the fact that the 
execution, or carrying-out, of the settlement agreement remains optional.40 It should 
be added that American-style mediation has not convinced clients, who still prefer 
recourse to their social networks or even to the .courts to resolve their disputes.
6.6 The Commercial Chamber
The Amman Chamber of Commerce is one of the major organizations representing 
the private sector in Jordan, it has more than 40,000 registered members. It was 
founded in 1923 as a non-profit organization to regulate and represent the interests of 
all trade firms in Amman and the surrounding areas, and is one of the oldest 
Chambers of Commerce in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
The Chamber provides a service for traders to resolve their disputes. There are three 
resident arbitrators. The same people have been there for 8 years. They are all traders 
with ten years of experience in arbitration. The arbitration committee was set up over 
twenty years ago in 1986. However, arbitration and mediation have been a part of the 
chamber’s by-laws since the 1950s.
Most of the awards are by mutual consent. The arbitrators occasionally refer to 
professionals or specialists for specific advice, but with the consent of the parties. 
The articles of the Chamber sets the fee at ten JDs (about $14), but this is not usually 
enforced.
40 F. Kemicha, ‘The Approach to Mediation in the Arab World’, WIPO Conference on Mediation, 
Geneva, 29 March 1996, online: WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center,
http://arbiter.wiDQ.int/events/conferences/1996/kemicha.html
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Since 1990, only two awards have been set aside by the courts. An arbitration that 
took the longest time in the history of the Chamber lasted for about eight months due 
to its complexity. The arbitrators try to find the best possible options for both parties, 
using elements of trust and confidence. One of these arbitrators told me "We rely on 
Shari’ah and commercial customs. We are active arbitrators, we investigate the 
cases...The arbitrators are very pleased as they feel that they are doing a service to 
God.”41 He said the main advantage of the Chamber is that it is free. Parties only pay 
the experts fees if necessary. Over 90 per cent of the cases are resolved. Lawyers are 
allowed to attend hearings, but they are not allowed to speak. There are parties who 
choose to directly approach arbitrators themselves privately, who are themselves also 
members of the Chamber, as this affords maximum secrecy. The Chamber gets about 
one to two cases a week and a few are not within the commercial sphere. The 
average is 50-70 cases yearly and about 30 per cent are non-Jordanian parties.
6.7 Arbitration in Amman as Seen by the Arbitration Players
“Arbitration is the arbitrator”
Aly El Ghatit, famous arbitration lawyer 
in interview in Feb 2005 in Cairo
Many of the lawyers I interviewed in Amman and the people I spoke to on the Arab 
arbitration circuit put a lot of emphasis on the arbitrator as the ‘make or break’ 
element of any arbitration. An experienced lawyer and arbitrator said “success in 
arbitration depends on the personality and choice o f the panel. ”
The importance of the arbitrator was demonstrated by the classification of a young 
law lecturer at the University of Jordan and a former Minister of State for Public 
Reforms. According to this, arbitration cases in Jordan are divided into two types; the 
first is when "the parties have successfully chosen the right arbitrator, which ensures 
that the award is more likely to be enforced as he understands the procedures. ” The 
second type is when the “arbitrator comes to the arbitration “off hand”,
41 Interview of an arbitrator in the Jordanian Chamber of Commerce in Amman on 15 July 2006
177
Part 4
consequently many o f the awards, i f  not most, are annulled as they have major and 
fundamental violations. ”
When making choices about the arbitration process, the choice of arbitrator is given 
number one priority in the minds of the lawyers representing the parties. A famous 
international arbitrator said “what makes a good arbitration is a good arbitrator; in 
his manner, knowledge, experience, fairness. Good arbitrators are rare in most 
countries. ”
Other observers said that there are other factors that make a successful arbitration. A 
member of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators in London explained, “A good 
arbitration has three features; well qualified arbitrators, qualified lawyers and a 
good choice o f seat, because the law is applicable to the seat. ”
A very experienced engineer and arbitrator listed the main characteristics of a 
successful arbitrator:
>  Experience in arbitration
> Understanding o f the Arbitration law o f the seat and the applicable law to the 
arbitration
> Ensures justice and equity
> Strong personality
> Well known and respected
> Cannot be bribed
> Sole arbitrations are quicker and more efficient.
6.7.1 Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages of Arbitration
There are a number of advantages and disadvantages that are generally recognised 
with regards to arbitration. Many of these were mentioned in the interviews, but there 
were Jordan-specific issues.
A very experienced lawyer and arbitrator explained his strategy; “arbitration would 
be my choice o f dispute resolution for commercial disputes because o f the ease o f the
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process. I  have a rule, disputes over a half million US Dollars go to arbitration. For 
anything less than that, the courts are better.
Another very experienced international arbitrator and lawyer stated; “Complex cases 
that need specific knowledge and need a lot o f effort are best suited to arbitration, 
especially technical cases where you need the tribunal to understand expert evidence 
well. There is no way these kinds o f cases can be resolved in court. ”
A lawyer who graduated from King’s College, London with a PhD in investment and 
World Trade Organisation law is very optimistic about arbitration in Jordan. He said 
“arbitration solves disputes in a conciliatory manner and avoids the complexity o f 
the judiciary. It is important for commercial claims as commercial men are profit 
oriented people and arbitration is closer to the commercial mentality than the courts. 
The great thing about dispute resolution is the fact that you can create your own 
rules. Promptness o f settlement is also very important for businesses that are 
counting on the money. ”
6.7.2 Lawyers and Arbitration
The other player in the arbitration process alongside the arbitrator is the lawyer.
Many arbitrators complain that the lawyers representing the parties still use the same 
adversarial manner they use in court.
A lawyer and arbitrator with an LLM and PhD from George Washington describes 
how “lawyers need to be ‘brain washed’ from the routine o f court tactics, which do 
not work in arbitration. The lawyers in Jordan act as i f  they are before a state court. 
I  get very upset and try to explain to them that you are not before a court. I  tell the 
lawyers before an arbitration tribunal, you must forget procedures and concentrate 
on substance. Your right o f defence is guaranteed. I  felt like T was an alien ’. There 
is no real co-operation between the lawyers on both sides. This tension that exists in 
the courtroom still exists in arbitration. It is the same style. ”
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An international lawyer and arbitrator that has two PhDs from Cairo and Bristol 
Universities explained, “The main problem we face in arbitration is caused by bad 
management o f arbitration. Whenever I  am an arbitrator and especially a chairman, 
I  do not allow any o f the usual judicial practices. I  accept most applications as long 
as they trying to help the process while maintaining complete impartiality and 
equality between the parties. At the start o f the arbitration, I  agree with the parties 
the initial procedures, like claims and defences, time periods but most lawyers do not 
know anything different from the court procedures. ”
An experienced lawyer and arbitrator with a PhD from George Washington in 
international law explains; “lawyers in Jordan are deeply versed in procedure. They 
can kill any case using procedure. This is not arbitration, this is not even law. There 
are procedures, but just to ensure equal defence and equal opportunity. The best 
lawyers are now the ones that use procedures to delay the case. I f  this is good for 
court, and I  do not believe that it is, it is bad for arbitration. It is very important in 
arbitration to have the matter completed as soon as possible. Jordanian lawyers 
invariably perform before an arbitration tribunal the same way they would before a 
court and this is very badfor the reputation o f arbitration in Jordan. ”
A young lawyer who works in arbitration said, "Arbitration is not necessarily 
shorter, but it is definitely more expensive. Some arbitration panels conduct the case 
in the same way as a judge in court; witness testimony must be written down, it takes 
two hours to write down two pages, arbitration is not shorter for sure. In theory, it 
should be less rigid and use fewer formalities, but that is not the case. Many o f the 
youngsters complete masters and PhDs in arbitration and think that they can become 
arbitrators straightaway. I  been in practice for seven years and I  would not dream o f 
putting my name forward as an arbitrator. ”
A  former judge who has become a practising lawyer explained; “there is a lack o f 
general qualifications among lawyers and this impacts on arbitration. Trust in 
arbitration is low in Jordan. ”
A  former member of the World Bank Committee on dispute resolution offered the 
criticism that, “there are a lot o f arbitrators who conduct arbitration without even
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understanding the concept o f arbitration or without reading any literature or history 
o f arbitration or understanding international standards o f arbitration. ”
A civil engineer of 30 years and a very experienced arbitrator said “there is limited 
arbitration experience in Amman. About 30 per cent o f lawyers and 10 per cent o f 
engineers have arbitration experience. 90 per cent o f the arbitration cases I  have 
participated in are like a court and the main reason for that is the lawyers. ”
The vast majority of lawyers I interviewed, and some engineers, have insisted that 
having a lawyer on the arbitration tribunal is vital. A renowned engineer who did his 
first arbitration in 1966; “I  think it is very important to have a lawyer on the tribunal. 
Arbitration is both technical and legal. ”
A very experienced engineer and arbitrator disagrees; “the presence o f lawyers 
depends on the needs o f the dispute. In my experience, in disputes that are technical, 
only engineers are needed on the panel o f arbitrators. There would be contractual 
issues, but engineers would be able to deal with them through their experience. By 
having a lawyer on the panel, one loses a voice in the technical deliberations. I f  a 
legal issue arises, the arbitrators can employ a legal expert to assist them if  
necessary."
An experienced lawyer with an LLM from the LSE agrees. He insisted, in a 
particular case, on the appointment of a Jordanian sole arbitrator who is an expert in 
construction; “a quantity surveyor with a good reputation and high technical 
calibre. ” His choice was based on the dispute itself, “there was no need for a lawyer 
on the tribunal as the dispute was the verification o f a claim that is purely technical. 
This would avoid the need for an expert report. The other party were insisting on a 
lawyer arbitrator but I  resisted. There were no legal rights claimed and thus no legal 
matters to be decided. I f  there are legal elements to the dispute, then it is preferable 
to have a lawyer. ”
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6.7.3 Arbitration is a Business
There is a general feeling developing in Jordan and the wider Middle East that many 
arbitrators treat arbitration as a business. A businessman said “arbitration is like a 
cake, everyone wants the biggest share; the arbitrators, the lawyers, and the parties 
lose either way. It is big business.”
Arbitration has become commercialised and is taking too long. Many older 
arbitrators describe how they will insist that the parties try to negotiate a settlement 
before starting arbitration proceedings so as to avoid arbitration all together if 
possible as they believe it is the best course of action. Then, if the parties do not 
succeed, the arbitrator will get the parties to agree on him imposing a settlement, 
which a number of arbitrators are very proud to say they have succeeded in doing. 
After the agreed settlement, the arbitrator produces an award of these agreed terms. 
These older arbitrators feel that the new arbitrators are ‘hungry’ and as soon as they 
are appointed they start the proceedings and ask for large fees.
A lawyer and arbitrator with a PhD in international contracts and dispute resolution 
from France believed “locally there are people that think that arbitration is for 
building fortunes. Jordanian law imposes VAT on lawyers and arbitrators fees which 
make arbitration even less encouraging. ”
A lawyer of over 35 years experience and extensive arbitration experience 
complained, “Fees are the biggest problem, there are much more than court fees and 
the award still ends up at court and the client must pay the court fees anyway. Thus, 
arbitrator’s fees are an extra cost. Some o f my clients are losing more money by 
going to arbitration. For example, from a 4,500JD claim, 500JD went to the 
arbitrator, 50JD to the clerk and 125JD was lawyer’s fees. While i f  we went to court 
it would have cost 135JD to go to court. We settled in one month. ”
A lawyer who has been involved in arbitration and feels that he was one of the 
people that promoted it said 'fees for arbitration could cause a lot ofproblems i f  the 
arbitrators do not set fees within reasonable limits in order to protect the process o f
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arbitration. One must look at the value o f the dispute, the complexity o f the case, the 
length and experience o f the arbitrators in order to decide the fees.
An engineer who worked a number of local arbitration cases and has studied law at 
undergraduate level suggests, “the fee o f arbitrators should be per hour and that way 
it may put pressure on the lawyers to become efficient and not waste time in 
hearings. ”
A young lawyer and arbitrator justified the high fees charged by arbitrators; “they are 
at the top o f their profession. The more you have a boom in the economy the more 
you will need commercially orientated procedures such as arbitration. ”
A former judge agrees, “The expenses o f arbitration are very high but within the 
normal range o f commercial dealings. ”
6.7.4 The Story of the Courts and Arbitration
Arbitration can not work effectively without a supportive judiciary. Also, arbitration 
is the alternative to court and many players in the region use arbitration to escape the 
national courts.
A distinguished academic who received his LLM from Harvard and PhD from Queen 
Mary London confirmed “there is an understanding o f alternative dispute resolution 
within our judiciary. The judges have a good understanding; there are conferences 
and workshops so there is a real awareness and acceptance o f arbitration and 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). ”
A  distinguished lawyer and arbitrator felt that the advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages of arbitration and says that this was due to “our courts being in an 
appalling state, thus, I  prefer arbitration. The results o f arbitration in Amman are 
encouraging and it is important that the arbitrators do not give arbitration a bad 
name. ”
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An experienced lawyer and arbitrator who achieved an LLM and PhD from George 
Washington gave a different point of view. “There is always jealousy between the 
court and arbitration. A trained judge that sees an engineer becoming an arbitrator 
considers this an infringement as the judge cannot become an engineer, but an 
engineer can become a judge. However, I  think because o f the judge’s workload, 
they are welcoming ADR. This is not an Arab specific issue, it is a worldwide 
matter. ”
Many interviewees confirmed that arbitration is welcomed by the courts as a way of 
reducing their very heavy workload.
6.7.5 Advantages of Arbitration Compared to the Court
There is a general agreement that arbitration, with all its delays, is still faster than the 
courts. Some interviewees insisted on describing how as arbitrators they complete 
the process in under a year, but the average it seems for arbitration cases in Jordan as 
between one and two years.
These are some of the main advantages mentioned by interviewees.
A respected lawyer and arbitrator feels, “arbitration is mostly done by experts in the 
field o f the dispute, unlike the courts. In addition, arbitration has proved to be 
relatively quicker as a fact finding process, and the outcome is likely to be accepted 
by the parties involved. Moreover, international arbitration cases conducted in 
Jordan are more likely to be accepted and enforced in foreign jurisdictions than 
local court decisions; this is mainly due to the New York Convention. ”
An experienced lawyer and arbitrator explained “there is no real saving o f money in 
arbitration as it costs more than going to court in some cases, but there is a time 
saving element except when losing parties apply to annul the award. In these 
situations, the courts take a long time, thus, no real time saving is possible. During 
arbitration, the parties get closer to each other and the arbitrators try to encourage 
the parties to settle. In most cases, the parties settle, which is the real advantage o f 
arbitration. We do exert some pressure on parties to settle their disputes. ”
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An experienced judge who has been practising law and arbitration confirmed, 
“Arbitration saves effort, time and money - money not so much especially when 
appointing a very experienced arbitrator, but time for sure. ”
An experienced lawyer and arbitrator confirmed “the main difference between court 
and arbitration is the element o f speed. ”
An experienced lawyer who does some arbitration cases felt, “speed as an advantage 
relies heavily on the type o f case. Good judges decide cases quickly. This is similar 
in arbitration. Some arbitrators do not allow delay, but some do. In general, 
arbitration is shorter than court proceedings as it is only one stage and there is no 
appeal. ”
A young arbitrator said; “in Jordan the personal aspects are greatly observed and 
appreciated in arbitration as well as court processes; since the community is 
relatively small, and the group who are involved in arbitration is even smaller, every 
one knows every one. I f  a person is respected, he will gain recognition, i f  he is not, 
most likely the arbitrators will be stricter. ”
A young lawyer and arbitrator points out: “Some arbitrators are very conscious o f 
the period it takes for an arbitration to finish as they do not want to gain a 
reputation that their arbitration tribunals take a very long time to conclude."
A young lawyer who works in arbitration argues: “The market is small and few  
people work within it. Sole arbitrators try to encourage a settlement rather than give 
an award to protect their chances o f getting appointed in the future. ”
There is no doubt that there are advantages to arbitration and the main one is 
informality in comparison to courts. “The main advantage to arbitration is not speed, 
it is informality, ” a long standing former judge said. “The arbitrator allows the 
parties to present as much evidence as they want, whereas a judge puts down strict 
limits as he has a heavy caseload. A first instance judge has about 25 cases listed 
each day. Arbitrators allow flexibility in presentation ofpleadings and evidence. ”
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Another advantage mentioned by a lawyer who been in arbitration since the 1950s is 
that “there is no need to translate documents to Arabic from English, for example, if  
the arbitrators can read them in English. Also witnesses are able to give evidence in 
English. ”
A lawyer that does mainly local arbitrations, who is also a member of the Jordanian 
Bar Association committee and a former head of the Bar Association feels that “some 
o f the advantages o f arbitration are also its disadvantages. For example, when some 
arbitrators ask for large fees, the parties decide to go to court instead. When looking 
at arbitration directly, it seems expensive, but i f  you look at it indirectly, it is cheaper 
than the court. However, the speed o f the process relies on the tribunal. The tribunal 
must include a lawyer to be able to grasp the law and thus increase the success o f 
enforcement o f the award. There are judicial requirements and the arbitrators must 
be aware o f them as legal problems could destroy the arbitration. ”
The ability to have consecutive hearings once the trial starts, was cited as valuable by 
arbitrators in Jordan. An experienced lawyer who specialises in international 
arbitration states: “Jordanian courts take a holiday from July to September for 6-8 
weeks, but arbitration hearings continue during that time even though courts are not 
sitting. ”
A  very experienced lawyer and arbitrator said: “I  have arbitration hearings on 
Fridays i f  necessary to keep the case moving
A young arbitrator who qualified as a lawyer in 1998 after spending a number of 
years as an academic feels that arbitration is cheaper than the courts. “I f  a case is 
concluded through arbitration within one to two years, this kind o f case, i.e. its size, 
will take about 15 years in the court. In court, lawyers cannot present their case 
adequately, regardless o f the number o f witnesses and documents, especially in 
construction cases like the ones I  worked on. The circumstances o f our courts can 
not allow this amount o f evidence, except i f  the judge only does one case every six 
months and that is impossible. In international cases where the witnesses are from
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outside Jordan, they need to be heard everyday to get through their evidence, they 
cannot keep coming back. This is not possible before the courts. ”
An experienced engineer and arbitrator felt that “arbitrators realise that parties 
referring disputes to arbitration are looking for flexibility and speed. We try to have 
weekly hearings except i f  there is a foreign witness then we have daily hearings. In 
court it is very different; there is a hearing here and a hearing there, which makes 
cases last for years, especially construction disputes. ”
A very experienced engineer and arbitrator stated the main advantage to arbitration is 
the fact that “arbitrators study the case in detail unlike judges. Therefore, this could 
lead to more just decisions. ”
An experienced lawyer and arbitrator sympathised, “the longest cases in court are 
construction cases, which last about ten years, so arbitration is essential for these 
types o f disputes as the courts are very ineffective. Judges really do not understand 
these disputes. To help the construction community, we need a specialised judiciary. 
At present, I  pray God help the people in the construction industry. ”
An experienced lawyer and arbitrator explains, “The cases that last for four years in 
arbitration would last so much longer in the court due to the amount o f the evidence, 
especially witness evidence. I  have a case that so far has 2000 pages on record. A 
key witness, for example, could last for four months. Sometimes, it is not possible to 
have hearings daily as the lawyers need to prepare their questions and then their 
cross-examination. There are cases that concluded in three, six months or one, two 
and four years. There are no real delaying tactics in arbitration as the majority o f 
lawyers that do arbitration are o f high calibre and it is not in their nature to delay. 
They are more concerned with justice and rights. ”
In contrast, an engineer blames the lawyers for the delay in arbitration; “there is no 
doubt that arbitration is faster than the courts. Even though it may take longer 
because o f the lawyers, but it is still faster. Lawyers need to delay the process to give 
an impression to their clients that they are putting in a lot o f effort and therefore 
deserve their large fees. The time is very short when there are no lawyers. I  have
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done a lot o f arbitration with no lawyers, just the parties and it was shorter as the 
procedures are much more straightforward. The difference between the court and 
arbitration is that arbitrators can ask for evidence and documents, whereas the court 
cannot. Therefore, arbitrators could get closer to the truth. ”
An experienced lawyer and arbitrator felt: “The procedure in arbitration is the same 
as the courts. Usually, when there is a sole arbitrator then the procedures are 
shorter and easier in comparison. When the two parties are local, the procedure 
looks very much like the courts, obviously there is some flexibility to process, but not 
enough. ”
A young arbitrator and a lecturer in the University of Jordan believes, “people prefer 
to go to court because it is less expensive; not many local parties go to arbitration as 
there are very few large contracts. They prefer the courts as they are traditional 
people. Arbitration is still reserved mainly to large and complex cases. ”
A former judge who is currently a practising lawyer and arbitrator confirms “the 
number o f arbitration cases is limited, the courts are still more popular. ”
A lawyer who specialises in international arbitration believes: “There are a lot o f 
local arbitrations but I  do not deal with them. I  encourage local clients to include 
arbitration clauses in their contracts. ”
An experienced arbitrator and a member of International Chamber of Commerce of 
Jordan disagrees with the above: “Arbitration is growing because people are fed  up 
with the courts not because they like arbitration. There is a lack o f confidence in the 
courts. I  used to be a supporter o f arbitration, but now I  am not so sure because o f 
the high fees and the reason that courts decide to set aside the awards. ”
An experienced quantity surveyor and arbitrator said: “Arbitration has become very 
similar to litigation and mediation is also going the same way. It is the lawyers1 way 
o f ensuring the existence o f their monopoly. There is a responsibility on the nations 
with developed legal systems to set an example; countries such as France, the USA,
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the UK and Egypt. They must create an effective, efficient system and we must learn 
from the mistakes o f the developed nations. ”
A very experienced international arbitrator and lawyer explained that: “/« situations 
where there is an incompetent judiciary and hopeless arbitration, we are better off 
using the judiciary. We choose arbitration to avoid going to the judiciary. 
Unfortunately there is no escape, as the enforcement o f awards in the Court o f 
Appeal are lasting for one to two years. This is wrong and a serious problem o f our 
courts. The impartiality issue concerning arbitration, plus the fact that awards are 
taking a long time to be enforced by the courts, leads me to say that we are better off 
in court. It is a circle; it needs to be perfect; an excellent arbitrator; a good lawyer 
and a judge who understands arbitration. Only, in these circumstances will 
arbitration be better than the court, but i f  one o f those elements is missing, then I  
prefer the courts. ”
Many of the lawyers interviewed launched fierce criticism against the courts and 
their ability to deal with arbitration procedures and awards.
A distinguished lawyer and arbitrator who graduated in 1974 complained: “There is 
a lack o f legal understanding by the court o f arbitration. For example, the law says 
that the decision to appoint an arbitrator by the court is final and cannot be 
appealed. One o f the grounds for setting aside an award is the improper appointment 
o f an arbitrator. There was a case where my opponent asked the court to appoint an 
arbitrator on my client’s behalf. The court did not inform us o f the application and 
appointed an arbitrator through a procedural hearing. An arbitrator was appointed 
without us being present and the award was set aside after the whole arbitration took 
place because the appointment was not done properly. In another case, a party asked 
the court to appoint one arbitrator, but it appointed two on behalf o f the party and 
the chairman, as it was clear from the contract that the panel consists o f three 
arbitrators. The law states a certain procedure to the appointment for the third 
arbitrator, which only requires the court to appoint the chairman i f  the two 
appointed arbitrators fail to do so and an application is made to court to make such 
an appointment. In this case, no such application was made. ”
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A former judge and current practising lawyer and arbitrator gives this example where 
“a party requested from the court to appoint an arbitrator on behalf o f a party that 
had failed to do so. The court ignored the choice o f the applicant and appointed 
three arbitrators as it saw fit. I  think this shows that the sight o f the judiciary is not 
clear regarding arbitration. ”
An experienced lawyer and arbitrator felt the way to avoid these kinds of problems is 
to have “a specialised panel o f judges in the Court o f Appeal that deal with 
arbitration cases specifically. ”
A practising lawyer who represents clients in arbitration, but refuses to be appointed 
as an arbitrator, explains the need for a specialised Court of Appeal. He says that 
each panel of judges deals with arbitration in a different way. “It depends on the 
particular panel o f judges that the case comes before, some judges just review the 
award on paper, others ask for oral pleadings. Whatever type o f arbitration, whether 
local or international, the courts have the final word. ”
A former judge and a current lawyer and arbitrator felt the lack of specialisation in 
the Jordanian legal profession is “...causing difficulties. Specialisation is also 
necessary for judges. The reason, in my opinion, is that a large number o f pieces o f 
legislation are being passed and this is creating a gap o f knowledge, expertise and 
skill in the legal world. The courts may be able to push the profession towards 
specialisation. ”
A lawyer and arbitrator explained to me that contrary to what is required by law; 
courts review all awards for enforcement with an oral hearing on the instruction of 
the Head of the Court of Appeal. “Even though Article 54 o f the 2001 Act clearly 
states otherwise, some cases were delayed for over a year on an application for 
enforcement then the case was appealed to the Cassation Court. Cases for the 
appointment o f arbitrators by the Court have taken three to four years. ”
One lawyer and arbitrator warns, “The law is too new to judge the courts' decisions, 
but very few awards are being set aside by the courts. The court respects both local 
and international awards. ”
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Another distinguished arbitrator and former judge explains: “The position o f the 
courts in relation to arbitration cannot be judged sufficiently as the number o f cases 
presented to the courts is not higher than *the fingers o f both hands ’. We are still at 
the beginning o f the road. The relationship between the courts and arbitration has 
not been finalised and the principles have not been clarified. It is all very new. ”
A professor at the University of Jordan with 26 years of legal experience feels, 
“Jordan has a relatively new Arbitration Act with lots o f loopholes. Only time and 
experience will reveal both the advantages and disadvantages o f arbitration in 
Jordan. ”
A former lecturer at the University of Jordan and a current practising lawyer and 
arbitrator gives a different point of view. He feels: “The condition o f the judiciary 
could be a secondary reason for the increase in arbitration. The main reason is that 
you can choose your arbitrator and tailor the process to the dispute. The situation 
with regards to the training o f judges has improved considerably. There are courses, 
scholarships for masters and PhDs which were not available in the past. There is 
some sort o f unofficial specialisation among judges. For example, some judges who 
have achieved a PhD in commercial law have those kinds o f cases directed to them. I  
think the status o f judges is getting better. The main problem for judges is the time 
allocated to deal with each case. ”
However, serious criticism of the legal profession and judges was levelled by an 
arbitrator who is involved mainly in international arbitration. “Judicial standards are 
getting worse and judges are creating bad lawyers. Lawyers are the standing 
judiciary andjudges are the sitting judiciary. ”
A long standing lawyer and arbitrator thinks the increase in arbitration is due to the 
failure of the courts: “The court decisions are contradictory and there is lack o f 
knowledgeable judges, especially relating to certain cases such as construction, the 
length o f cases in courts and the lack o f specialised judges means that people do not 
have any other choice but to submit their disputes to arbitration. Basically, I  say the 
use o f arbitration is to avoid the use o f the courts. I  think i f  our judicial system was
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stronger and had more qualified people then the use o f arbitration would decrease 
because arbitration is very expensive. An example o f the court system’s failure was 
demonstrated in an article where the Bar Association asked all lawyers to submit a 
list o f cases they submitted to the Cassation Court. There is a desperate shortage o f 
judges in the highest court. We have cases in the court that have been there for two 
years and still have not even been allocated to the relevant panel. So how do you 
want people to trust our court system? ”
An engineer and arbitrator who is much more optimistic said, “Arbitration in Amman 
is successful except for some problems but it is still better than the courts. Judges do 
not understand technical matters and there are huge delays in the courts. ”
A seasoned construction manager and arbitrator told me, “The main reason people 
go to arbitration in Jordan for technical disputes is that the judges are very weak, 
especially matters o f construction. ”
A well established lawyer and arbitrator was furious about the current state of the 
country. “This is our reality and anybody that says otherwise is lying. With this 
current mentality o f judges, we will never develop. A judge rang me to find out our 
fees and the fees o f the arbitrators. He said he would work for several years and not 
get paid that much. ”
There was also strong comments from a Bar Association committee member and an 
experienced lawyer and local arbitrator, “/  advise my clients to choose arbitration 
over the courts. I  have no confidence in the judiciary. There are political and other 
pressures on them. This causes my lack o f confidence. ”
An experienced lawyer and arbitrator described how “there are mixed feelings 
towards arbitration but as long as the courts are o f this low status, arbitration will 
continue. The benefits o f arbitration to many lawyers outweigh its disadvantages. ”
A  lawyer with over 30 years’ experience in arbitration felt that “the new generation 
o f lawyers and judges are not well educated and do not read. The judgements o f the 
courts are badly drafted and lack reasoning. ”
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Not everyone feels that arbitration is better than courts however,
An experienced lawyer and arbitrator feels that “in court you get ‘three bites at the 
cherry'. One o f them will be the right decision. Whereas in arbitration there is no 
appeal and one is stuck with the award. ”
A former judge who is currently a practising lawyer and arbitrator states: “7 do not 
advise my clients to include an arbitration clause in their contracts as arbitration in 
Jordan is not trustworthy. The weakness o f the courts is also due to the lack o f 
qualifications and expertise, but in court there are three stages to correct any 
mistakes and ensure justice, unlike arbitration. ”
As seen, there are mixed feelings among Jordanian arbitrators in relation to 
arbitration and the Jordanian courts. While there are strong supporters of arbitration, 
others prefer the courts, but the majority do not favour either completely. A number 
of arbitrators decide on whether they refer a case to arbitration based on the value of 
the claim or its complexity. It seems there is a consensus that arbitration is not 
suitable for all types of cases. The most unified criticism from the arbitrators is the 
court-like manner of arbitration, which I submit is caused by the Western model of 
arbitration. In the next chapter, I paint a picture of how the Jordanians resolve their 
disputes in modem Jordan by using wasta, which is in itself changing.
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Chapter Seven 
Informal Dispute Mechanisms
“Tribal society and tribal ethic is still alive and well in Jordan, albeit 
obviously not in the same physical form that it was a century ago or even 
half a century ago...the tribes of Jordan still consider themselves as 
such... ’you can take the Arab out of the desert, but you cannot take the 
desert out of the Arab.’”1
The formal institutions in Jordan in the form of arbitration and the courts are a fair 
representation of the Western influence on the Jordanian legal and dispute resolution 
systems. However, despite the perceived adoption of Western models of commercial 
arbitration in particular and dispute resolution in general, Jordanian people and 
culture are still very much tribal, with deeply embedded heritage and customs. The 
modem interaction of the tribal traditions with the Western model is looked at in this 
chapter. This chapter represents Jordanian rationalities of dispute resolution and 
transaction formation in the form of wasta. It also shows the modem use of third 
party intervener and the tensions between the two rationalities.
7.1 Wasta and the Tribes
At the turn of the Twenty-first Century, the population of Jordan was five million 
people, of which a quarter come from nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes; at least 
350,000 are Jordanian Bedouins and 650,000 semi-nomads. Added to this, another 
30% of the population are settled Jordanian tribes of East bank origin. This means 
according to Princess Ghazi bin Muhammad , a former Advisor to the King on Tribal 
Affairs, the majority of the population of Jordan is still tribal, even to this day. In 
modem Jordan, there are strong national institutions as well as countless social 
customs, ranging from individual tribal accents and gestures, eating with one’s hands 
and wearing traditional Arabic clothes, to openly wearing weapons and engaging in 
blood feuds. There are institutions that are particularly reserved to the Bedouin and
1 G. bin Muhammad, The Tribes o f Jordan: At the Beginning o f the Twenty-first Century, (Jordan: 
Jamlyat Turath al-Urdun al-Baql, 1999), 20
2 ibid
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desert tribes, such as distinct voting districts and certain seats in parliament. The 
Desert Police Legion is composed entirely from Bedouin and semi-nomads and there 
is a ministerial-level post of “Advisor to H.M. the King for Tribal Affairs”, usually 
filled by a member of the Royal Family itself or by a Sharif who is traditionally 
responsible for the conditions of the tribes and advises the King on tribal matters, 
while promoting their interests within government. Tribal sheikhs are recognised by 
royal decrees. The government has allocated special scholarships and projects 
specifically for the tribes in order to improve conditions and deal with any specific 
desert related problems and issues.
Tribal heritage is not just genetic, it is a way of life where “a person and his/her tribe 
think the same way; believe in the same principles; assimilate the same values and 
ethos; act according to the same unique rules and laws; respect the same hereditary 
sheikh; live together; migrate together; defend each other; fight together and die 
together. In short, it is the consciousness of belonging to that tribe and behaving 
accordingly.”4 This consciousness and pride is still very much alive among the 
Jordanian people and every member of the tribe recognises the history of his tribe 
and knows that ‘if push comes to shove’, the tribe will defend him and stand by him 
in times of crisis or personal adversity. This applies equally to “westemalized 
individuals from old settled tribes who will fall back on modes of behaviour and 
considerations that are entirely tribal...a former minister and Chancellor of a 
University whose entire higher education had taken place in the West thought his 
brother was murdered and as a result was considering a blood feud.”5
Even though state authority struggled at first in winning over the loyalty of the tribes 
and endured rebellions during 1920s and 1930s, it eventually succeeded on turning 
the tribes around as described in chapter 5. Prince Abdullah’s Hashemite religious 
legitimacy helped considerably in winning over the tribes, as well as a number of 
practical and well-thought through measures such as a policy of generous 
governmental concessions and the Emir befriending the sheikhs as a strategy of
3 A Sharif is a Hashemite also descended from the Prophet Muhammad and thus paternally related to 
the Royal Family
4 n 1 above, 13
5 nl above, 17
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uniting or isolating them depending on the situation. All of which aided him in his 
quest to secure good relations with the tribes. Also, recruiting a large number of 
tribesmen into the army not only produced an excellent army, but extended the 
loyalty of those men to the state and its authority. Vatikiotis argues that the army 
created the state, “the army was a vehicle and an instrument for the pacification and 
integration of a predominantly tribal society into a state to whose central authority 
the tribes became responsive and to whose administrative control they became 
subjected.”6 Thus, the tribes played a central role in the construction of the Kingdom 
of Jordan.
According to Ayubi7 the system recognised the “traditional authority networks” of 
the Bedouin and has incorporated them within the state structure. The result is 
“bedoucracy” with its emphasis on family and kin relationships or “petro- 
bedoucracy”. Bureaucracy co-exists with kinship and further it could be argued that 
it is held together through patronage. “Patronage is an integral part of informal
o
politics or more accurately of an informal system of influence.” It is not an 
overstatement to assert that the right family name in Jordan is a resource of its own 
right. The politics of sociability and personalised mediation are essential to Jordanian 
society. In the past an individual would go to a tribal sheikh or notable with his 
request, yet as the state developed, it “preserved the system, but increasingly 
extended [its] influence over the ability of the old leaders to satisfy individual 
requests.”9 In this way, patronage has become institutionalised within the state, 
whereby “webs of personal connections...constitute the basic sinews of the social 
system.”10
The family, the tribe and the village constitute the significant units within which 
social life is lived and circles of relationships are built. In this pattern, politics
6 P. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study o f the Arab Legion 1921-1957, (London: 
Cass, 1967), 5
7 N. Ayubi, “Arab Bureaucracies: Expanding Size, Changing Roles” in Dawisha and Zartman (ed.) 
Beyond Coercion- The Durability o f the Arab State, (London: Croom Helm publications, 1988), 31
8 S.H. Fathi, Jordan: An Invented Nation? Tribe- State Dynamics and the Formation o f National 
Identity, (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient- Institute, 1994), 185
9 P. Robins, Jordan to 1990- Coping with Change, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Special 
Report No. 1074, December 1986), 13
10 J.A. Bill and C. Leiden, Politics Leadership: Towards a General Analysis, (London: Sage 
publications, 1987), 75
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becomes less a matter of principles and issues of allegiance given or withdrawn on 
the basis of attitudes towards the personality of the individual leader. People turn to 
the figure most able to help them and their families personally, to lend money, 
provide food when it is scarce, give employment and act as an advocate before 
higher authority. The patron -  follower relationship remains a basic factor in 
Jordanian life.
Tribes remain important social and cultural categories, having adapted to new 
realities and transformed in the face of them. Moreover, in the course of this process, 
the tribal population of Transjordan has become the backbone of the Hashemite 
regime and among the most enthusiastic supporters of the kingdom. Even today, 
tribal identities, though significantly modified since the days of the Mandate, 
continue to play a major role in Jordanian politics. Scholars of modem Jordan have 
acknowledged the special relations between the tribes and the Hashemite monarchy. 
They have also emphasized the centrality of tribes and tribal political culture in 
contemporary Jordan.
The tribes in Jordan have managed to hold on to their traditions, thus, making these 
traditions very much part of the Jordanian way of life. The tribes have also sustained 
their own dispute resolution system, which is still used when a crime of blood, such 
as murder or rape, is committed. The Jordanian criminal law system runs parallel to 
tribal justice. Antoun states “the process of consensual ad hoc conflict resolution 
within the context of wide ranging social networks”11 is simply how disputes are 
resolved.
The family in Jordan is the primary agency for economic cooperation, social control 
and mutual protection. The first loyalty of the individual is to his family, on whose 
wealth, welfare and reputation his own depends. Prescriptions relating to family 
obligations, marriage and the defence of family honour are binding and there is a 
strong tradition of kin solidarity which antedates the advent of Islam. Deep family 
loyalty manifests itself in business and public life no less than in domestic matters. 
Within the family, sons are not only economically dependent on their father, but they
11 R. Antoun, “Civil Society, Tribal Process, and Change in Jordan”, Int. J. Middle East Stud. 32 
(2000), 441,447
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are socially and politically fully aligned with him and can not make decisions 
without his approval. If a son wants to trade, he can not do so without the consent of 
his father. If he wants to marry, then it is his father who would discuss it with 
members of the lazam and with them is responsible for arranging the marriage with 
the girl’s family. Also, if the son is involved in a dispute, he can not go to the elder 
of the hamula or members of his lazam without his father’s wasta.
This mutually protective nature is taken as a matter of course and kinsmen are to
render to each other special favours and services. Bearing this in mind, one can
understand why King Hussein described his realm as “the big Jordanian family”. One
must note that the Hashemites rule as a family, they express their dominance in a
patriarchal rhetoric brimming with kinship metaphors and they “preside over a body
politic in which households and their influential heads are of far greater significance
10than electoral constituencies, public opinion or individual citizens and their rights.”
The entire Jordanian system is built on the interplay between families, many of them
sheikhs’ families representing tribes. Shryock and Howell point to the origins and
nature of the political system of Jordan “...Abdullah and Hussein built a political
system that corresponds to, addresses and depends on these houses in fundamental
ways: as targets of incentives, punishment and rewards; and cite methods of
1 ^recruitment to public office; and as a means of exclusion from power.”
King Hussein invoked an image of community and an authorised style of political 
exchange that made sense to his subjects. In the 1970s, a new term was introduced; 
al-usrah al-urduniyyah al-wahidah, the unified Jordanian family. In his final years of 
rule, he consolidated his role as national father figure and King Abdullah II has 
managed to continue his father’s language of political kinship. Shryock and Howell 
argue that Jordan’s identification with a household is an idea officially endorsed by 
the Hashemites. Jordan’s politics and Jordanian society as a whole is best analysed, 
according to Shryock and Howell, as a manifestation of “house politics”, a mode of
12 A. Shryock and S. Howell “Ever a Guest in Our House: The Emir Abdullah, Shaykh Majid Al- 
Adwan, and The Practice of Jordanian House Politics, as Remembered by Umm Sultan, The Widow 
of Majid”, Int. J. Middle East Stud. 33 (2001), 247, 247
13 ibid 266
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domination in which families, the royal one being only the most central and 
effective, serve as instruments and objects of power.
Thus, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan can be described as “an estate made up of 
material and immaterial wealth, which perpetuates itself through the transmission of 
its name down a real or imaginary line, considered legitimate as long as the 
continuity can express itself in the language of kinship or affinity, or most often, 
both.”14 This concept of ‘house politics’ helps us further understand Jordanian 
society and the role tribal heritage plays to this day.
The tribal system makes the socioeconomic setup tightly knit and based on wasta. 
The sons of the tribes are socialised to refer to their leaders in order to help them 
resolve disputes. This is built into their attitudes from an early age. The youngster 
refers to his father to resolve problems between him and his family or relatives. 
Thus, the father is his wasta or mediator between him and his relatives. As the child 
gets older, he will start to refer also to the elders in his family whether they are 
uncles or cousins, thus everyone is very used to helping each other. At times of 
crisis, everyone rallies round their tribal son, referred to as fazaa. As seen in chapters 
five and six, tribesmen are familiar with what is considered to be arbitration or 
wasta; the arbitration of the father for his sons, in addition of relatives and also the 
sheikh for the members of his tribe. Usually, only when disputes are complex and 
serious will tribal members refer the matter to their sheikh. There are certain 
traditions and customs that have special status and are considered sacred, which has 
led to their survival with little change.
“Almost all economic and political transactions in the country are based on tribal 
networking.”15 If anything is clear, it is the fact that “the seeds for later wasta” were 
planted at the time of the formation of the Kingdom. Wasta was a central dimension 
in the formation of the Kingdom. Robert and Sarayrah argue that the tribal sheikhs 
were very much involved at the time when Prince Abdullah was trying to build the 
nation and in the affairs of government, including in the appointment of tribal
14 C. Levi-Strauss, The Way o f the Masks, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1983)
15 M. Hammami “Political Uncertainly, Investment Decisions and Development Policy Implications”, 
Workshop: Research Bank on the World Bank, Monday, September 18, 2006, Singapore, 12 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/exteu/SharePapers.nsf7($air)/4A0BF1733A82700B852571FD004CBA 
D9/$File/HAMMAMI.PDF
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members to government jobs and army positions. Lust-Okar argues that "the 
economic dependency of the predominately Transjordanian areas makes these 
citizens more likely to strengthen their ties to the government, mediated through 
wasta”16 The tribes started to function as a vehicle for channelling and allocating 
resources and services originating from central government and thus became 
dependent on it. When the Jordanian bureaucracy expanded during and after the 
1960s, an agency head would fill positions with employees from his extended family 
or region and then his successor will fire these employees and replace them with his 
own relatives. Nowadays, “the appointment of kinfolk continues but in a modified 
form”17 rather more subtly. For example, a minister may exchange appointments 
with another or appoint someone from another family to prevent his own being fired. 
This reciprocity widens the network of family influence and allows the tribes to 
remain the dominant political and social unit.
The stability of the Hashemite monarchy depends on the Palace’s ability to manage
state resources in the face of competing interests. Jordan is an arid land and the
1 8majority of its resources come from aid provided by the US to maintain a pro- 
Western stance. These resources are mainly distributed among tribal elites to obtain 
political support, “because it relies on mediating competitions over state resources, 
the regime restricts access to resources, reinforcing the roles of societal elites who 
can provide points of access.”19 Thus, wasta is vital for manoeuvring in the public 
sphere and indeed vital for the success of a wide variety of activities, no matter how 
simple, such as obtaining a driving licence or renewing one’s passport. Wasta 
ensures that governments continue to reflect the family and tribal relationships. 
Elders cooperate and compete to maximise self and family interest.
The origin of the concept of wasta comes from the tribal heritage of the country, 
which was systematically and carefully interwoven into the fabric of the Kingdom as
16 E. Lust-Okar “Reinforcing Informal Institutions Through Authoritarian Elections: Insights from 
Jordan” unpublished, 6
17 R.B. Cunningham & Y. K. Sarayrah, Wasta: The Hidden Forces in Middle Eastern Society, 
(London: Praeger, 1993), 10
18 Jordan receives more than $1,696 billion from the US in cash assistance from 1997 to 2005 alone, in 
addition to development projects and expert assistance within government ministries. US provide 
three-quarters of Jordan’s aid. “USAID Jordan: Cash Transfer” at
www.usaidiordan.org/sectors.cfin?inSector=23
19 n 16 above 5
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described in chapter five. A large part of this notion is related to dispute resolution, 
which centres on collective bargaining and lasting relations, as outlined in chapter 
six. Wasta is a melange of networks; collectivism, patronage, support, mutual 
benefits and dispute resolution that maintain all these things. The fact is; “The wasta 
system is generalised in the society and performs important functions within the 
family and clan as well as outside it. One needs wasta in order not to be cheated in 
the market place, in locating and acquiring a job, in resolving conflict and legal 
litigation, in writing court decisions, in speeding governmental action and 
establishing and maintaining political influence, bureaucratic procedures, in finding a 
bride.” Wasta is at the heart of Jordanian society and helps to ensure the survival of 
the tribal identity.
7.2 Wasta in Modern Jordan
Wasta’ means, literally the middle and is associated with the verb yatawassat, to 
steer parties towards a middle point or compromise. Wasta refers to both the act and 
the person who mediates or intercedes.21 Wasta has been an institutional part of 
Jordanian society since its creation. Its tribal origins centered around an intermediary 
role that is associated with prevention of retaliation in inter-personal or inter-group 
conflict. However, wasta has evolved from conflict resolution as a means of survival 
to intercession to maintain one’s place of honour within contemporary Jordan. 
According to Cunningham and Sarayrah, “wasta seeks to achieve that which is 
assumed to be otherwise unattainable by the applicant. In recent years, wasta as 
intercession has become prominent, particularly in seeking benefits from 
government.”22
The more modem face of wasta is this intercessory wasta that involves a protagonist 
intervening on behalf of a client to obtain an advantage for that client. Many 
individuals, supported by their wasta backers, may be seeking the same benefit. 
When the seekers for a benefit are many and the opportunities are few, only aspirants
20 S, Farouson, “Family Structure and Society in Modem Lebanon”, in L. Sweet, (ed), Peoples and 
Cultures o f the Middle East, (New York: S.N.,1970), 270
21 n 17 above, 1
22 ibid
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with the strongest wasta are successful. Succeeding or failing depends on the power 
of the wasta. The exact classification of this multi-dimensional concept is very 
difficult. At one extreme of the spectrum, it is a useful dispute resolution notion and 
on the other, it is taking advantage of one’s influence, power and connections to 
attain one’s targets and objects. However, both notions are inter-connected and 
dependant and the common thread is reliance on family and recognition of kinship 
hierarchy.
Wasta has many different facets, but mainly describes personal informal networks 
based on friendship, kin or patron-client relations. Wasta relationships, involving 
reciprocal and co-operative obligations, have expanded to include other significant 
loyalties such as ethnic or religious groups, political parties or social clubs, as well as 
friends and acquaintances. It also extends to private agreements, whereby services 
are provided in exchange for gifts or specific fees. Thus, “the societal value of 
supporting extended family can be overridden by personal interest.” Traditionally 
the family is the basis for intervening to resolve disputes or to seek a benefit, and 
family loyalty remains the foundation of the wasta system in contemporary Jordan, 
whereas other forms of wasta, especially financially motivated ones, are frowned 
upon by society.
Fathi24 refers to wasta as a form of mediation which is widespread in Jordan. Farsoun 
explains that “the wasta procedure is complex, its rules varied depending on the
*yc
sphere and nature of activity whether it is legal, familial and economic.” 
Furthermore, wasta may take the form of formal mediation and interference or it 
could be informal through sponsoring or recommending. At the political level, wasta 
is one of the forms of patron-clientship “with the political figure securing loyalty in 
exchange for assistance in the form of mediation.”26
23 ibid 10
24 n 8 above
25 n 20 above
26 D.G. Bates and A. Rassam, Peoples and Cultures o f the Middle East, (New Jersey: Englewood 
Cliffs, 1983), 245
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Wasta refers to a socially predetermined pattern of social interaction, which is
07regarded as of value in itself. Cunningham and Sarayrah explain that some wasta 
acts are legal and moral within most cultural contexts. The search for wasta, 
according to Pawelka and Boeckh28 does not primarily refer to material gain, but to 
immaterial issues such as an enhancement of social status, the search for 
scholarships, licenses, a parliamentary seat or other advantages and privileges that 
might enhance the well-being or social status of a person looking for wasta. Caiden 
arid Caiden29 say that wasta is not treated as a legal issue, but as a systematic 
practice.
Danet argues that people in the Middle East both rail against wasta and practise it
themselves, making a chasm between verbal expression and behaviour, complicating
generalized societal norms. Sharabi describes wasta as “the lubricant of the 
 ^1
patronage system.” Wasta is used to secure appointments and advancement and to 
influence legal rulings. This is possible by the continuing importance of traditional 
tribal codes of conduct and dispute resolution. Cunningham and Sarayrah explain; 
“Understanding wasta is key to understanding decisions in the Middle East, for 
wasta pervades the culture of all Arab countries and is a force in every significant 
decision.. . .  Wasta is a way of life."32
Cunningham and Sarayrah argue that wasta has changed over time. Patrons who used 
to help their followers mostly for reasons of prestige now seek monetary rewards. 
Also, its main goal has changed from defusing tribal conflict to acquiring economic 
benefits. They identified three categories of request for wasta in modem Jordan. The 
first is wasta sought or performed for family and friends, which activates the oral 
communication network. Second, wasta requests from close friends outside the 
family denote a peer relationship, an exchange system where individuals have
27 n 17 above, 4
28 P. Pawelka and A. Boeckh, “Patrimonial Capitalism: Economic Reform and Economic Order in the 
Arab World”, 25 April 2004, 40,
http://w210. ub. unituebinsen. de/dbt/volltexte/2005/1947/pdf/complete.pdf
29 Caiden, G. and Caiden, N., “Administrative Corruption”, Public Administration Review 37(3) 1977, 
301
30 B. Danet, Pulling Strings, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989)
31 H. Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A theory o f Distorted Change in Arab Society, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988), 45
32 n 17 above, 3
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different skills and abilities, but share a comparable social status. The third, contact 
based w.asta involves people not connected by kinship or friendship. Someone facing 
difficulty in obtaining the desired result through personal effort seeks the services of 
a wasta. There are no fixed rules, but there is an understanding that the wasta 
provider will demand a favour at a future date in many different ways including 
another wasta or political loyalty of backing.
One of the ways wasta is practised in Jordanian society is through parliamentary 
elections. It is noteworthy that Jordanian electoral law prescribes a set number of 
seats for Bedouin representatives. “Politics is strongly focused on personality and 
consists largely of changing networks of dyadic ties. These ties are informal 
contracts between two individuals and are based on mutual expectations of loyalty 
and assistance, rather than commitments to abstract principles or codes.” Thus, 
elections provide an important competition over access to resources. Parliament is a 
base from which one can call upon ministers and bureaucrats to allocate jobs to 
constituents. Parliamentarians receive discretionary funds which they can allocate as 
they see fit in responding to constituents’ needs. As Kilani and Sakijha conclude:
“Parliament, whose main task is to monitor government’s performance 
and legislate laws, is gradually becoming the haven for wasta practices. 
Voluntarily or out of social pressure, parliamentarians’ role in mediating, 
or, in other words using wasta between citizens and the state 
[is].. .becoming their main task.”34
It is clear that the party system in Jordan is weak and it is the tribe which serves as 
the main constituency for a politician. Being a member of parliament, a senior 
administrator, an academic or military officer can guarantee an individual a 
leadership position among his tribe, even if he does not hail from one the sheikhs' 
families. Once in power the occupier of the position is expected to serve the interests 
of his kinship group. His effectiveness in performing this social duty then forms the 
main criterion for his fellow tribesmen to judge him. The predominant social norm is 
that this figure would be expected to be easily accessible and would be asked to help
33 D.G. Bates and A. Rassam, Peoples and Cultures o f the Middle East, (New Jersey: Englewood 
Cliffs, 1983), 244-245
34 B. Sakijha and S. Kilani, Wasta in Jordan: The Declared Secret, (Amman: Jordan Press 
Foundation, 2002), 58
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his constituency handle all sorts of bureaucratic matters. “In fact, he functions as a 
modem sheikh.”35 Patai says that a person in a leading position is expected to use his 
influence to employ as many of his relatives as he can. “This is looked upon as just 
as natural as building up a business enterprise based upon family participation in the 
United States; it has none of the unpleasant flavour of American patronage attached 
to it.”36 The solidarity and responsibility of the group obliges its leaders to exercise 
some sort of supervision and control over the behaviour of its members and to put 
pressure on them whenever necessary.
As well as parliamentarians, Bedouin officers who retired from military service have 
started to build their authority within the tribe in competition with traditional sheikhs. 
For instance, in 1965, retired Brigadier Irfayfan Khalid and retired Colonel Barakat 
al-Trad tried to win the chieftainship from their cousin, the traditional Sheikh Nayif 
al-Khurayshah of the Bani Sakhr. This led to the tribe of Khurayshah splitting into 
two opposing factions over the chieftaincy.
7.3 The Changing Face of Wasta
Despite its deep and legitimate roots in Jordanian culture, wasta today is widely 
stigmatised. A study conducted by the Arab Archives Institute, largely based on a 
pioneering opinion poll in 200037, showed that while 87 percent of respondents 
stressed the need to eradicate wasta, more than 90 percent believe they will be using 
it at some point in their lives. The study detailed four hundred Jordanians, where 320 
were politically active members of elites such as doctors, journalists, lawyers and 
politicians. The majority believed that they need wasta to get business done in a 
government office, with 45.8 percent responding that they would seek wasta before 
beginning their task, and 19.16 percent looking for it after beginning. Not 
surprisingly, some deputies thus complain that the public lacks an interest in public 
issues, turning to the deputies instead only to provide everything from university 
admissions to appointments as ambassadors and ministers. The poll also showed that
35 Y. Alon, The Making o f Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State, (I.B. Tauris, 2007), 155
36 R. Patai, The Kingdom o f Jordan, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), 288
37 B. Sakijha and S. Kilani, Wasta in Jordan: The Declared Secret, (Amman: Jordan Press Foundation, 
2002)
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more than 60 percent of respondents felt subjected to social pressure as a result of 
wasta. Similarly, a German Development Institute survey found that of 58 business 
elites interviewed, 86 percent believed that wasta was important for doing business 
with public institutions and 56 percent of the respondents admitted to use wasta 
themselves. More than three-quarters of 180 low- and middle-ranking civil servants 
surveyed believed wasta was either very important (51%) or somewhat important 
(25%) in order to gain employment in their department.
In 2000, King Abdullah II told a group of Jordanian editors, “I stand against 
cronyism. Everyone who works on consolidating it or ignoring its existence is my 
personal enemy...government should establish a code of honour to put an end to
- J Q
wasta, favouritism and cliques.” Through a high-level ministerial committee on 
corruption formed in 2000 and an ad hoc committee on corruption and favouritism 
formed in 2002, Jordan has started taking direct steps to fight corruption. Again, in a 
conference entitled “Towards Transparency in Jordan,” in Amman in April 2002, the 
King and his Prime Minister at the time, Ali Abul Ragheb, condemned corruption 
and confirmed political and legislative reforms coinciding with reforms in public 
administration, financial and judicial areas, hoping that all together this would 
enhance social and economic justice and transparency.
“We look upon the phenomenon of “wasta” (patronage) and favouritism, 
a public complaint, as another form. While we are proud of our values of 
solidarity, social responsibility and human understanding of others' 
problems, which are rooted in our Arab and Islamic heritage, favouritism 
and patronage infringe on the rights of others, have squandered public 
funds, and deprived some citizens of their rightful opportunities. Thus, 
patronage that deprives others of their rights is incongruent with 
Jordanian values and should be regarded as a gross violation of justice 
and equality that is punishable by law.”40
However, the link between legitimate solidarities associated with wasta and 
corruption remains extremely complex. There remain gaps in the legislation and
38 M, Loewe et al., “The Impact of Favouritism on the Business Climate: A Study on Wasta in 
Jordan”, Bonn: German Development Institute, May 2006
39 B. Sakijha and S. Kilani, Wasta in Jordan: The Declared Secret, (Amman: Jordan Press Foundation, 
2002)
40 Letter of His Majesty King Abdullah II to Prime Minister H.E. Dr. Adnan Badran on Anti- 
Corruption Fight (26 June 2005) on website www.kingabdullah.io
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institutions available to reduce corruption, and the state’s treatment of corruption 
cases is not consistent. Jordanian law prohibits public officials from taking bribes, 
but there are no requirements that they report the receipt of gifts or hospitality, nor 
are there any restrictions on post-public sector employment.41
The eradication of wasta is extremely difficult. It involves Jordan’s political and 
economic elite. Jordan’s economic system is characterised by the duality of informal 
social patterns and formal institutions pertaining to the concept of a market economy. 
Strict hierarchies of power and personal relations continue in many cases to 
determine the success or failure of economic activity. This social norm cannot be 
“wiped clean as if it was a stain on the carpet.”42 Sharabi states “No amount of 
external criticism can change the inner structure of the patronage system, for 
wherever patriarchal relations exist...patronage dominates.”43
Distinguishing the many dimensions of wasta is problematic. From the protagonist’s 
perspective, every wasta use is a legitimate attempt to cut through red tape or to level 
the playing field. As viewed by those who do not have access to strong wasta, the 
entire system is corrupt and wasta is an opprobrious term. It is clear that wasta is a 
double edged sword; some features enhance fairness by softening a rigid system or 
helping the disadvantaged. One the other hand, the dark features of wasta allow those 
with family or financial power to benefit disproportionate; thus the higher one’s 
status in the family, social order or occupational benefits, the better one’s chances of 
achieving objectives through wasta.
The reality of the situation seems to boil down to wasta becoming a taboo word that 
means corruption and cronyism. The truth is that the original functions of wasta are 
noble and should be encouraged in any dispute resolution process. The traditional 
tribal wasta, the sheikh, was a man of honour, whose word was his bond, who would 
assume responsibility for his acts. Today's wasta is too often a middle-man, seeking
41B. Sakijha, National Integrity Systems [NIS] Country Study Report: Jordan 2001, (The Hague: The 
Netherlands Ministry of Justice and Transparency International, May 2001), 5
42 O. Schlumberger “Jordan’s Economy in the 1990s” in George Joffe Jordan In Transition, 1990- 
2000, (London: C Hurst, 2001), 243
43 H. Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A theory o f Distorted Change in Arab Society, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 47
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fame and fortune by doing favours. This form of wasta is spreading in Jordan due to 
the social and economic difficulties the country faces. It seems clear that using 
western political and economic concepts will not cure the difficulties that corruption 
causes.
Sakjiha and Kilani44 explain that the experience of the past ten years shows that the 
issue of wasta had been frequently tackled, but with little effect. This is due to 
several reasons which are constitutional, legal, political, civil and economical. For 
example, the Jordanian constitution places several restrictions on prosecuting senior 
officials and Jordanian laws conflict with each other which create loopholes making 
them ineffective. The fact is that real representation of the people is absent in 
parliament and civil society institutions are weak therefore they do not perform their 
anticipated role in fighting corruption. Also, the private sector’s contribution to the 
economic process is meager and traditions with certain acquired rights may 
encourage certain pro-corruption practices.45
The government has tried on many occasions to deal with the issue of wasta in many 
different ways. For example, King Hussein on occasions appointed cabinet ministers 
who had weak clan loyalties and were willing to ignore family pressures, in order to 
avoid wasta. However, it remained and remains a delicate subject as a significant 
number of supporters of the King believe in traditional tribal practices and feel 
protected by their wasta connections. In the early 1990s, King Hussein called on the 
then Prime Minister, Zaid bin Shaker, to reduce the influence of wasta in hiring 
decisions. This was a response to the high unemployment rate in the country at the 
time, but unfortunately like all the previous attempts, very little was achieved.
On July 30, 2000, the government, upon one of King Abdullah’s directives, formed a 
higher ministerial committee to fight corruption. The committee, under the 
chairmanship of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice, was 
composed of the directors of the Audit Bureau, the Monitoring and Inspection
44n41 above, 4
45 ibid
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Bureau46, the Anti-Corruption unit at the Intelligence Department in addition to the 
Minister of Administrative Development, and the Companies Monitor at the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade. Although, the committee is purely governmental and was 
criticised for its lack of representatives from civil society institutions, it was 
nonetheless an admission of the incapacity of the existing agencies to perform their 
proper role in fighting corruption. The press questioned the reasoning behind 
designating a govemment-committee to monitor the performance of the government 
itself and its institutions 47 Hussein Rawashdeh, a writer in Ad-Dustour, commented 
on the governments’ willingness to fight corruption by saying: “with the exception of 
very few cases, the war of words that successive governments launched against 
corruption did not yield any result. The public would not be convinced now that the 
formed committee...will eventually lead to containing the [epidemic] or limiting its 
spread after it [has become] impossible to do so.”48
There have been other attempts at reform by the Jordanian executive, under the 
leadership of King Abdullah II. For example, on 9 December 2003, Jordan signed the 
United Nation Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and ratified it on 24 
February 2005. In the same year, the King stepped up the fight against corruption by 
directing the government to form an independent commission that is to draft a law to 
combat corruption, explicitly including “wasta” as a target.49 However, the main 
obstacles remain the mechanisms used to ensure more transparency, justice and 
integrity and the creation of the anti-corruption commission as an independent body. 
Anti-corruption efforts in Jordan have thus been strained by failures at certain stages 
over the past few years and these necessitate the creation of a new institution to fight 
corruption and promote reform, especially in the judicial system. Therefore, the Anti- 
Corruption Commission law intended to fulfil a “clear strategy”50 to combat
46 The Bureau is the executive branch’s arm in monitoring the different government institutions in the 
field of fighting corruption. It unveils violations and pinpoints the ones responsible. It also ensures 
that laws and legislation are properly implemented in the civil status field, or government tenders or 
government works. The department does not issue a regular report but its director presents the annual 
work to the press without revealing the details of violations.
47Hilmi Asmar. Ad-Dustour, August 10,2000
48 Ad-Dustour, August 7,2000
49 website www.kingabdullah.io
50 n 40 above
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corruption and prosecute its perpetrators.51 This resulted, for the first time in the 
history of Jordan, in criminalizing the use of wasta.
Thus in September 2006 the government, led by Prime Minister Bakhit, pushed for 
an independent committee that would have absolute freedom to investigate anyone in 
government, including himself and his government. Most deputies opposed him. 
Moreover, when wasta was debated as part of an Anti-corruption Commission draft 
law, some MPs felt that wasta was acceptable if it was being used to help the poor 
and ensure that their rights were being upheld, others argued that penalties should be 
imposed on officials accepting wasta and not those who “mediate to get services for 
others.” At the end of the debate, the Lower House endorsed only three articles out of 
25 of the draft law. Nevertheless, the draft law was passed by the Senate on 27 
September 2006 after endorsing an amendment introduced by the Lower House 
under which the Anti-corruption Commission would be linked directly to the Prime 
Ministry.
This link to the Prime Ministry has fuelled much criticism. Such a move, observers 
say, strips the Commission of its powers and has turned it into window-dressing. 
Hani Dahleh of the Arab Human Rights Organization told the Jordan Times, 
“Linking the Commission to the Prime Ministry means it is no longer independent. 
Executive council officials would receive orders from the Prime Minister, who is 
under scrutiny himself...Apparently there is no honest policy to fight corruption.” 
Dahleh held that the officials at the Commission must be “untouchable” and the 
government should not be able to control their employment.
The Anti-corruption Commission law received the royal assent on 4 December 2006. 
Under this law, an official body entrusted with combatting corruption in the public 
sector will be established in the Kingdom with the name of the Anti-corruption 
Commission. The Commission will have a free mandate to pursue current and former 
officials who are suspected of being involved in corruption. The law stipulates that 
the commission will be autonomous, with its officials enjoying absolute immunity
51 Jordan Times, Monday, June 27, 2005
52 M. Ben Hussein, Jordan Times (Amman) 28 September 2006, 
http://www.mfa.gov.io/events details.php?id=16205
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from prosecution.
The law specifies the level of officials answerable to the law, including the Prime 
Minister and his Cabinet, members of Parliament and judges. Article 8 details the 
commission's duties and authorities, including investigating financial corruption and 
scrutinising individuals who break the law. It also authorises the commission to 
impound fixed and non-fixed assets from suspects and freeze their authority. 
Deputies were critical of this decision. The Deputy Mahmoud Kharabsheh53 
complained: “The government is keen on establishing an independent commission, 
but lawmakers seem not to care.” He then went on to say: “The Commission should 
investigate the activities of the executive authority because billions are being spent in 
contracts and agreements. Therefore, the Commission should be sovereign.” 54 Walid 
Sadi, an expert in international law, believes the Commission is better off linked to 
the judicial rather than the executive. “The manner in which members of the 
executive council are appointed is incorrect. Appointments must come from the 
judiciary, not the government.”55
The law defines corruption as any act that violates official duties and all acts related 
to wasta and nepotism that could deprive others from their legitimate rights, as well 
as economic crimes and the misuse of power. A poll, conducted by the University of 
Jordan’s Centre for Strategic Studies in November 2006, showed that citizens 
believed that nepotism, fraud and graft have steadily increased in both the public and 
private sectors. Over 60 percent of those polled believe that corruption is “rampant” 
within the public sector, while over 50 percent said it had also become more 
widespread in the private sector.56
During a meeting with Transparency International in 2006, His Majesty King 
Abdullah said: “An anti-corruption culture should be instilled in the minds of people 
so they realize that the values of merit, justice, integrity, equal opportunity and the
c<7
rule of law are the ones the community should seek to enhance.” The Commission
53 Balqa, First District
54 http://www.mfa.gov.io/events details.php?id= 16205
55 n 52 above
56 Jordan Times (Amman) 5 December 2006
57 n 52 above
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received several complaints and cases which were dealt with in an institutionalised 
manner, some are still pending investigation, while others have been referred to the 
parties concerned. The Commission is planning to prepare periodic reports on the 
kind of cases it dealt with and the measures taken to address them. The reports will 
also include cases referred to the concerned judicial authority, stressing than any 
person who is proved to be involved in an act of corruption will be held accountable
co
under the law. Only time will tell what is the impact of this legislation is and that of 
the Commission on Jordanian society and the way Jordanians conduct themselves.
The image of wasta may have changed considerably in the last two decades and this 
modification can been seen in the comments of Jordanian arbitrators in the next 
section. Many say that the concept causes many problems in arbitration both 
domestic and international.
7.4 Partisan Arbitrators and Wasta
In Jordan, the biggest problems complained of are partisan arbitrators who are 
emotionally attached to the appointing party and the wasta calls that arbitrators are 
subjected to.
An arbitrator and lawyer who was a member of the World Bank committee for 
dispute resolution believes “the real problem is how an arbitrator could disengage 
himself emotionally, consciously or subconsciously from the party that appointed 
him?”
A seasoned lawyer and arbitrator stated, “There is a lack o f understanding among the 
arbitration community and its biggest product is impartiality. The sense is that once 
an arbitrator is appointed, he is impartial and cannot have any emotional 
attachment to the side that appointed him seems to be missing from the Jordanian 
understanding o f arbitration. ”
58 Jordan Times (Amman) 22 August 2006
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A young lawyer states, “Arbitrators are not aware o f the need for impartiality. Both 
clients and some arbitrators do not understand that when an arbitrator is appointed, 
he is independent and is not on the tribunal to argue the case o f the party that 
appointed him. Some arbitrators actually defend the point o f view o f the party that 
appointed them. ”
A lawyer and arbitrator for over 40 years criticised the understanding of the parties 
of arbitration. He said, “People do not understand that you are not representing the 
party that appointed you. Experienced arbitrators are able to avoid this. ”
A former judge who now works as a lawyer believes, “the party appointing an 
arbitrator sees that person as his representative in the tribunal. Parties usually 
explain the case and try to check the person’s point o f view on the dispute before 
appointing him. ”
A  young lawyer who graduated with an LLM and PhD from London disagrees that 
the partisan issue is as critical as is described by other lawyers. He claims “sole 
arbitrators are better but either way I  do not believe it is a serious problem, there 
are checks and balances within the system itself. ”
A  judge for 25 years who has been a lawyer for 16 years feels, “having three 
arbitrators is useful because each party feels that there is someone on the panel that 
presents their case adequately during the deliberation. This does not mean that they 
are being impartial, but rather someone that understands their points and 
arguments. For a sole arbitrator, the parties need to have a great amount o f trust in 
this one man and it can be very hard to get both parties to agree on one arbitrator. 
However, trust is important whether it is one or three arbitrators. ”
A  large number of the interviewees complained about the pressures wasta placed on 
arbitrators. “As an arbitrator -  the party will ask my friends and colleagues to speak 
to me to explain their points o f view. I  was a sole arbitrator in a case and a very old 
friend o f mine called me who knows the parties. I  want you to be kind to the parties. I  
replied, you cannot say that to me, I  have to make my decision based on the evidence 
and nothing else. He got upset and did not speak to me for a long time. It is
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important that the parties have the right arbitrator that they trust and feel he will do 
his job properly. ”
Some of the interviewees gave me practical examples of how they suffer from wasta. 
An arbitrator and lawyer for 25 years described how while he was writing an award 
after listening to the witnesses and reading all the documents, one of the parties 
attended his office with their lawyer and said: “We want to take five minutes o f your 
time. I  said you are most welcome, but i f  you mention one word about the case then I  
will have to ask you to leave. In another case, I  had to stop the hearing because one 
o f the arbitrators was filling in the gaps o f the examination o f one o f the witnesses. I f  
the lawyer missed something he stepped in to aid him. It was obvious that he was 
helping his appointer. I  said to him I  would annul the whole arbitration and the other 
side threatened to remove him. ”
A possible explanation for the attachment of some arbitrators to the client who 
appointed them could be found in the comments of an arbitrator who got his LLM 
from Harvard and PhD in Letters of Credit from Queen Mary, London. ‘7  got 
appointed as an arbitrator and once you are appointed, it starts -  from one case to 
another. The same arbitration firms just reappoint you. ”
To another this was a major problem. A lawyer for 30 years and an experienced 
arbitrator felt: “Some people find it very easy to appoint arbitrators as they have a 
list o f five to six people that they consider part o f the group and they just get 
appointed over and over again. There are firms that seem to appoint the same 
people. That raises questions. An appointment by a certain firm always leads to the 
same arbitrators. Do you agree with me that this makes it very difficult for an 
arbitrator to decide against that firm as they provide *his bread and butter ’? ”
As this is a very important issue to Middle Eastern entities whether lawyers, 
engineers or clients. Many leading arbitrators have suggested a number of ways to 
resolve this attachment to the appointing party. One renowned Egyptian arbitrator 
and lawyer59 said that the parties agree on three arbitrators and an arbitral institution
59 Dr Yahya Al-jamal Conference Sept 2005
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of their choice choose one out of those three, thus maintaining party choice, but 
severing the direct connection between parties and arbitrators. The Jordanian 
interviewees also had suggestions to help sever any attachment the arbitrator may 
feel towards the party that appointed him.
An arbitrator who worked in Kuwait from 1975- 1990 and in Amman since 1993 
suggested, “An independent body to nominate the arbitrators for both parties. ”
An experienced lawyer and arbitrator in international arbitration recommended: “The 
parties all three arbitrators choose from a list that was compiled between them. Each 
party puts forward the names o f one to twenty arbitrators in order o f choice and then 
the first three that they agree on will form the tribunal. Arbitration will gain 
credibility and would spread further i f  the way arbitrators are chosen is changed. 
However, the parties should always be involved in the choice o f arbitrators. This 
way the parties get a tribunal that they feel comfortable and agree with. ”
A highly respected engineer who has been involved in arbitration since 1966 feels, 
“the parties should have a say in the third arbitrator. ” (who is the chairman and is 
usually appointed by the two arbitrators that were appointed by the parties.) He 
explains “i f  I  am appointed and another engineer is appointed, we put together the 
names o f three (usually) or five (if we cannot agree) lawyers/ engineers and ask the 
parties to choose two names from the list. Usually, at least one, i f  not the two, are 
common between them and in that way they choose the third arbitrator. This will 
increase the confidence in the tribunal and arbitration. ” He went on to say, 
“Impartiality is everywhere and is not limited to our culture. ” He also suggested a 
solution for this problem, “the party set out the characteristics o f the arbitrators 
(engineer, age range, nationality) that they require and allow an arbitration centre 
o f their choice, or where the arbitration has been referred to appoint three 
arbitrators that conform to these characteristics. ”
It is clear that some Jordanian arbitrators believe the choice of arbitrators should be 
protected and even extended to include the third arbitrator. The issue with wasta is 
particular to some arbitrators where they feel that they have experienced pressure to 
decide in a certain way. The strict rules of international commercial arbitration are
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what caused these arbitrators problems. It may be that talking to the parties 
individually could help to settle the dispute, which is an outcome many older 
arbitrators feel should be attempted at least.
7.5 Differences between East and West Embodied in the Use of Wasta
The concept of wasta in its many facets seems to be difficult to grasp in some 
quarters. Some of the difficulty is explained by Pawelka and Boeckh as due to the 
differences between the Eastern and Western worlds. They argue that Westerners 
usually display loyalty towards office, ideology or constitution, in other words, 
towards some abstract value. However, the realities of social life in the Arab world 
do not work in the same way as they do in liberal democracies. “As a result, the 
search for individual advantages or for the benefit of one’s family or one’s clientele -  
something that is usually regarded as self understood and perfectly normal -  is often 
labelled ‘corruption’ by Western authors writing on the subject.”60 They go on to 
explain that this terminology does not capture Middle Eastern realities since it is 
inherently based on the systems of the industrialized countries of the West. There is, 
they say, a strong normative bias against the Arab ways.
“Acting corruptly in a Western context means to deviate from a given 
norm. This norm is so strong that norm violation, if known, is 
considered a crime that will be punished by the judiciary. Corruption 
is thus a term of Western origin with a strongly negative connotation that 
depicts criminal behavior. Quite the opposite is the case with wasta: It is 
a term of Arab origin that does not denote behavior against, but 
according to a social norm.”61
Despite the rapid social and cultural changes wrought by modernisation, the cultural 
profiles of Arab-Islamic societies still differ profoundly from those of the West. 
Although pastoral nomadism has declined rapidly in favour of village- and city- 
based modes of social life, nomadic peoples and their traditions have nonetheless left
60 n 28 above
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a deep imprint on Middle Eastern culture, society and politics.62 Urban professional 
classes have indeed emerged, yet the peoples of the Middle East have not yet 
disposed of loyal attachment to families and distinctive rituals of hospitality and 
conflict mediation. Nor have they dispensed with their flexible and effective kin- 
based collectivities, such as lineage and the tribe, which until quite recently 
performed most of the social, economic and political functions of communities in the 
absence of centralized state government.
Even today, the institutions of the state do not always penetrate deeply into society, 
and ‘private’ justice is often administered through informal networks in which local 
political and/or religious leaders determine the outcome of feuds between clans or 
conflicts between individuals. Communal religious and ethnic identities remain 
strong forces in social life, as do patron-client relationships and patterns of 
patriarchal authority.64 Group solidarity, traditional religious precepts and norms 
concerning honour and shame retain their place in Middle Eastern society and more 
so within Jordanian society. Thus, dealings such as transaction formation, as well as 
dispute resolution are performed completely differently than in the East. The many 
differences are outlined in the next two sections. The way wasta influences these 
dealings is significant for anyone working in the Middle East
7.5.1 Wasta and Transaction Formation
The preference for highly personalised relationships is evident in the bargaining 
process of Jordanians. The process is traditionally the dominant way goods are 
bought and sold in Jordan. A Jordanian finds it natural to bargain in almost any 
situation, thus calling for the two parties’ agreement. One can say that he finds 
security and satisfaction in the ‘give and take’ of the bargaining process. Bargaining 
provides the opportunity for parties to demonstrate their virtuosity and to exchange 
gossip and opinions, as well as arrange a transaction. A sharp and persistent
62 D. Eickelman, The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach, (New York: 
Prentice Hall, 1997)
63 L.E. King-Irani, “Kinship, Class and Ethnicity: Strategies for Survival in the Contemporary Middle 
East” in D. Grener, (ed.) Understanding the Contemporary Middles East, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1999)
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bargainer gains in social prestige, while to refuse to bargain is apt to be taken as an 
insult or gratuitous breach of convention as bargaining is seen as the natural way of 
doing business.
The emphasis placed on the personal relationship is also reflected in the tendency to 
rely on oral rather than written agreements, which stems from the Bedouin tradition. 
Written agreements are employed, but there is a finality about them that is distasteful 
to Jordanians. A Jordanian man’s word is his honour and he is bound by it. Before 
1914, tribesmen and town merchants engaged in commercial undertakings with no 
written documents or signed undertakings as the two parties trusted each other. The 
transactions were made orally usually in the setting of the public guest house. If one 
asked a tribesman how much he owed a merchant, he would say “I don’t know, ask 
him”; without any doubt that the merchant would speak the truth.65
Wasta and kinship ties that are entrenched in society make it easy to distinguish 
between Western and Arabian ways of conducting business transactions. 
McConnaughay explains that the differences between Western and Eastern 
expectations in commerce are that “commercial contracts between Western parties 
tend to include a detailed recitation of the parties’ respective rights and obligations 
(not only actual but contingent), and the parties fully expect to honour and be 
governed by this recitation during the course of their relationship... In contrast, law 
and contract traditionally have not shaped commercial expectations in Asia.”66 
McConnaughay uses the Far East to demonstrate this distinction. I think his 
explanation for this lack of reliance on the law in the Far East applies equally to the 
Middle East, but perhaps for different reasons.
“Unlike in the West, where law is bound up with ideas of deistic origin 
and moral authority, the associational reference for law in most of the Far 
East was imperial or despotic rulers, for whom law served merely the 
instrumental purpose of imposing on the general population arbitrary 
commands and duties having everything to do with the rulers’ 
discretionary prerogatives, but little or nothing to do with private spheres 
of life and commerce... Commercial matters were governed like other
65 B J.B Glubb, The Story o f the Arab Legion, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948)
66 P. McConnaughay, “Rethinking the role of law and contracts in East-West commercial relations”, 
Law and Economics Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. 00-09, December, 2000, 3
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interpersonal relationships, with status and mutual accommodation rather 
than external principles of law or contract shaping and controlling 
expectations and performance.”67
Business relations in the Arab world are not cold impersonal matters governed by the 
general principles of law and of contract in a world apart from home and family. 
Business is a segment of the whole web of friendship, kinship obligation, and 
personal relations that support a particular way of life. Due process of law, sanctity 
of contract and free enterprise based on purely individual rights never became the 
sacred trinities that they are in the West. Whereas Westerners know the primacy of 
law, Arabs know the primacy of interpersonal relationships. Arab commercial 
relationships are ‘relational’ in the same sense that Western commercial relationships 
are ‘legal’. Thus, leading to the paradox that the West has conceptions of discreet 
bounded notions of contract, whereas Arabs have fluid and multi-layered notions of 
the same.
An interesting example that demonstrates how the two sides differ in their 
expectations and practices is described by a lawyer from the Middle East, who had 
just become a partner in a big American law firm. An old friend wanted to entrust 
him with an important case. After the initial telephone contact, his friend and 
potential client invited him to a good restaurant to continue the discussion. The 
firm’s invoicing rules required that the lawyer send him a detailed account of his 
fees. This account detailed the fine details of the ‘professional services’ in the case, 
i.e. the telephone conversation and the time taken by the meal, also the cost of 
sending and receiving faxes. Indeed, in the Middle East it would be unimaginable to 
bill for a first telephone call, and even more so to bill for time spent being entertained 
by a friend or for two pages of faxes. The invitation to lunch was a gesture of 
friendship and gratitude on the part of a person who would offend a friend by 
offering to pay him. From an individualist perception however, nothing is more 
natural than to keep professional activities and amicable relations apart.
The primacy of relationships in the governance of Arab commercial affairs, 
moreover, has resulted in the development of a host of subsidiary values and
67ibid
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expectations opposite to those developed in the West: group interests have prevailed 
over personal interests, situational and circumstantial considerations have prevailed 
over contractual terms and expectations, conflict avoidance and negotiation or 
conciliation have prevailed over all-or nothing adjudication, and custom and usage 
(along with the rest of these values) have prevailed over written law. Further, those 
fundamentally different Arab conceptions of the role of law gave rise to contracting 
and dispute resolution practices that are significantly different from those known in 
the West.
The most significant difference is that the contract records not the ‘conclusion’ of a 
business deal, as a contract signing in the West, but the business relationship’s 
beginning. Jordan and especially Amman is very small and everyone knows each 
other or knows someone that does. Whenever people meet for the first time, it is 
important to identify the person’s tribe or origin from his/her surname. Then, the 
individuals will try to refer to someone from that family or tribe that he/she knows. 
The purpose of this “is to ensure the empathetic anchoring which is essential for 
good business relations.” Also, to some extent, it is the Jordanian way of 
establishing trust. They will try to know someone in the other person’s family, thus 
demonstrating that they are an insider.
Usually, contractual and business partners become friends and possibly relatives 
through marriage. Also, the whole process of business dealing is informal, for 
example before any form of business related interaction occurs, Jordanians will 
exchange polite conversation about the health and well-being of the family while 
they drink coffee to break the ice. These Jordanian particularities are very much part 
of their way of life and are part of their personal and business interaction.
Also, if the dealings are not going smoothly or there are glitches, wasta is used to 
find someone that would be able to sway the other party or help the parties reach an 
agreement. This person is usually in some way hierarchal to the parties; he would be
68 N. Antaki, “Cultural Diversity and ADR Practices in the World” in ADR in Business: Practice and 
Issues Across Countries and Cultures by Goldsmith, Ingen-Housz and Pointon, (London: Kluwer Law 
International, 2006)
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senior in the family or the tribe, in employment structure or religious or political 
affiliations.
This same concept is used in relation to dispute resolution. The senior member or 
members of the tribe or any group that the parties have an affiliation with, would be 
asked to intervene in order to influence the parties to reach a workable solution for 
both of them.
7.5.2 Wasta and Conflict Resolution
Tribal values shape much of Jordanian culture, but in particular conflict resolution. 
Tribal methods of conflict resolution and customary law continue to operate, 
regulating social relations and informing legal procedure. The Tribal Control Laws 
of 1936 served as the legal basis for the Tribal Courts for forty years. In 1976, the 
Laws and the Courts were abolished to allow for the application of one law for all 
citizens. In practice, tribal law continues to regulate social relations in Jordan today. 
State officials, as well as the King, actively encourage it and sometimes act as 
mediators in conflict resolution conducted following tribal custom. Often, formal 
court proceedings are accompanied by an agreement for compensation arrived at 
between the two families through the process of wasta and jaha. Such successful 
resolution has the effect of encouraging the court to be lenient on the offender. Thus, 
tribal customary law remains an integral part of the Jordanian legal system.
The process involving wasta and jaha described in chapter 6 runs parallel to formal 
criminal sanctions in Jordan. For example, if someone runs over another person, the 
court will hold the perpetrator in custody for his protection (and obviously because 
he has committed a crime) in the same form as ja la '. A wasta delegation of elders 
will attend the victim’s family and request permission to bring a jaha to solve the 
matter. They also ask if the victim’s family could write to the court explaining that 
the perpetrator’s family have 30 days, for example, to come along with a jaha and in 
the meantime, they will not seek revenge for their relative. The court then releases 
the driver on bail. Once this is done, the jaha is organised and attempts to resolve the 
matter whether in monetary compensation or another way. A point that is worth
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mentioning is that the perpetrator will not be allowed to enter the jaha negotiations. 
He waits outside until the victim’s family agree o n reconciliation, then he walks in 
and thanks both sides for their efforts. There are two reasons for this; one, having the 
offender in the room might exacerbate the feelings of the victim’s family and two, it 
is inappropriate for someone who is requesting something from another to do so in 
person because that might make the other party feel pressured and uncomfortable. 
One of the jaha’s requests is for the victim’s family to waive ‘their personal claims’ 
before the court. Once the courts are aware that jaha is being organised then the trial 
will be adjourned until the jaha negotiations are completed. Once personal claims are 
waived, the sentence passed will be reduced considerably as the crime could be 
treated as a traffic violation rather than manslaughter depending on the particular 
circumstances of the case.
In a recent case where a police officer was shot dead by a thief he was trying to 
arrest, the victim’s family accepted a truce and the attendance of a jaha within three 
months but excluded the killer from any negotiations. In other words, they did not 
waive their personal claims, but agreed not to seek revenge against any other 
members of his family. They also imposed a condition that the defendant would not 
appoint a defence in court and would accept the death penalty. This agreement is 
quite unusual and tested the system’s ability to resolve matters that could have 
resulted in bloodshed. Thus, the reconciliatory nature of the system was relied upon 
and recognised as valuable within Jordanian society and the legal system. The main 
source of (and aims of) the success of this process is the maintenance of relationships 
and the desire for harmony between the tribes. The elders recognise that one day they 
may be the tribe accepting the wasta, but the next they will be seeking it.69
70Antaki distinguishes two models of dispute resolution mechanisms. The first is 
intuitive and informal and the second is cognitive and formal. He argues that the East 
subscribes to the first and the West to the second model and the parties usually 
adhere to one of these two models. Western approaches to reconciliation concentrate 
on the individual. The individual in the East is enmeshed within his own group or 
tribe. Thus, the ritual of wasta in Jordanian society is necessarily to resolve disputes
69 Interview with a tribal elder and criminal lawyer in Amman, August 2005
70 n 68 above, 266
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and foster reconciliation. It is recognised by the government as a legally acceptable 
tradition of Bedouin tribes that could be invoked in parallel to any official justice.
An American statesman and lawyer, the Honourable Eliot Richardson, has said it 
best in a publication of the Euro-Arab Arbitration System. "To pursue a lawsuit is to 
gamble on victory. To elect conciliation is to seek fairness. Victories undermine 
relationships. Fairness strengthens them. Those who build for the long term would do 
well to choose conciliation." It is not just business relations that need to be 
maintained in the Arab world, family and societal connections as a whole need to be 
promoted and protected, which is more likely to occur through arbitration and 
mediation rather than litigation.
Conflict in the West is accepted as natural and a product of self-interest and
competition which is solvable and leads to stronger relationships and peace. The
71basic assumption, Irani and Funk argue, made by Western conflict resolution 
theorists is that conflict can and should be fully resolved. “This philosophy, whereby 
virtually every conflict can be managed or resolved clashes with other cultural 
approaches to conflict.”72 Whereas Western proponents of conflict resolution 
underscore the primacy of individual choices in facilitated settlement processes, the 
traditional Arab-Islamic approach is communally oriented. Individuals are 
considered to be enmeshed in webs of relationships that must be preserved. This 
preservation of social harmony and the building of consensus sometimes requires 
individual sacrifice. Where the Western approach to conflict resolution is framed by 
provisions of the state's legal system, the Arab-Islamic approach is legitimated and 
guaranteed by the jaha led by communal leaders and village elders, who facilitate a 
process of acknowledgment, apology, compensation, forgiveness and reconciliation.
While the Western third party relies on a secular idiom, guidelines from a specialized 
field and personal experience, the Arab-Islamic process depends on explicit 
references to religious ideals, sacred texts, stories and moral exemplars, as well as to 
local history and custom. Western conflict resolution aims to satisfy individuals,
71 G. E. Irani and Nathan C. Funk, ‘Rituals of Reconciliation: Arab-Islamic Perspectives’ (1998) 20:4 
Arab Studies Quarterly 1,4
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interests and needs through a fair deal that is sealed by a formal, written agreement. 
In contrast, the Arab-Islamic process prioritizes relational issues, such as restoring 
harmony and solidarity and restoring the dignity and prestige of individuals and 
groups. Far more is at stake than the interests of individuals. Disputing families and 
lineage groups solicit the intervention of prominent individuals to prevent the 
escalation of the conflict and the disruption of communal symbiosis. The process is 
therefore completed with a powerful ritual that seals a settlement and reconciliation 
with handshakes and a collective meal.
The scale of disputes and their frequency are greater when the parties do not speak 
the same language and do not have the same perceptions or do not believe in the
H'Xsame values, in other words they belong to different cultures. The choice of the 
dispute resolution mechanism depends on their parties’ culture and also on the time 
and place of the dispute. The existence of a young but clearly defined culture of 
international commercial arbitration which is now accepted, Antaki argues is sealed 
from cultural differences.
Cultural difference and the long present hierarchies of the colonial world engender a 
generalised suspicion on the part of Jordanian parties towards contractors who may 
appear to charge too much or to have done too little. Somehow, such conflict brings 
with it feelings of colonisation, victimisation and inferiority, especially in a country 
like Jordan which shares borders with many of the politically volatile countries in the 
region. There is sometimes a feeling of revenge. Unfortunately, I think these negative 
feelings are exaggerated when arbitration is conducted under the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) with its huge fees that may easily cripple even the 
richest businesses in Jordan. In non-ICC arbitrations, many Jordanian arbitrators try 
to encourage the parties to agree on terms of reference, but this is usually resisted by 
the parties. This seems to be explained by the Jordanian parties need for fluidity and 
flexibility in dispute resolution and commercial relations. The leading arbitrators, in 
Jordan, are in a sense in a difficult situation. They sympathise in some way with the 
Jordanian parties and maybe feel somewhat similar, but they cannot afford to be seen
73 n 68 above, 266
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as biased or partial because they may lose future appointments in international cases, 
which might generate them high revenues.
Anthropologists classify societies according to four main social orders, differentiated 
by the way in which they perceive the cause of a dispute and its resolution.74 These 
social orders are: imposed order, where justice is the expression of an external and 
superior force that decides who is wrong and who is right by virtue of a legal norm; 
negotiated order, where the solution results from the voluntary effort of all the 
parties involved and is the expression of a force within the group, mobilized in order 
to find a consensual means of preserving the homogeneity of the group or the 
continuation of social relations; accepted order, which is based on the self-discipline 
and education of the members of a group for which divergence from the norm, like 
incitement to conflict, contributes to disorder or disharmony; and contested order, 
which is more a ferment of transformation than a coherent answer to the problems of 
society. It seems that Western societies fall within the imposed order paradigm and 
Jordanian society falls loosely within that of negotiated order. Therefore, Jordanians 
prefer amicable solutions that do not disturb the established order.
Certain Arab economic operators argue that renunciation of national courts does not 
signify the acceptance of a new allegiance to an arbitration board, the majority of 
whom are foreigners. “Although certain Arab parties consent, although unwillingly, 
to insert an arbitration clause in contracts binding them to foreign parties, it is in the 
conviction that arbitration cannot be terminated by sentences in terms they would not 
accept. When they discover that such is not the case, they are extremely 
disappointed.” However, it is not difficult to see from the history of the region that 
amicable means for settlement of disputes, particularly commercial disputes, are 
deeply rooted in Arab customs and traditions and have long been implemented in
7practice. As seen in chapter 3, in Islamic jurisprudence, mediation and arbitration 
are considered preferable to litigation before courts of law. Moreover, arbitration is
74 ibid 268
75 F. Kemicha, “The Approach to Mediation in the Arab World”, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation 
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an alternative very near to mediation, in that the arbitrator also assumes the 
responsibilities of a mediator in certain circumstances.
International commercial arbitration finds itself at the very centre of the conflicting 
understandings and historical bitterness engendered in a colonial context. This 
situation is compounded by the contrast between Western commercial interests’ 
quest for certainty and predictability of outcomes and the Arabic focus on sustaining 
relations and a culture of seeking pragmatic solutions to conflict. An interesting 
phenomenon in Amman that was brought to my attention is that a large number of 
arbitration cases between two Jordanian parties are agreed upon after the dispute has 
arisen and has been dealt with in the court process. Most Western lawyers would say 
that if there was no arbitration clause before the dispute arose, it would be very 
difficult to get the parties to agree when relations have became tense. Also, many of 
the parties in local arbitrations give the power to the arbitrators to enforce sulh, the 
amiable compositeur role, thus parties may feel more content and involved in the 
process.
The institution of international arbitration was originally designed purposefully to 
avoid any preordained notion of how differences between parties from different 
nations or legal traditions should be addressed and resolved. As argued in chapter 
two, this design does not seem to work well in practice. This is despite the fact that 
the New York Convention provides a legal framework for international commercial 
arbitration that offers three features critical to the potential accommodation of non- 
Westem traditions and expectations in international commercial relationships. The 
first is the virtually complete autonomy of parties to international commercial 
transactions to design dispute resolution procedures and mechanisms unconstrained 
by the peculiarities of national laws and practices. The second is the assurance that 
arbitral awards rendered pursuant to those procedures and mechanisms will be 
reliably recognised and enforced in virtually all of the world’s major trading nations. 
The third feature, which is critical to the accommodation of non-Westem traditions 
and expectations, is the increasingly unfettered autonomy of parties to international 
commercial transactions to freely designate whatever law or decisional rule they 
wish to apply to their dispute, to the exclusion of otherwise applicable law. In 
combination, these three features of international commercial legal practice offer the
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potential of new paradigms of dispute resolution capable of respecting and 
accommodating the traditions and practices of non-Westem participants in 
international commercial transactions, consistent with the success of the transactions 
for all parties.
Unfortunately like the judiciary, which began as an art and became a science, 
arbitration for a long time remained an art but has also now changed into a science. 
The process has become more complicated and judicialised, now imitating court 
proceedings.77 Nan disagrees “International commercial arbitration has become, 
more than ever before, a multicultural phenomenon. In other words, the cultural 
approach to the conduct or administration of international commercial arbitration 
shared by arbitration users, their counsel, arbitrators and arbitration institutions is not 
the consequence of notions or ideas exclusively fashioned by a group geographically 
localized in this or that country or group of countries, nor does it trace back its
*70
origins to a specific or single legal tradition.” This is theoretically true, but 
unfortunately the reality is very different.
The movement that seems to be developing among leading Arab arbitrators to limit 
the appointment of some of the most respected French and Swiss arbitrators in West/ 
East disputes as outlined in chapter four, claims a clear bias on the part of those 
arbitrators against Arab parties and nations. Arab arbitrators say they experience this 
unfairness while they are co-arbitrators or representatives of Arab clients. My feeling 
is that Eastern arbitrators are exaggerating the situation somewhat, but that does not 
mean that in reality there is no ignorance on the part of the Western arbitrators in 
relation to Arab and Middle Eastern cultures.
Arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution is viewed by many in the
7QEast as a false Western panacea, a programme imposed from outside and thus 
insensitive to indigenous problems, needs and political processes. George Irani 
contends,
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“There is a need to fathom the deep cultural, social and religious roots 
that underlie the way Arabs behave when it comes to conflict 
reduction and reconciliation... Issues such as the importance of 
patrilineal families; the question of ethnicity; the relevance of identity; 
the nature of tribal and clan solidarity; the key role of patron-client 
relationships; and the salience of norms concerning honour and 
shame need to be explored in their geographical and socio-cultural 
context.”80
Antaki promotes a form of dispute resolution that he says is a hybrid system that 
combines the best of arbitration and mediation, serving the international commercial 
community most effectively. He describes the person conducting the procedure as “a 
neutral third party, [who] acts sometimes as a mediator and sometimes as an 
arbitrator without being overly concerned with the traditionally narrow legal 
descriptions. Here, the third party’s personal qualities are more important than the
Q 1
formal nature of his actions.” This is the face of wasta that could serve both 
Western and Eastern parties. The A in alternative dispute resolution (ADR), Antaki 
argues, has become appropriate dispute resolution disregarding the purity of the 
procedure, but concentrating more on the effectiveness of the results, which may be 
the solution to the hostility between East and West and a more effective and efficient 
dispute resolution mechanism for the whole world.
Wasta has many faces and it is clear from successive governments’ measures and 
experienced Jordanian arbitrators that there are faces of wasta that are unfavourable 
and even negative. However, this does not mean that wasta as a concept needs to be 
eradicated, but rather turned it back ‘to its origins’. The face of wasta that employs 
the “principle of mediation as a pre-emptive quality control mechanism can generate 
both effective performance and societal harmony”82 has many merits. Cunningham 
and Sarayrah suggest that some principles of the tribal conflict resolution system 
should be recognised and maintained. They argue that one can make positive and 
appropriate use of the powerful third party and well-connected insiders in order to
80 G. Irani, “Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflict”, Middle East Review o f 
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resolve conflicts amicably. There is a necessity to airing repressed grievances in a 
public arena and thus trade moral condemnation and symbolic goods for substantive 
concessions. Thus creating a society where social harmony must prevail over 
individual interest.
The face and content of wasta have changed considerably over the years, but its 
original spirit of reconciliation and mediation lives on and is used daily within 
Jordanian society in some form or another. Wasta is often misunderstood by Western 
observers and this is one example of the competing rationalities of West and the 
Middle East. In this chapter, I demonstrated the effect and process when Western and 
Arab rationalities meet. Wasta reflects the tribal and traditional solidarity that existed 
in Jordan since its creation and continues to affect any model of dispute resolution or 
otherwise that is imported or imposed onto the Jordanian society.
83 ibid
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Concluding Remarks
“Minds fed on the myths of the dominant culture need to be provoked 
into rethinking their complacencies.”1
The Western notion that SharVah is an unsophisticated, obscure and defective 
system breeds significant distrust within the Islamic world and devalues an 
influential legal system in the eyes of many in the West. The continuing attitude of 
certain Western arbitrators (characterised by a lack of sensitivity towards the national 
laws of developing countries, either due to ignorance, carelessness or unjustified 
psychological superiority complexes) negatively affects the promotion and 
acceptance of the Western model of arbitration. Where such ignorance exists, it is 
unjustified as the acceptance of arbitration in the Middle East is evident. Bahrain was 
a centre of international commercial arbitration before Paris and London and 
European merchants and traders used it in the early 1900s to resolve their 
commercial disputes. Also, in Saudi Arabia* for instance, until the 1950s arbitration 
was the primary tool for resolving oil concession agreement disputes.4 Despite this 
history and tradition, international commercial arbitration in the Islamic world in 
recent history can best be summarized as a troubled or ‘roller coaster’ experience.5 
However, El-Kosheri predicts “the era of a universal, less formalistic “arbitration 
culture”, more liberated from its existing ties with the Western “litigation culture” is 
not far away.”6
The Competing Rationalities as Described in this Thesis
1 M. Abul-Fadl, “Beyond Cultural Parodies and Parodizing Cultures” (1991) 8:1 American Journal o f 
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The title of this thesis is competing rationalities, which encompasses both the 
normative and the practical levels on each side of the spectrum and consists of 
objectives, aims and principles. In each chapter, the thesis examines a specific 
paradox and then contrasts the particular context in order to paint the picture of 
contemporary arbitration in the Middle East. Chapter two, for example, describes the 
international commercial arbitration model that the Middle East, and specifically 
Jordan, stand contrasted with. It also highlights the tensions found in international 
commercial arbitration, particularly in the form of arbitration in the ‘grand old men’ 
style as opposed to the ways of the ‘technocrats’. The model created out of these 
battles, which is adversarial and individualistic, is set in clear contrast against the 
Eastern model of dispute resolution and that in turn informs the competing 
rationalities examined in the rest of the thesis.
Whilst part one of the thesis covers the Western arbitration world, part two describes 
Eastern rationalities and the effect of these on relations in the commercial world 
between the East and West. Chapter three explores the traditional solidarity which 
created the regime of conciliation in the Middle East. Chapter four, on the other 
hand, shows the ‘fireworks’ that resulted, and which are still burning today, when the 
international commercial arbitration model, described in chapter two, was 
superimposed on the Islamic conciliatory model of dispute resolution. The competing 
rationalities in this chapter defines the differences between the written text in the 
form of legislation and treaties and even rhetoric to the reality and true feelings of the 
people in the Middle East. Most of the countries in the Middle East are now 
signatories to all major international treaties, but one can see from the comments of 
the Jordanian arbitrators interviewed that they are not seen in a particularly positive 
light.
Part three of the thesis focuses on Jordan as the case study of a Middle Eastern state 
and a representative of tribal societies which are also strong in the Gulf in particular, 
as well as some areas of Syria, Palestinian, Lebanon and Iraq. Chapter five outlines 
how certain key men in the state of Jordan have used the competing rationalities of 
the state verses the tribe to their utmost advantage. They managed to reconcile the 
two rationalities in order to create the state of Jordan, which they then ruled by 
making the tribes important stakeholders of the system. On the other hand, the
231
competing rationalities of the state against the tribes did not do well when it came to 
formal dispute resolution, even after the demolition of the tribal justice legal system 
in the 1970s. As was seen, informal tribal justice is very much a thriving rationality 
in Jordan and in some situations, such as criminal matters, works in conjunction with 
the formal court system.
Part four of the thesis addresses the formal processes as described in chapters six. 
The Eastern rationality of informal dispute resolution and transaction formation is 
outlined in chapter seven. The criticisms made by the Jordanian arbitrators of the 
court system and formal institutions explain the continued survival of wasta in 
Jordan. At the same time, a certain form of wasta was severely criticised by the 
Jordanian arbitrators. Many arbitrators felt strongly that arbitration was the lesser of 
two evils. The arbitrators highlighted the specific use of arbitration within the 
Jordanian setting, for example, in construction cases where there is a large volume of 
evidence, in cases where there are foreign witnesses and cases where there are 
documents in languages other than Arabic. Otherwise, they were not complimentary 
of the arbitration process, which is designed along the same lines as the international 
commercial arbitration model in chapter two.
One overarching point that surfaced from the interviews was the criticism regarding 
the court-like fashion and strict procedures that arbitration seems to have developed 
of late. Many believe this means the process is losing the core characteristics of 
arbitration. These criticisms outline the difficulty that arbitration in its current form 
(seen as ‘offshore justice’) faces in the Arab/Islamic Middle East. I clearly contrast 
how Western practice and rationality in chapter two and Eastern in chapter seven are 
‘competing’ with each other. This may sound the extreme, but at any point along the 
spectrum, the two worlds are effectively still in competition.
It is not hard to see a world that in ten to twenty years subscribes in some way to the 
norms of India and China, the fastest growing economies on earth. Also, it is 
noteworthy that the hostility towards arbitration in the Middle East has changed over 
the last fifty years from boycott, to engagement, to change from the inside of the 
process or even, in some situations, creating an alternative avenue that subscribes to 
the Arab/Islamic norms. It does not seem unlikely that, with the rise in oil prices and
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the increase in sovereign investment funds in the Gulf States, Arabs may stop asking 
for inclusion and instead create/ assert the norms that the rest of the world may have 
to abide by when contracting with them.
This has already started. At present Arab arbitrators seem to be divided into two 
groups. One group, sponsored by the Cairo Regional Centre which adopts the Arab 
norms and interests, is creating an Arab arbitration ‘mafia’ like the one that existed in 
the days of the grand old men with a few invited and approved European arbitrators. 
The second group is sponsored by the ICC in Paris and the majority of the arbitrators 
are European with a few invited Arab arbitrators included. These two groups 
represent the latest manifestation of the competing rationalities of the arbitration 
landscape in the Middle East.
The Paradox of Competing Rationalities
It seems clear from chapter three that there is a rich legal tradition of Shari ’ah with a 
sophisticated system with its own methodology and mechanisms for evolution to 
meet the needs of contemporary society. The dismissal of Shari ’ah as an archaic and 
irrelevant system is not conducive to Western organisations developing the mutual 
respect required to fashion an inclusive international system. It is not desirable (and 
indeed may no longer be possible) for the West to continue to impose their dominant 
position and values on others and to continue to judge other societies using their own 
standards. The proponents of international commercial arbitration cannot afford to 
alienate people whose experiences, socioeconomic predicaments and 
cultural/religious norms may not align completely with Western conceptions. It may 
not be very realistic to expect that international commercial arbitration rules will be 
consistent with all Islamic interpretations. Yet, given the flexibility inherent in 
Shari ’ah, it is equally unrealistic to expect that international commercial arbitration 
rules and practice will have legitimacy in the Middle East and the larger Islamic 
world if Shari ’ah principles and methodologies are completely ignored or 
undermined. Arbitrators must have an understanding and appreciation of these very 
principles, as well as the cultural and religious differences when determining intent,
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choice of wording and linguistic anomalies, as well as analysing the negotiation and 
drafting of contracts.
Arabic mediation and conciliation forms of dispute resolution aim to protect the long 
term relations of the parties, whereas the court-like manner of strict procedures and 
adversarial style inherent in Western approaches usually result in bitter and damaged 
relations. Contemporary Arab and Muslim societies, even the richest, most 
Westernized or most economically developed ones, remain much more traditional in 
their way of thinking than the foreign observer might imagine. Social conventions 
dictate behaviour and everyday language is loaded with ancient values. It is, indeed, 
extremely rare, almost inconceivable, for legal action to be taken today against a 
business partner, a family member, a neighbour, an employer or an employee without 
it having been preceded by a long period of negotiation and many amicable 
interventions on the part of friends, business partners or other people close to the 
parties involved.8 Traditional institutions for dispute resolution are still very much 
alive in many regions, especially in Jordan. As was shown in this thesis, they are part 
of the everyday lives of Arab people.
The Arabs’ attachment to tradition does not prevent them from following the 
movement of progress. These countries are commercial and trading entities that 
maintain sustained and intense relations with the rest of the world. There is no 
denying that the Arabic-Islamic world is apt to adapt to modem Western life and that 
there is a true marriage of universal civilization in many instances. However, 
adaptation does not signify elimination. Arabs should not be forced to just copy 
Western civilization, since they have their own originality and history. “It is 
necessary to build the bridge between history and contemporary reality... it is 
extremely important for the future of a true inter-penetration of civilizations and 
mentalities.” 9 It is a universal human effort to try to find solutions that are correct 
and satisfying regardless of the name attributed to them. There should not be a legal
7 R. Cohen, ‘Language and Conflict Resolution: The Limits of English’ (2001) 3:1 International 
Studies Review 25, 37
8 F. Kemicha, ‘The Approach to Mediation in the Arab World’, WIPO Conference on Mediation, 
Geneva, 29 March 1996, online: WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/events/conferences/1996/kemicha.html
91. A1 Fallouji (Geneva, Switzerland) comments in the WIPO Conference on Mediation, Geneva, 29 
March 1996, online: WIPO . Arbitration and Mediation Center,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/events/conferences/1996/discussion3.html
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boundary, nor a legal prison. Law must build a bridge between civilizations. Both 
worlds should recognise the other’s differences and use the helpful features of their 
respective civilizations as part of their dispute resolution mechanisms.
Notwithstanding the fact that arbitration, conciliation, settlement and mediation are 
separate words with distinct meanings, in reality they shade into one another and 
settlement is the result of any of these. Therefore, it is a result, not a process. The 
prominent international arbitration expert Professor Neil Kaplan writes:
"There is a long history of conciliation in Asia particularly in the 
People’s Republic of China, where arbitration and conciliation are 
considered part of the same organic process. The Chinese see the 
conciliator, aware of the needs and motivations of the parties, as the ideal 
arbitrator when the parties are unable to resolve their dispute voluntarily.
In their view there is no need--in fact, a lost advantage-to have different 
people serve as conciliator and arbitrator. In the West, however, 
conciliation and arbitration are viewed as two very different procedures.
It is unthinkable that an arbitrator, in the course of his or her arbitration, 
would switch hats to act as a conciliator and, should the attempt at 
conciliation fail, continue with the arbitration. Parties would be reluctant 
to put all their cards on the table before a conciliator knowing that the 
same person may, in the end, arbitrate their dispute."10
In some way, the Arab/Islamic procedure falls in the middle of these two positions. 
In fact, the combination of arbitration and conciliation or the use of conciliation or 
mediation in arbitration has been endorsed not only in the East, but also in many 
parts of the West, for example in Germany. Combining both arbitration and 
mediation together creates “an ADR dynamic that makes the whole a more effective 
force than the sum of the two components used individually.”11 It maybe that only 
some elements of mediation could be introduced into the arbitration process, which 
could bring considerable improvement by promoting settlement and possibly 
increased satisfaction resulting from this.12 Hoellering contends “while its 
[mediation] combination with arbitration can take on different forms...it continues to
10 N. Kaplan, “HKIAC’s Perspective on Arbitration and Conciliation Concerning China”, in A. J Van 
den Berg, New Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration and Beyond, (The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International, 2005)
11 J. P. Sanderson, Innovative Dispute Resolution: The Alternative, (Scarborough: Carswell, 1994), 6
12 M. E. Schneider “Combining Arbitration with Conciliation”, in Van den Berg (ed.), International 
Dispute Resolution: Towards an International Arbitration Culture, International Council for 
Commercial Arbitration Congress Series, No.8 (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1998)
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be conventional wisdom that arbitration and mediation operate best when employed
•  •  1  ^ •as separate processes, since each has its own purpose and ultimate morality.” This 
issue of combining the two processes is controversial among the Western arbitration 
community, where no real consensus has been reached yet, but it is a matter that 
causes few problems in the Middle East.
In reality, there are a number of common features between some versions of 
international commercial arbitration and the traditional Arab/Islamic models. The 
dominant opinion among international arbitrators who are considered grand old men 
is that “Arbitration is a duty not a career...Arbitrators should render an occasional 
service, provided on the basis of long experience and wisdom acquired in law, 
business, or public service.”14 Some of these elements are also relevant to arbitration 
in the Islamic Middle East. Many of the arbitrators in the region feel that arbitration 
is a duty or a service to God. The sheikhs, for example, as well as the community, 
feel that he has a duty to resolve disputes between his tribesmen. In Islam, Allah 
confirmed this duty in the Qur ’an: ‘And i f  two parties or groups among the believers 
fall to fighting, then make peace between them both...make reconciliation between 
them justly, and be equitable. Verily! Allah loves those who are the equitable. The 
believers are nothing else than brothers (in Islamic religion). So make reconciliation 
between your brothers, andfear Allah, that you may receive mercy.'15
In the rare case that a party was tempted to lapse from grace, in either the 
international arena or the tribal structures, “the prospect of disapproval by one’s 
peers [was] deterrence enough.”16 Informal control mechanisms were particularly 
effective among lawyers involved in international arbitration, because they were an 
intimate group of practitioners whether European or Arab, who shared a tacit
1 7understanding of what constituted proper behaviour. It is noteworthy that among
13 M. Hoellering, “Comments on the Growing Inter-Action of Arbitration and Mediation”, in Van den 
Berg (ed.), International Dispute Resolution: Towards an International Arbitration Culture, 
International Council for Commercial Arbitration Congress Series, No.8 (The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Law International, 1998), 124
14 Y. Dezalay & B. G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Construction o f a Transitional Legal Order, (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1996)
15 Surat 49 ‘The Dwellings’, Ayat 9-10
16 D. F. Vagts, “The International Legal Profession: A Need for More Governance?” 90 AM. J. INT’L 
L. (1996) 250, 250
17 n 14 above
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this group of ‘grand old men’ these informal controls still exist. This form of 
compliance extended to the parties, for example, the ICC Arbitration Rules of 1923 
provided only that the parties were “honour bound” to carry out the award of the 
arbitrators. It was expected at that time that moral norms and “the force that
151businessmen of a country can bring to bear upon a recalcitrant neighbour” would be 
sufficient to ensure respect of arbitral awards.
In the West, traces of informality in the arbitration process could be found in dispute 
settlement mechanism organised by closely structured groups such as traders of 
certain commodities. The arbitration system of some the western commodity 
exchanges rely heavily on group solidarity, just like in Arab tribes. The arbitrators 
are in close contact with their respective parties and first seek to reach settlement. 
The principle sanction for failure to comply with the decision is blacklisting and 
exclusion from the group.19 In the past, international arbitration was not that far away 
from this informal model and quite close to the Arab/ Islamic model. Recently, the 
most senior judge in England, Lord Chief Justice Lord Phillips said: “Those who are 
in dispute are free to subject it to mediation or to agree that it shall be resolved by a 
chosen arbitrator. There is no reason why principles of sharia law or any other 
religious code should not be the basis for mediation or other forms of dispute 
resolution.”20 Also, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, suggested 
Islamic law could utilise marital law, financial transactions and arbitration in 
disputes.
Bearing the above in mind, it does not seem too difficult to imagine an international 
commercial arbitration model that is less adversarial, but more conciliatory, informal, 
focused on relationships and even culturally sensitive. Collectivity and group 
solidarity are at the heart of Islamic society, especially the ones based on tribal 
structures. These inform the reconciliatory nature of dispute resolution in these 
communities and focuses on long term relations and harmony in order to maintain
18 G. Ridgeway, Merchants o f Peace: Twenty Years o f Business Diplomacy through the International 
Chamber o f Commerce, 1919-1938, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1938), 322
19 n 12 above
20 S. Doughty, “Sharia law SHOULD be used in Britain, says UK's top judge” 4th July 2008, Mail 
online at C:\Documents and Settings\ALRAMAHI\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\OLKlAD7\Sharia law SHOULD be used in Britain says UK's top judge Mail Online.htm
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cooperation. The system is held together by hierarchal kinship and community based 
structures that allow it to function effectively and efficiently.
It is difficult to comprehend arbitration without understanding the identity of the 
arbitrators and how together they form arbitration, making the cultures of these 
players of major relevance to the arbitration process itself. As Islamic and tribal 
cultures are very much part of Middle Easterners, the understanding and appreciation 
of these cultures might help achieve a more harmonious relationship between East 
and West, not just in commerce but in many other fields. Arbitration is here to stay 
as the leading dispute resolution mechanism for international trade, thus by making it 
effective and familiar to all cultures, it will guarantee the aim of all dispute 
resolutions; “justice must be seen to be done”.
This thesis has shown that there are many differences between the Arab Middle East 
and the West as the Middle Eastern party can be seen to have an intrinsic community 
and a collective attitude to conflict, whereas the Western party is probably more 
individually minded and procedurally orientated, thus causing friction between the 
two sides. The distinctions between them relate to the perceptions of conflict, the 
formation of procedure and the status and function of the third party intervener. 
International commercial arbitration is sufficiently equipped to accommodate these 
two norms, if it is used effectively. Many of the features discussed in this thesis 
would improve the international model and allow it to apply more widely to many 
more cultures, indeed the increasing significance and influence of Middle Eastern 
organisations and resources worldwide might force this to be the case.
“Whatever the culture which might prevail at any given moment, there is 
always another possibility, an alternative to understanding and to virtue, 
weaned to the idea that whatever the culture which might prevail at any 
given moment, there is always another possibility, an alternative to 
understanding and to virtue.” 21
21 n 1 above
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